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Introduction
This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of the link between eco-
nomic behaviour and social relations. Sociologists and economists have extensively
studied how social structures affect economic outcomes. These studies have con-
tributed to one of the most successful sociological theories, that is, the ‘social embed-
dedness’ of the economic behaviour (Granovetter 1985). This has allowed sociologists
to understand the performance of firms and markets in various socioeconomic sys-
tems beyond what is predictable by contract enforcement and institutional rules. The
role of trust and social norms to overcome free-riding temptations, as well as the
competitive advantage of contextual knowledge shared by economic actors through
non-purely instrumental social connections, are only two examples of how social
forces might have important economic implications. However, less is known about
the opposite direction of the link between the economy and the society. Here, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that, in certain circumstances, economically-oriented interactions
with their instrumental nature might even trigger expressive social relations, which
might in turn reinforce business outcomes.
Although less is known about the link between economy and society, this problem
is crucial in contemporary complex societies. For instance, the process of globaliza-
tion of the world economy brings a large multitude of people to interact with each
other without necessarily sharing a salient collective identity. Nevertheless, economic
exchanges, such as co-working, professional collaborations or business relations, are
a context where peers can develop relations that go beyond the original instrumental
motives and get expressive value. Millions of professionals around the world col-
laborate everyday on shared projects through internet-based repositories, provide
and seek advice on specific technological issues, contribute to improve collectively-
managed open-source tools. Moreover, companies in knowledge-intensive tertiary
sectors design loose organizational structures to grant employees the freedom to
collaborate with peers and share their expertise. Therefore, understanding how sol-
idarity relations can form without group identity is key to address the problem of
eliciting solidarity in current societies.
For this reason, this dissertation looks at the emergence of solidarity from eco-
nomic exchanges as a crucial phenomenon of contemporary societies. In other words,
this work aims to help answer the question: “Under which structural conditions
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do purely instrumental exchange relations develop into expressive ones that are
valued in their own right?” (Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002, p. 140). In doing this,
we aim to challenge the idea that economically-oriented interactions are necessarily
detrimental for social relations, which is rooted in foundational works of economic
sociology (e.g. Polanyi [1944] 1957). This would be because economic exchange
relations are intrinsically motivated by conflicting individuals’ self-interest. This ten-
sion may yield negative effects on social relations, which instead are often based on
non-instrumental motives. In Polanyi’s work, economic exchange becomes disruptive
when it is ‘disembeddeded’ from social regulation. However, we argue that individu-
als who interact for economic purposes, by experiencing each other’s behaviour, can
indeed develop beliefs on each other that eventually elicit the development of social
expressive relations, even without centralized regulation.
In order to understand this problem, we must first disentangle the subtleties of the
interplay between instrumental and expressive motivations. On the other hand, the
dynamic relational structure that constrains actors’ motives must also be considered.
This requires to study how individuals use the information they have about others’
business behaviour to develop expectations about others’ availability to help them
in other situations. This is the basic mechanism that could help extend a previously
instrumental relation into an expressive one, which may extract social value from the
very first business contact between individuals.
Moreover, this work is also motivated by the idea that stable social systems
can often emerge thanks to actors’ self-organization. Studying mechanisms that let
solidarity emerge from the bottom up as a form of self-organization can help us
understand how individuals can develop efficient informal institutions that regulate
economic and social interaction. These institutions can be even more stable than
those coming from top-down regulation or centrally-enforced norms, which can even
be detrimental in eliciting dysfunctional motives and behaviour (Simpson and Willer
2015).
Essentially, our epistemological approach here starts from looking at micro-level
causal mechanisms to explain emergent social phenomena. This means to explain
social phenomena “not merely relating them to other social facts [. . . ] but by detailing
in clear and precise ways the mechanisms through which the social facts under
consideration are brought about” (Hedström and Bearman 2009, pp. 3-4). Therefore,
the following chapters focus on individuals’ beliefs and motives which underlie their
actions, the dynamic opportunity structure that constrains them and the way these
elements affect each other to bring about new ‘social entities’. This process cannot be
properly understood without accounting for actors’ beliefs on others.
Here, it is important to note that studying the emergence of social relations from
the bottom up requires the use of formal modelling and computer simulations. These
tools are especially useful for a mechanism-based approach to socioeconomic interac-
tions for two reasons. First, they are powerful tools to build empirically-grounded
theories. On the one hand, modelling requires clarity in the conception of social
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entities and mechanisms, which is achieved through theory-driven research design.
On the other hand, it translates theory in a form that is comparable with empirically
observed reality, so that empirical research can truly help testing explanatory hy-
potheses. Secondly, computer simulations of formal models allow researchers to go
beyond explanations of observed phenomena and explore other possible scenarios.
This is achieved by manipulating in silico certain aspects of a social system which
are either difficult to observe in real settings or may occur in the future. It is worth
noting that "future" here has not merely a ‘predictive’ meaning (e.g., knowing the
state of a system at time t = 0 to predict its state at t = 1), but is a way to conceive the
social reality as only one of the possible instantiations of certain social mechanisms.
This means that exploring alternative scenarios can also be useful to understand
the strength of a social mechanism and its possible generalization to many similar
instances in similar contexts.
Passing to the presentation of the work, it is worth saying that this dissertation
has been designed as a collection of stand-alone contributions to the analysis of soli-
darity within economic exchange networks (Chapters 3-5), framed by an introductory
literature review (Chapter 2) and followed by a concluding chapter (6). More in detail,
the remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on solidarity and exchange relations in sociology
and the behavioural sciences. The chapter aims to elaborate a theoretical framework
and working hypotheses for the following chapters. A definition of solidarity at the
behavioural level is proposed and various empirical contributions are examined.
Next, Chapter 3 presents an empirical study on the link between professional
collaboration and social support relations. In this work, certain hypotheses are tested
on a group of independent professionals sharing a ’coworking’ space. The work has
benefited from the feedback received at several international conferences and work-
shops, namely the 3rd Doctoral Workshop in Economics of Innovation, Complexity
and Knowledge (Turin, Italy, January 21-22, 2016), the XXXVI Sunbelt Conference of
the International Network for Social Network Analysis (Newport Beach, California,
USA, April 4-10, 2016), the INAS 2016 Conference of the International Network of
Analytical Sociologists (Utrecht, The Netherlands, June, 3-5) and the 2nd European
Social Network Conference (Paris, France, June, 14-17, 2016). The study has been
submitted to an international journal for peer-reviewed publication in a slightly dif-
ferent version, co-authored by Niccolò Casnici and Flaminio Squazzoni (University
of Brescia).
Chapter 4 presents an extensive literature review of the use of Agent-Based
Models (ABM) for sociological research. Given the key role of this methodology
in this dissertation, the chapter aims to provide a comprehensive account of the
contributions to sociology given by applications of ABM computer simulations.
Moreover, a classification of these contributions is proposed according to the various
methodological approaches to ABM in social research. The aim of the chapter is to
review ABM as a possible means to overcome some limitations of the study presented
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in Chapter 3. A slightly different version of this chapter, co-authored by Flaminio
Squazzoni, has been published in Wiley Interdisciplinary Research: Computational
Statistics, Vol. 71, after being reviewed by two anonymous referees.
Chapter 5 applies computer simulation to study cohesion and integration of a
social support network from economic exchange. In this chapter, an ABM of the
mechanisms observed in Chapter 3 is presented. The model is used to simulate
the effect of competition and resource distribution on social support networks. The
aim of this work is to explore the effects of different environmental conditions and
overcome the context-specific properties of empirical data. The work has been done
in collaboration with Andreas Flache (University of Groningen, The Netherlands)
and Flaminio Squazzoni and has been presented at the 4th Doctoral Workshop in
Economics of Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge (Turin, Italy, December 15-16,
2016). This study has benefited from a visiting period at the Department of Sociology
/ ICS of the University of Groningen, where I was hosted by Andreas Flache. There, I
had the opportunity to take part to the working activities of the ‘Norms and Networks’
and the ‘Social Networks’ research groups.
Finally, Chapter 6 includes a general discussion of the findings from previous
chapters and suggests some concluding remarks.
Coming to acknowledgements, all the work presented in this dissertation has
widely benefited of the support provided by the colleagues of the GECS (Research
Group on Experimental and Computational Sociology) at the Department of Eco-
nomics and Management of the University of Brescia. In particular, I am grateful to
Marco Castellani and Simone Gabbriellini for their encouragement and suggestions.
I am also grateful to Giangiacomo Bravo, who hosted me for a brief visiting period
at the Linnaeus University in Växjö, Sweden. Finally, I would like to devote special
thanks to Niccolò Casnici, with whom I have been fruitfully collaborating and sharing
my office.
This work has greatly benefited from a visiting research period at the University
of Groningen. I am very thankful to my host, Andreas Flache, for his great dedication
and support to explore innovative ideas. For their hospitality, precious feedback and
engaging discussions, I would like to thank Thomas Feliciani, Francesca Giardini,
Michael Mäs, Nynke Niezink, Tom Snijders, Gert Stulp and the members of the
’Norms and Networks’ research cluster. A special mention goes to Lucas Sage, my
office mate.
The evolution of this work has profited by the several opportunities of discussion
provided by the ’project colloquium’ seminars of the PhD programme in Economic
Sociology and Labour Studies. I would like to thank the faculty and my colleagues for
providing me valuable feedback and suggestions. In particular, Andrea Maniscalco
has never missed the opportunity of a lively debate. I am also thankful to other
fellow PhD students within and outside the NASP (Network for the Advancement
1. See Federico Bianchi and Flaminio Squazzoni (2015) “Agent-Based Models in Sociology”, Wiley
Interdisciplinary Research: Computational Statistics, 7: 284–306, doi: 10.1002/wics.1356
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of Social and Political Studies) for sharing some difficult moments and developing
common projects: Cristina Cavallo, Iraklis Dimitriadis, Alessandro Fasani, Marco
Fregoni, Martina Panzarasa, Matteo Piolatto, Mirele Plenishti, Gianluca Pozzoni. This
work has also benefited by comments and suggestions by colleagues and mentors at
the University of Turin. In particular, Filippo Barbera, who encouraged the original
design of this work, Davide Barrera and Pietro Terna.
This work would not have been possible without the support provided me by
Talent Garden srl, thanks to Lorenzo Maternini, Vice President Corporates & Partners
Relations. My special thanks go to Elisa Remondina, Head of Campus in Talent
Garden Brescia, who helped me perform an insightful fieldwork. Her role for securing
full participation to the survey presented in Chapter 3 has been decisive.
Finally, while working at this dissertation I had the chance to work within the
framework of the ‘PEERE - New Frontiers of Peer Review’ EU-COST Action TD1306
project. In the project, I have applied ABM computer simulations to study the in-
terplay between strategic behaviour and social relations in peer-reviewed scientific
evaluation. First, I studied the impact of the number of reviewers on the efficiency
and quality of peer review. This work has been selected through peer review for a
talk at the 2015 Winter Simulation Conference (Huntington Beach, California, USA)
and published in the conference proceedings2. Secondly, I analysed how behavioural
heterogeneity of scientists affect the peer-review system through resource allocation
between publishing and reviewing. This work, co-authored with Francisco Grimaldo
Moreno (University of Valencia, Spain), Giangiacomo Bravo and Flaminio Squazzoni,
is currently under revision in Scientometrics. Finally, in another work I have compared
quality and efficiency of open and confidential peer review systems assuming sci-
entists’ strategic behaviour. This work, co-authored with Flaminio Squazzoni, has
been presented in several conferences and is currently in progress. Furthermore, the
PEERE project has given me the tremendous opportunity to participate at regular
group meetings in different European countries (Croatia, Greece, Spain, Switzerland)
and work in team with brilliant scholars of different disciplines. After various consid-
erations, we decided not to include these works in this dissertation. Although they
revolved around a similar ‘broad tent view’ theme, i.e., the interplay of instrumental
and expressive motivations in social behaviour, we thought that the coherence of this
work would have been probably compromised by including also these works.
Last but not least, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Flaminio Squazzoni,
for supporting me in ways that exceed what is to be expected by a good mentor. I
am especially thankful to him for granting me the freedom to pursue my scientific
interests while providing me the help I needed. Thanks to him I have learnt that
science is mostly hard work that cannot be done without a collective effort.
2. See Federico Bianchi and Flaminio Squazzoni (2015), “Is Three Better than One? Simulating the
Effect of Reviewer Selection and Behavior on the Quality and Efficiency of Peer Review”. In: L. Yilmaz,
W. K. V. Chan, I. Moon, T. M. K. Roeder, C. Macal, and M. D. Rossetti (eds.), Proceedings of the 2015 Winter
Simulation Conference, IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, pp. 4081–4089. doi: 10.1109/WSC.2015.7408561.
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Solidarity and Social Exchange
The problem of solidarity is as old as sociology is. In everyday life, we typically find
material or emotional support in our closest social groups. We may ask our families
or relatives, our inner circle of friends, or we may turn to strangers with whom we
share some sort of collective identity. Nevertheless, solidarity can often be found in
other situations. In fact, previously unacquainted people sometimes provide each
other material resources or emotional help in such a way that a new group of mutual
support can emerge.
In current times, the internet has allowed a multitude of people to share resources,
without having any group identity. Yet, previously unacquainted individuals develop
everyday stable and successful collaborative relationships. For example, consider
that now increasingly large shares of the labour force of industrialised countries
are freelance workers, who might share their competencies with others on specific
projects. In these cases, people coordinate their self-related interests towards a shared
goal, often without being compelled by any hierarchical organizational structure.
Interacting for economic purposes is key for unrelated individuals to establish
relations that eventually go beyond instrumental motivations. Unfortunately, the
social sciences have mainly focused on the other direction of the link, namely the
effect of social resources on economic outcomes.
This chapter presents a literature review on the social mechanisms of solidarity
among different individuals. Special attention is devoted to understand how solidar-
ity emerges between people who do not necessarily share a salient collective identity.
Here, it is important to note that, given that our aim is to study the emergence of
solidarity beyond specific normative, organizational or hierarchical structures, we
did not consider the effect of norms and rules. Therefore, this review revolves around
relational mechanisms1 of solidarity rather than institutional or normative contexts.
Section 2.1 suggests a definition of social solidarity, by reviewing both classical
and recent contributions in sociological theory. The aim is to elucidate behavioural
properties of solidarity at the dyadic level. By following the durkheimian concept
1. Simpson and Willer (2015) have classified the social mechanisms of prosocial and cooperative
behaviour into three main categories: a) "rules", i.e. "prevailing norms and their enforcement", b)
"reputations", i.e. "the perceptions and rank of individuals in groups", c) "relations", i.e. "the character
and structure of relations connecting individuals" (p. 44).
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of ’mechanical solidarity’, Section 2.2 briefly presents experimental and observa-
tional evidence about cooperation among individuals who happen to share certain
socio-demographic traits or the membership to a social group. Here, evidence is
mainly drawn from literature in sociology, cognitive and social psychology and other
behavioural sciences. Section 2.3 introduces some concepts about various forms of
exchange within the Social Exchange Theory paradigm. Section 2.4 reviews experimen-
tal literature in sociological social psychology about mechanisms which bring about
commitment, relational cohesion and solidarity within networks of social exchange.
A special emphasis is given to two competing theories of the emergence of solidarity,
namely the Affect Theory of Social Exchange (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008) and the
Reciprocity Theory of Solidarity (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007). Section 2.5 reviews
sociological literature on social networks and suggests the need for empirical research
on multiplex social networks that bridges Social Exchange Theory and empirical
social network research. Finally, Section 2.6 discusses our conclusions by identifying
some critical points in the literature, which are addressed in subsequent chapters.
2.1 What is solidarity?
Although rooted in the classic foundations of sociological science (see f.i. Durkheim
1984 [1893]), defining social solidarity is still an open analytical task for social research.
Moreover, despite the prominent position of solidarity in the history of sociological
research, there has been little attention to examine the conditions that generate
solidarity among unrelated individuals. Therefore, there is still no convincing theory
of the stability of social solidarity. In fact, sociological theory cannot account as to
why solidary groups emerge from the interaction of dissimilar individuals, nor does
it provide theories on the structural reasons for the fragility of solidarity bonds. As it
has been noted by Lindenberg (1998), this depends on the lack of understanding of
what constitutes solidary behaviour, i.e., the microfoundations of social solidarity.
The way sociological theory has conceived ’social solidarity’ has been influenced
by the classical durkheimian conception (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 2002). In La
division du travail social, Émile Durkheim looked at this problem while discussing
mechanical and organic solidarity. While the former is based on similarity of group
members’ traits and characteristics via psychological attraction (’vitality’, see Lin-
denberg 1998), the latter depends on the structural interdependence of differences
created by the economic division of labour.
Unfortunately, the classical durkheimian theory does not provide a microfounda-
tion for solidarity that goes beyond the distinction between mechanical and organic
relations (Markovsky and Lawler 1994). Such a dychotomy continued also after
Durkheim. Indeed, sociological theory has tended to focus on either an emotional,
similarity-based or a utilitarian, rational-choice explanation of group formation.
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Following Homans (1950), Fararo and Doreian (1998, p. 16) distinguished four
distinct ways to analyse solidarity from a more operational point of view. They
suggested to focus on:
1. sentiment: the affective bonds which unite members of solidary groups;
2. activity: the common behavioural patterns within the group;
3. interaction: the patterns of interaction and exchange which are denser within
the group as regards to the outside;
4. norms: expectations of normative behaviour based on group-level obligations.
This classification shows certain similarities with a narrower one previously pro-
posed by Hechter (1987). According to him, group solidarity could be defined through
behaviour and sentiment. Behaviour referred to contributing with private resources to
collective ends, sentiment to love, fellow feeling, or feeling of brotherhood.
Sociological rational-choice theorists have made significant contributions to un-
derstand the microfoundations of social solidarity. They have proposed a definition
of solidarity as: a) a byproduct of the rational action of actors and their social capital
(Coleman 1990; Lin 1999) and b) obligation towards group norms that maintain social
order (Hechter 1987; see also Heckathorn and Rosenstein 2002; Fararo and Doreian
1998.
In the first stream of literature, the unit of analysis has been shifted to the dy-
namical creation, maintenance and dissolution of ties of social capital (Coleman 1990;
Lin 1999). The main point is that actors strategically create and maintain ties of
social capital in order to secure access to various resources. More precisely, Coleman
(1990, p. 309) argued that rational actors strategically accumulate "credit slips", i.e.
obligations, by helping others. In this way, ego woul bear the cost of providing help
to alter when alter needs ego’s resources. This would create some form of assurance
for a future exchange, where asymmetry will be reversed, so that future benefits for
ego would exceed current costs. Suffice to say here that this conception of solidarity is
highly related to durkheimian organic solidarity, as asymmetry of costs and benefits
are created by specialization, which comes from the social division of labour.
Although pointing at solidary behaviour, thereby providing a more dynamic
analytic framework, this account of solidarity shares a typical weakness of rational-
choice models of human behaviour, due to lack of realism and a narrow conception
of action as strictly related to instrumentalist purposes (Hedström 2005). First, it does
not consider symbolic values (Mauss 1925), which are highly important for a person’s
access to a variety of expressive resources (e.g., emotional support; see Lin 1999).
Secondly, it fails to explain risky effects of asymmetries due to time gap between
the two sides of a resource exchange, which is explored by social exchange theory
(Emerson 1976; Molm and Cook 1995; Molm 2003, see also). Finally, the theory is
limited to unpredictable needy situations and it does not address endogenous or
exogenous sources of fragility.
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An important milestone that looked at the dynamic fragility of solidarity is The
Principles of Group Solidarity by Michael Hechter (1987). Moving from a critique of
macro-level sociological theories, he recognised that, although much sociological
work is based on solidarity, neither normative, functional, or structural explanations
could provide adequate accounts on its social mechanisms. This brought Hechter
to consider the behavioural dimension of group solidarity. Nevertheless, defining
solidarity in behavioural terms was more a methodological rather than a theoretical
choice about the difficulty of measuring sentiment (Fararo and Doreian 1998; Linden-
berg 1998). This led towards defining solidarity as a group-level property, which is
backed and maintained through individual contributions to collective goods, whose
regulation is specified and enforced by social norms. Conformity to norms is here
related to expediency rather than morality, differently from other classical normative
sociological theories (e.g., Parsons 1991 [1951]). Actors will contribute to the collective
good if norms are enforced by effective sanctions. This accounts also for dynamics
and change of group solidarity: If sanctions are not effective, actors can exit the group
and join a more benefiting one, or stay in the group and exploit collective resources
as free-riders.
Although Hechter’s theory deals successfully with internal control of coopera-
tion (see f.i. Fehr and Gintis 2007; Simpson and Willer 2015) and dependency and
external sources of precariousness (i.e., exit temptations), it does not account for the
production of solidary behaviour. Solidarity is conceived only as a group property.
Helping behaviour is completely ignored, since it does not involve cooperation or
collective action per se. Moreover, here solidarity seems to work only if people face
no alternatives and norm enforcement is fully effective. Not surprisingly, Hechter
acknowledges that his theory "does not seem capable of accounting for the kind of
solidarity that is so often celebrated in our own experience" (1987).
This revealed that a sociological theory of solidarity requires a definition of
solidary behaviour that also accounts for its fragility at the group level. To do so,
Lindenberg (1998, p. 64) proposed to look at five solidarity-clue behavioural patterns,
which can be related towards another actor or a group.
1. Common good situation. Ego and alter both belong to a group that produces a
common good. Ego will contribute to the common good even if he/she could
free ride.
2. Sharing situation. If there are joint divisible benefits and costs and if ego is the
one who can divide them, he/she will not seek to maximize what he/she gets
from the benefit and minimize what he/she gets from the costs but take a fair
share of both.
3. Need situation. Ego will help alter in times of need.
4. Breach temptation. Ego will refrain from hurting alter even at a cost to herself.
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5. Mishap situation. Acts can be intended solidary but actually turn out to go
against the expectation of solidary behaviour. In that case, ego will show that
he meant to act differently. If ego knows in advance that she will not be able
to keep to the agreement, she will warn others in advance, so that they can
mitigate the damage.
So, solidary behaviour is not just cooperative behaviour, because it entails a form
of voluntary costly transfer of benefits from ego to alter, without any assurance of
future benefits and with a risk structure entailed by the character of unilateral transfer.
These five behavioural dimensions have some variable costs for actors. Common good
situation implies variable contribution costs for collective good, sharing situation
implies a variable amount of what can be considered as a "fair share" of costs and
benefits, need situation implies variable meaning of needs and variable expectation of
what constitutes help, breach temptation entails a variable minimal amount of cost
expected that has to be borne for not hurting alter.
In conclusion, Lindenberg’s definition of solidary behaviour (1998) provides mi-
crofoundations of solidarity that accounts for a relational dimension. More precisely,
it encompasses a sufficiently wide spectrum of solidarity-related behaviour, without
reducing them to strategic rationality. Moreover, it does not assume the existence of a
group-level norm to which individuals have to comply.
2.2 In-group bias and group identity
In-group bias refers to displayed favouritism towards in-group members in prosocial
and cooperative behaviour and consequent discriminatory behaviour towards out-
group members (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002).
Suppose a game where two subjects are provided with a shared endowment of
resources. One randomly chosen player has to decide how to divide the resources
between himself/herself and the other player. The endowmnent is then split ac-
cordingly. Assuming that the subjects were completely self-interested, one should
expect that subjects decide to keep the entire endowment for themselves. However,
experimental tests showed that players share, on average, between 20% and 30% of
their resources. This game, defined as the ’Dictator Game’, is usually applied to mea-
sure subjects’ other-regarding preferences in behavioural experiments (Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Camerer 2003).
Behavioural research on this game has showed that in laboratory experiments
subjects tend to share a larger amount of resources with their kin (Hamilton 1963), or
their friends and acquaintances (Goeree et al. 2010; Leider et al. 2009; Brañas-Garza
et al. 2010), than with strangers.
Other-regarding preferences can also be biased by shared identities which build
on ascribed categories, such as ethnicity (Whitt and Wilson 2007), religion (Adida,
Laitin, and Valfort 2010) or political partisanship (Fowler and Kam 2007). These
findings confirm observational studies that found that people who are similar in
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age, education, prestige, social class and ethnicity tend to form ties more preferably
among each other due to homophily preferences (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and
Cook 2001). While group attachment can explain prosocial behaviour in strategic
situations (Baldassarri and Grossman 2013), understanding of network effects on
in-group favoritism is more difficult. A set of studies has shown that individuals are
most willing to share their resources with people to whom they are directly connected
or are less distant in their social network than towards more distant others (Leider
et al. 2009; Goeree et al. 2010; Apicella et al. 2012).
These results are backed by evolutionary research. In complex societies, coopera-
tion and generosity among strangers likely stem from a group-level selection process
which favoured prosocial norms sustaining mutually beneficial exchanges beyond
kin-based social relationships. This allowed human groups to reach large-size scale,
which might have driven important steps of the evolution of human societies (e.g.
Henrich et al. 2010).
However, in-group favoritism has been observed not only in cases when group
membership was based on ascribed categories, but also when it was randomly
assigned (Goette, Huffman, and Meier 2006), as well as in laboratory settings where
scholars induced trivial group identities (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Chen and Li 2009).
In this respect, Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides a cognitive mechanism un-
derlying in-group bias. Moving from the assumption that a person’s sense of self
derives from his/her membership in social groups, group identification emerges
from a process of categorisation, identification and comparison in which individuals,
including oneself, are classified into groups by context-specific attributes (Tajfel and
Turner 1979).
However, more recent studies have questioned the robustness of cooperation
elicited in the ’minimal group paradigm’. They showed that in-group biased coopera-
tion in social dilemmas (e.g., Bicchieri 2002) arises when the existence of a common
group interest is clearly perceived by players in absence of inter-group competition
(Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007). Moreover, the group identification hypothe-
sis, which was tested in experimental research, has been questioned, in favour of an
explanation based on group norms built by players within the experimental frames
(Bicchieri 2002).
The literature on in-group bias provides some interesting insights on the emer-
gence of solidarity. On the one hand, experiments of the minimal group paradigm found
that prosocial behaviour is not strongly constrained within salient social groups. On
the other hand, common-sense knowledge is rich of examples of occasional prosocial
behaviour between strangers. Yet, solidarity requires a relational stability that goes
far beyond casual acts of cooperative and prosocial behaviour.
However, given that framing a collective interest is a mechanism that elicits
prosocial behaviour (Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007), then we should expect
solidarity to emerge if individuals learn how to coordinate their own interests with
others’. This can occur while interacting within an exchange relationship.
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2.3 Exchange, commitment and cohesion
In sociology, the relational dimension of solidarity has often been conceived as the
cohesion of a group, i.e., the stability of the bonding ties among members of a group
(Willer, Borch, and Willer 2002; Moody and White 2003).
Some scholars have attempted to study the structural mechanisms that account
for the stability of group cohesion. McPherson and Smith-Lovin (2002) have pro-
posed a homophily-based theory of relational stability, which accounts for structural
features of group dynamics such as membership duration, internal coherence and
group survival in a general ecological framework where groups compete with each
other within larger societies. The theory has been further developed by treating
the establishment and maintenance of relationships as a form of collective action
(Heckathorn and Rosenstein 2002).
Considering the relational facets of solidarity is crucial to understand large-scale
social phenomena. However, structural analyses of group cohesion do not seem
to overcome the analysis of the structural interdependence of actors within groups.
Therefore, by relying on simple assumptions about relational dynamic (e.g., ho-
mophily), they cannot open the black box of the interaction mechanisms that underlie
the emergence of solidarity.
In this respect, Social Exchange Theory (SET) provides a solid theoretical framework
to study the emergence of solidarity between interacting individuals (Molm, Collett,
and Schaefer 2007; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008). Deeply rooted in classic sociological
works (Homans 1958, [1961] 1974; Blau 1964; Emerson 1976), SET has tried to explain
important facets of social interaction and the social structures it generates. It has
stimulated a large body of experimental studies in the laboratory (see f.i. Molm and
Cook 1995; Fehr and Gintis 2007). A structurally oriented formulation of SET goes
under the label of Network Exchange Theory (NET), which embeds the analysis of social
exchange interactions within network structural configurations, by applying tools of
Social Network Analysis (SNA) (see f.i. Cook and Emerson 1987; Molm and Cook 1995;
Walker et al. 2000).
The theory is centred around the concept of social exchange, which is defined as
a mutual transfer of benefits (f.i., physical goods, including economically valuable
goods, or symbolic ones, such as information, aid, affection, etc.) between two or
more actors under conditions of incompletely specified obligation (Blau 1964). An
exchange relation is defined as a longitudinal sequence of opportunities, initiations
and transactions, which forms a variably enduring relation between specific partners
(Emerson 1976). Finally, a set of two or more connected exchange relations identifies
an exchange network. Thereby, SET aims at studying social interaction and its link with
social structure by treating the social relation as its unit of analysis (Molm and Cook
1995).
Every social exchange relation is viewed as a power-dependence relation, as actor
i depends upon actor j as the source of a resource which i values. This mutual
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dependence occurs as far as i and j need each other in order to engage in a rewarding
exchange. It also accounts for its initiation and continuation over time (Emerson 1976;
Molm and Cook 1995). Moving from the assumption that actors "behave in ways
that increase outcomes they positively value and decrease outcomes they negatively
value" (Molm and Cook 1995, p. 210), a social exchange is a mixed-motive relationship
(Schelling 1960), in that actors’ interest is to cooperate for obtaining other’s resource
but also to compete for maximizing their own profit.
Here, cohesion is defined as a structural attribute of exchange relations and the
exchange networks in which they are embedded (Molm and Cook 1995). It is a
function of the degree of power-dependence of the relation and is positively correlated
with the frequency of exchanges (Emerson 1976). The overall cohesion of an exchange
network is the aggregate effect of the stability of ties among network nodes, which in
turn depend on the dynamics of exchange opportunities and transactions.
This implies that power-dependence and cohesion as structural attributes of
exchange relations allow new emergent relational properties to be generated over
time, such as commitment (Molm and Cook 1995). SET has provided mixed evidence
about both cognitive (see Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002 for a comprehensive review)
and behavioural (Cook and Emerson 1978; Kollock 1994; Yamagishi, Cook, and
Watabe 1998) dimensions of commitment in exchange relations.
Therefore, since power-dependence within exchange relations implies the oppor-
tunity for actors to exploit partners, commitment in an exchange relation may emerge
between two actors as a strategic mechanism to reduce uncertainty. This leads to
repeated exchanges with specific partners, so ignoring potentially more rewarding
exchange partners (Cook and Emerson 1978).
An experimental test of this hypothesis was then provided by Kollock (1994),
who found that increasing uncertainty and information asymmetries about other
players’ trustworthiness in simulated market transactions made long-term interaction
partners more attractive for future exchanges. So, risk and uncertainty generated
emergent commitment among partners, giving actors the opportunity to prove their
trustworthiness, thereby stimulating new exchanges. This mechanism cumulatively
led to more commitment and increasing mutual dependence between actors, which
in turn generates stronger relational cohesion. Further tests were performed across
U.S. and Japan by Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe (1998), who similarly found that
committed relations were more likely to develop between people who displayed
a lower level of generalized trust towards others. This confirmed that risk and
uncertainty reduction are linked to commitment and cohesion. Following these
experiments, Back and Flache (2006) showed that strategies based on commitment
may be more efficient in avoiding risk of exploitation by free-riders through computer
simulations of game-theoretic exchanges. Finally, empirical evidence has then been
collected through observational studies of networks of economic exchanges, where
it is more likely that commitment is actually caused by strategic behaviour (see f.i.
Podolny 2001; Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004).
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In partial contrast with these studies, other scholars have suggested that the
emergence of commitment in social exchange relations would be the result of the
positive outcomes of exchange. More precisely, commitment could be due to emotions
that are intrinsic to a successful exchange (see f.i. Lawler and Thye 1999), rather
than on strategic behaviour (Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002). Within this research
programme, which is called Theory of Relational Cohesion (TRC) (Lawler and Yoon
1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler and Thye 1999; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000), cohesion is
defined as the perception by individuals in an exchange relation that their relationship
is an integrative element in the social situation (Lawler and Yoon 1996). Commitment
is then defined as the perceived strength of the tie existing between a person and a
social unit, such as a relation, a group, a network, an organization, a community and
so forth (Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002).
Lawler and Yoon (1993) developed a causal model which included the positive
role of emotions as an intervening mechanism between structural power-dependence
factors and commitment behavioural outcomes within exchange relations. Starting
from the idea that people tend to attribute responsibility for the emotions which they
feel, to some identifiable sources, the model argues that equal relative power and ne-
gotiation in a dyadic exchange leads to repeated agreements, which in turn generate
satisfaction in the actors, eventually eliciting commitment (Thye, Yoon, and Lawler
2002). First experimental tests showed that individuals who had the possibility to ne-
gotiate exchange terms in a face-to-face interaction in a balanced mutual dependence
relation, displayed commitment behaviour. For example, they were committed to a
relation despite more profitable alternatives and were prone to mutual concessions in
the agreement. In short, this study showed that positive emotions are an intervening
factor that links successful exchanges to relational cohesion.
Moreover, other experiments showed that emotions, e.g., satisfaction, were prox-
imate causes of exchange outcomes and were generated from the social character
of the very joint activity of negotiation. Furthermore, since people tend to attribute
responsibility for the emotions they feel to some sources, these experiments showed a
positive effect of satisfaction on relational cohesion, i.e., increasing commitment and
collective-oriented behaviour (Lawler and Yoon 1996). Later, new experiments com-
pared the effect of different network structures on dyadic exchange. Results showed
that greater frequency of exchange in unequal power relations was not sufficient
to produce commitment because it did not elicit positive emotions. Group identity
also displayed a positive effect on commitment (Lawler and Yoon 1998). Finally,
emotional enforcement of commitment in exchange relations was experimentally
disentangled from strategic behaviour of uncertainty reduction. This suggests that the
two mechanisms, rather than concurrent, might rather be complementary depending
on different social situations (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000).
To summarize, TRC has accumulated robust experimental evidence on the occur-
rence of an endogenous process within dyadic exchange relations via the elicitation
of positive emotions in the exchange partners towards their relation. In this way, by
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interacting exchange partners attach expressive value to their relation, which helps
to create the integrative bonds that are necessary to produce relational cohesion in
an exchange network (Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002). Moreover, unlike strategic
uncertainty reduction, these mechanisms tend to trigger stable group cohesion, since
they are likely to generate more salient relations for exchange partners. It is important
to note that these mechanisms also apply to a wider spectrum of exchange networks.
In conclusion, TRC provides insights on causal mechanisms of solidarity within
an exchange network, since the expressive value generated through the interaction
can trigger solidary behaviour between the actors. However, this process seems to
occur only in equal-power networks, especially when the frequency of exchanges
and the elicitation of positive emotions are linked (Lawler and Yoon 1998). Therefore,
it might not be suitable for exchange interactions where actors’ conflict of interests is
more salient.
2.4 Forms of exchange and solidarity
TRC experiments only considered one particular form of dyadic social exchange
(with the sole exception of Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000), namely one in which actors
negotiate an agreement which constraints their exchange. More recent developments
in the SET programme have further inquired the emergence of solidarity across
different forms of exchange (Lawler 2001; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Lawler,
Thye, and Yoon 2008). In order to do so, some experimental studies have compared
different forms of social exchange, moving from the assumption that each one entails
different configurations of power-dependence (Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999,
2001). However, findings have been inconclusive due to the context-dependency of
different forms of exchange in actual social settings.
Here, it is important to consider that forms of exchange vary according to the
structure of transaction which they entail. They are defined by analytically abstracting
from the contingency of actors, resources or network structures (Emerson 1981; Molm
and Cook 1995; Molm 2003). First, according to the kind of mutual dependence
between actors, a social exchange can be either direct or indirect. In direct or restricted
exchange actor i provides value to actor j and j to i, so that each actor’s outcome
depends directly on another actor’s behaviour. In indirect or generalized exchange, a
benefit received by j from i is reciprocated indirectly, by j’s transferring value to
another actor k.
The latter form of exchange has dominated the classical social exchange literature
both in sociology and anthropology (see f.i. Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Lévi-Strauss 1949;
Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1925; Sahlins 1972). The most common form of generalized
exchange is what Takahashi (2000) has called pure-generalized exchange, in which no
fixed structure of giving is entailed, i.e. i might transfer benefits to j and k on a
different occasion. On the other hand, in chain-generalized exchange, benefits flow
in one direction in a circle of transferring which eventually indirectly reciprocates
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benefits to the initiator. For instance, in a three-actor chain, i transfers benefits to j, j
to k and k to i. Structures of chain-generalized exchange underlie classic exchange
phenomena such as the Kula ring (Malinowski 1922) and matrilateral cross-cousin
marriage (Lévi-Strauss 1949; Bearman 1997). Finally, it is worth to outline that
while direct exchange implies a dyadic relation, indirect exchange has a collective
dimension.
Secondly, direct exchange relations can be further distinguished in negotiated or
reciprocal (Blau 1964; Emerson 1981; Molm 1997; Lévi-Strauss 1949). In a negotiated
exchange, actors engage in a joint decision process, such as explicit bargaining, in
which they typically seek a binding agreement on the terms of exchange. Therefore,
the benefits enjoyed by both partners can be conceived as paired events, which
identify a transaction. In reciprocal exchanges, actors’ transfers of benefits are separately
performed and non-negotiated. Actor i initiates an exchange as the outcome of
an independent decision, by unilaterally transferring benefits to actor j without
knowing whether, when, or to what extent j will reciprocate in the future. Negotiated
exchanges cover most economic exchanges (other than fixed-price trades) as well
as many social exchanges (Molm and Cook 1995). Reciprocal exchanges, however,
characterize the vast majority of exchanges among family, friends and acquaintances
(Homans [1961] 1974). Moreover, scholars in economic sociology have widely shown
the importance of reciprocal exchange in business and trade relations (see f.i. Uzzi
1996; Granovetter 1985).
Reciprocal and negotiated forms of exchange differ across three key analytic
dimensions (Molm 2003). First, in reciprocal exchanges benefits flow unilaterally
from i to j, since each actor’s outcomes are contingent solely on the other’s individual
actions: actors can initiate exchanges which will not be reciprocated, as well as they
can profit from another’s transfer without reciprocating (Emerson 1981; Molm and
Cook 1995). On the contrary, negotiated exchanges entail bilateral flow of benefits,
each actor’s outcomes being instead contingent on the joint negotiating interaction,
so that nobody can profit without an agreement which benefits both sides. Secondly,
following from difference on contingency, while communication within negotiation
implies shared information about outcomes, in reciprocal exchange actors cannot rely
on the same kind of information. Last but not the least, differently from negotiated
exchanges, in reciprocal exchanges the degree of equality in exchange outcomes
develop only over time, as it does not rely on discrete transactions but on individually
performed, sequentially contingent transfers (Molm 2003; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett
2009). Moreover, it is also worth noting that while negotiated exchanges can be
formally modeled in terms of cooperative games, in which interdependent agents
share a common knowledge of the game, reciprocal exchanges can be modeled as
non-cooperative games, in which agents make independent choices (Heckathorn and
Rosenstein 2002).
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2.4.1 Affect Theory of Social Exchange
Further TRC studies looked at the effects of exchange interaction on the relations
and networks (Lawler 2001; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008). Relying on previous
experimental evidence, Lawler (2001) proposed a causal model to explain variations
in strength and stability of emergent relational cohesion across different forms of
exchange networks. The model, which has been called Affect Theory of Social Ex-
change (ATSE), moves from the assumption that emotions perceived in joint social
activities are attributed by actors to social units (relationships, networks, or groups),
thereby producing stronger or weaker affective attachment. The aim of the theory
is to account for the mechanisms which cause the emergence of a micro social order,
defined as "a recurrent pattern of interaction among a set of actors, from which they
come to perceive themselves as a unit (i.e., a group) and to develop feelings about
that unit" (Lawler 2002, pp. 4-5). The strength of the group attachment implied by
a micro social order may then determine collectively oriented behaviour, such as:
providing unilateral benefits without expectation of reciprocity, expanding areas of
collaboration beyond the vulnerability to opportunism, forgiving isolated free-riders
and staying in the relationship despite more profitable alternatives (Lawler 2001).
Another basic assumption of the model is that each form of exchange requires a
certain joint activity, which varies according to a structural and a cognitive dimension:
a) the degree of separability of actors’ task behaviours and contribution and b) the
perception of shared responsibility on exchange outcomes. Hence, a causal mech-
anism is implied so that increasing non-separability generates a higher perception
of shared responsibility, which in turn increases the probability that actors attribute
emotions to the exchange relation as a social unit. This mechanism could explain
why the strength of differences in strength of emergent micro social orders may vary
across different forms of exchange. Here, the model predicts that direct forms of
exchange produce stronger micro social orders than generalized exchange and that
negotiated has stronger effects than reciprocal exchange. Moreover, ATSE predicts
that the endogenous process argued by TRC yields a mediating effect on outcomes.
These model predictions were tested through a laboratory experiment through
a factorial design that compared different forms of three-actor exchange networks
(Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008). The emergence of micro social orders were measured
by four indicators: 1) frequency of exchange, 2) positive feelings about exchanges,
3) perceptions of the network cohesion, 4) affective attachment about the social unit.
Results only partially supported model predictions. Generalized exchange actually
yielded the lowest measures of micro social order, with network cohesion decreasing
over time, direct exchange was shown to generate stronger across all indicators. In
short, unlike ATSE predictions, this study did not find any significant differences
between the negotiated and the reciprocal forms of exchange.
Other SET experimental scholars found results that challenged TCR, by shifting
the focus on the effects of risk and uncertainty on trust and commitment formation
(Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999; Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000; Molm,
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Peterson, and Takahashi 2001; Molm 2003; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009).
First, in some experiments, negotiated and reciprocal direct exchange relations
were compared to look at differences in contingency of benefit flow, information and
timing. Especially interesting for the emergence of solidarity, Molm, Takahashi, and
Peterson (2000) showed that reciprocal exchange is more effective on the production
of affective commitment between actors because of a mechanism linking the risk of
non-reciprocity to trust formation. Defined as the "structural or situational potential
for incurring a net loss" (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009, p. 5), risk is a necessary
condition for trust to develop among actors within an exchange relation, as it provides
actors the opportunity of proving to be trustworthy (Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988;
Hardin 2002; Kollock 1994; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998). This is done by
displaying and recognizing signs and signals of trustworthiness (e.g., Bacharach and
Gambetta 2001; see also Macy and Skvoretz 1998). Actors can interpret the partner’s
reciprocation as a sign of his/her trustworthiness, given that it would have been
more profitable for the partner to not reciprocate.
Despite the fact that some degree of risk is related to each form of exchange,
in situation of negotiation, there is only the risk of being unable to establish an
agreement, whereas reciprocal exchange implies a stronger risk of non-reciprocation
(Molm 2003). Once an agreement is reached, the risk of being exploited by an
opportunistic partner is kept under control by various social mechanisms that can
enforce the agreement, e.g., law enforcement in case of a contract, reputation and
decentralized social control in case of informal agreements. Thus, if actors succeed
in establishing an agreement, trust between actors can be rather unnecessary to
get positive outcomes in negotiated exchanges, as they can rely on the assurance
provided by an agreement (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994).
In an experimental study, Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson (2000) found strong
and consistent differences in trust and affective commitment, measured via subjects’
self-assessment, between the two forms of direct exchange. They argued that while
negotiated exchange provides actors the opportunity to display only a behavioural
form of commitment (i.e., the disproportionate exchange with one partner despite
more profitable alternatives; Kollock 1994; Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998), the risk of
non-reciprocity in reciprocal exchanges allows actors to display their trustworthiness
by reciprocating exchanges over time. This elicits trust formation. Furthermore, in
cases there are no assurance structures, actors are more likely to attribute partners’
reciprocating to their intentions rather than to exogenous enforcement structures. This
generates affective commitment. Moreover, reciprocal exchange can also exacerbate
strategic behaviour aiming to reduce uncertainty. Indeed, Molm, Peterson, and
Takahashi (1999) had showed that powerful actors were less likely to use their power
to maximize their profit in reciprocal rather than in negotiated exchanges, because
they tended to avoid risk (see f.i. Kahneman and Tversky 1979) by disproportionately
opting for reciprocity. Finally, other experiments supported the importance of the
expressive value of reciprocation in itself. Indeed, it is likely that reciprocation is a
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sign of affective regard to exchange partners beyond trustworthiness (Molm 2003;
Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2007; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007).
In conclusion, although they do not question the occurrence of an emotion-based
commitment mechanism, these last studies cast serious doubts on the differences
between negotiated and reciprocal exchange in the generation of solidarity. Molm
(2003) argued that the same features that make negotiated exchange more structurally
cooperative than reciprocal exchange (i.e., joint decision-making, bilateral flow of
benefits, the two-party social unit created by the task of negotiation) might also lead
to a conflict of interests between exchange partners. While Lawler (2001) suggested
that a perception of shared responsibility reduces competition bias in negotiated ex-
changes, the only fact of having an agreement prevents actors to infer trustworthiness
and develop affective regard for exchange partners (Molm 2003). This would explain
why some experimental studies found that individuals show greater resistance to
unequal negotiated exchanges than to unequal reciprocal exchanges. Moreover it was
found that subjects generally perceive that negotiated exchanges are more unfair than
reciprocal exchanges even when outcomes are equal and are less positively affected.
Finally, actors usually show less affect, less trust and less commitment to the partner
in negotiated exchanges (Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999; Molm, Takahashi, and
Peterson 2000; Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 2003; Molm 2003). However, as Lawler
(2001) argued, these studies measured levels of commitment towards the exchange
partner and not to a larger social unit. This would indicate that these findings cannot
help to look at cohesion as group attachment.
Therefore, TRC provides important insights to explain the emergence of solidarity
from negotiated exchanges. However, its results seem to be limited to exchange
networks where power differences between actors are not relevant, i.e. where com-
petition between partners is not salient. In this context, the success of an economic
exchange can trigger an emotional mechanism that enhances solidarity between
the partners beyond their trustworthiness. However, it must be said that most eco-
nomic exchanges in natural settings occur in situation of resource asymmetry and
competition.
2.4.2 Reciprocity Theory of Solidarity
The Reciprocity Theory of Solidarity (RTS) has challenged the explanation proposed by
ATSE for the emergence of solidarity from exchange relations (Molm, Collett, and
Schaefer 2007).
Building on previous experimental evidence on the comparison of different forms
of exchange (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer
2006; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2007), the RTS predicts that reciprocal exchanges
generate stronger solidarity than negotiated ones and that within reciprocal exchange,
generalized forms are more important than direct ones. They defined solidarity as
"the integrative bonds that develop between persons and between persons and the
social units to which they belong" (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007, p. 207).
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Their experiment tested the affective components of solidarity by measuring self-
assessed subjective feelings of the following aspects: a) "trust", i.e. "the belief that the
exchange partner will not exploit the focal actor", b) "affective regard", i.e. "positive
feelings and evaluation towards the partner", c) "social unity", i.e. the perception of
the exchange relation as a social unit, with actors united in interests and purpose",
d) "feelings of commitment to the partner and the relationship" (ibid.). The model
assumes that each exchange form entails a different structure of reciprocity, defined
by two dimensions: a) whether benefits are reciprocated directly or indirectly and
b) whether benefits flow unilaterally or bilaterally (Emerson 1981; Molm and Cook
1995; Molm 2003). These variations are responsible in the model for the generation of
three causal mechanisms: 1) the "risk of nonreciprocity", 2) the "expressive value of
reciprocity", 3) the "salience of conflict" (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007, p. 211).
These three mechanisms would affect the different levels of solidarity generated
in different forms of exchange. First, the risk of nonreciprocity should be higher in
reciprocal than in negotiated exchanges (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000; Molm
2003). Moreover, generalized exchange would be more risky than direct reciprocal
forms. This is because actors are dependent on the actions of multiple others in the
generalized exchange, with risk increasing in proportion to the length of the chain.
This would affect the production of trust proportionally.
Secondly, the expressive value of reciprocity would increase in the absence of
assurance structures. This is especially when benefits flow unilaterally rather than bi-
laterally (Molm 2003; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2007) and with stronger magnitude
with generalized rather than direct reciprocity, given that in generalized exchange
not even a tacit obligation is implied.
Finally, according to the mixed-motive structure of social exchange, the salience of
conflict should decrease feelings of solidarity to be even exacerbated by the bilateral
flow of benefits entailed by negotiated exchange (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2006).
Moreover, indirect reciprocation should reduce the salience of conflict by removing
any direct reciprocal relation between the two partners.
An experimental test was run by comparing in a factorial design all three forms of
exchange (negotiated, direct reciprocal and chain-generalized) in both three- and four-
actor networks. This was to disentangle potential confounding effects of network size
and power, according to the typical setting of SET laboratory experiments (see Molm
and Cook 1995; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007). Experimental results confirmed
the model predictions, according to which generalized exchange generates higher
levels of solidarity than direct reciprocal exchange, which in turn is more effective
than negotiated exchange.
Therefore Molm, Collett, and Schaefer (2007) and Lawler, Thye, and Yoon (2008)
provided conflicting results about the effect of different forms of exchange on the
emergence of solidarity. However, a closer look into the two experimental designs
reveals that the validity of their results can be extended to different social situations,
without necessarily overlapping.
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On the one hand, the study run by Molm, Collett, and Schaefer (2007) calls for
reconsidering the validity of ATSE, because actors engaged in exchanges within equal-
power networks and this could have favoured the activation of the emotion-based
mechanism proposed by TRC (Lawler and Yoon 1998), while previous experiments by
Molm and colleagues were performed unequal-power networks (Molm, Takahashi,
and Peterson 2000; Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 2001; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer
2006). Moreover, Molm, Collett, and Schaefer (2007) measured subjects’ perception
of social unity as indicator of solidarity, thereby avoiding the problem of relating to
person-to-person commitment instead of group attachment (Lawler 2001). This im-
plies that outcomes contradicted results by Lawler, Thye, and Yoon (2008), although
subjects engaging in negotiated exchange indeed experienced the positive emotions
argued by TCR.
On the other hand, the experimental design by Molm, Collett, and Schaefer
(2007) and Lawler, Thye, and Yoon (2008) differ in one important feature. While
in the former study subjects were embedded in a negatively connected network,
which implies that actors choose only one exchange partner simultaneously for direct
exchanges (Molm and Cook 1995), the latter experiment was set in null-connected
networks, where actors could engage in direct exchange with multiple partners at a
time. Since generalized exchange always implies the transferring to only one actor at
a time, this implied a substantial differences in the salience of conflict between direct
and generalized forms of exchange. This discrepancy could have made potential
conflicts in direct exchange less salient in the experiment by Lawler, Thye, and Yoon
(2008). This would explain higher outcomes in cohesion and perception of social
unity.
Here, it is important to note that a more recent experimental study conducted
by Molm, Schaefer, and Collett (2009) has provided new insights on the emergent
stability of relational cohesion through trust development. This study started from
the idea of building more realistic experimental settings where looking at the dif-
ference between negotiated and reciprocal exchange. In this study Molm, Schaefer,
and Collett studied a form of negotiated exchange with non-binding agreements
and a form of reciprocal exchange where actors were allowed to communicate. This
was to vary risk and uncertainty within negotiated and reciprocal exchange forms.
These experiments showed that even when levels of produced trust were equal across
different forms, reciprocal exchange produced a more resilient and affect-based form
of trust. Conversely, in negotiated exchange trust was based on cognition and more
"fragile". More precisely, actors in reciprocal exchanges were more likely to forgive
occasional untrustworthy behaviour, to trust partners who displayed imperfect trust-
worthiness and to develop stronger affective regard towards the trusted partners.
Similar results about the context-dependency of solidarity in negotiated exchanges
has been confirmed by experiments by Kuwabara (2011).
Furthermore, these results suggest that trust can be generated also by negotiated
exchanges. This confirms findings by an experimental study by Barrera (2007). There,
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negotiated exchanges in equal-power networks could generate trust between partners,
although subjects did not perceive the partners as trustworthy.
To summarize, research in sociology and social psychology has examined causal
mechanisms that are relevant for social solidarity in exchange networks. Despite
differences in some results, experimental studies in laboratory settings successfully
showed that exchange networks might provide opportunities for actors to develop
endogenously more or less stable ties, which eventually overcome instrumental
individual interests in the exchange. Therefore, exchange relations may yield actors’
commitment to the network as a social unity, even when there is no shared group
identity between the actors. In some cases, economic exchanges might generate
solidarity between the actors, although in contexts where the conflict between their
interests is not salient.
In conclusion, experimental studies are key to disentangle the link between in-
strumental and expressive motivations. Nevertheless, empirical research in natural
settings can help us understand the interplay between different forms of exchange
and different social contexts.
2.5 Social structure and solidarity
While SET focuses on various forms of social exchange, social network research
provides information also about the content of exchange relations, i.e. the exchanged
resources. Over the last decades, social network research has examined in detail rela-
tional mechanisms that are responsible for evolution and change of social networks
over time.
Moreover, social network research has looked extensively at structural processes
that make certain social relations turn into different kinds, according to the content of
the interaction or the actors’ motives.
2.5.1 Heterophily and collaboration
Professional collaborations is a type of economic exchange that has been studied exten-
sively by empirical social network research. In these cases, two or more professionals
interact to achieve a common goal by joining their skills and competencies.
Here, resource asymmetry is often one of the drivers of collaboration. This is
usually due to the fact that diversity in terms of skills and competencies may be of
great advantage in case organizations need the representation of dissimilar functional
specializations or connections to different financial or political resources (Westphal
and Milton 2000; Mizruchi 2004). Yet, collaboration ties among dissimilar individuals
are also formed voluntarily. This process has been called heterophily and has been
extensively analysed by studies on collaboration networks.
A collaboration network means every group of individuals who work together in
teams for a common goal. The diversity of social ties has been studied, for example,
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in the cases of coauthorship in science (Newman 2001a; Moody 2004; Wuchty, Jones,
and Uzzi 2007), codirectorships on the same board (Westphal and Milton 2000)
and coperformance in the same artistic production (Watts 1999; Uzzi and Spiro
2005; Uzzi 2008). In creative and economic production, ties connect dissimilar co-
workers because collaboration requires different attributes, complementary skills
and capabilities. Research on multiplex networks has studied the interacting effects
of complementarity and other personal attributes on professional collaborations,
providing evidence for what Blau (1974) termed "multiform heterogeneity". This
means that network ties may be between individuals who are simultaneously similar
and different, sharing similarities on some dimensions and differences on others. A
study by Casciaro and Lobo (2008) found that members of different organizations
select coworkers whom they perceive to hold complementary skills, only if they
evaluate those persons as enjoyable to work with according to similar demographic
traits, which signal trustworthiness and ease communication.
In any case, heterogeneous relationships in professional collaborations are ori-
ented towards the completion of a project or goal. Their short-term character often
does not permit their evolution in solidarity networks. Moreover, the diversity
between collaboration partners might exacerbate the inherent conflict of interests
within every kind of economic exchange. Empirical research on multiplex net-
works is needed to understand how collaboration ties can spill over new ties of
non-instrumental relations. This process is mediated by relational mechanisms,
which can make actors’ beliefs and motives change within the context of one kind
of interaction and trigger the development of a new kind of relation (Simpson and
Willer 2015; Baldassarri 2015).
2.5.2 Repetition
In order to understand how new social relations can develop from already existing
weaker relationships, it is probable that examining frequency and direction of social
relations is key. This requires a "within-the-network" approach (Rivera, Soderstrom,
and Uzzi 2010). Sociological network research has extensively tried to understand
how network change is predicted by the previous structure of a network in a prior
time period, as it conditions opportunities of interaction and the flow of trust and
information among actors (Stuart and Sorenson 2007).
Repeated interaction allows individuals to learn about each other’s beliefs and
motives. This, in turn, might generate feedback effects about actors’ intentions and
determine the maintenance or the dissolution of an exchange relation. This is why
the frequency of interaction is an important predictor of network evolution over time.
More precisely, being informed about future interaction repetition can make actors
cooperate in order to avoid the partner’s retaliation (the so-called "shadow of the
future"). In a seminal study, Axelrod (1984) showed that in a two-person iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, self-interested players can find it rational to reciprocate the
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partner’s cooperative behaviour. Conversely, a one-shot interaction would make it
more convenient to defect and exploit the partner.
Moreover, the repetition of risky interaction exchanges can also trigger mecha-
nisms of learning and control (Buskens and Raub 2002). Firstly, strategic players
might infer from the structure of an exchange that they will be able to sanction the
partner’s opportunistic behaviour. This would elicit cooperation as actors would
expect each other not to defect. Secondly, repetition also allows actors to experience
each other’s trustworthiness and predict that the partner’s future behaviour would
be consistent with the past.
Furthermore, repeated interaction provides the opportunity for actors to develop
commitment to partners in exchange networks. This holds for cognitive (Cook and
Emerson 1978; Kollock 1994; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998; Back and Flache
2006) as well as for affective commitment (Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002; Molm,
Takahashi, and Peterson 2000), as detailed in Section 2.3.
Network research has extensively studied the effects of repetition in many types
of ties, both social and economic (Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi 2010). Concerning
collaboration ties, research has showed that professionals are more prone to voluntar-
ily select as partners those persons with whom they have previously already worked.
This phenomenon has been observed in various fields, ranging from artistic and
creative professions (Uzzi and Spiro 2005) to scientific working groups (Guimerá et al.
2005). For instance, this last study developed an agent-based model that showed that
the network structure of four scientific disciplines exhibited similarly high rates of
repeated ties. By comparing the rate of repeated ties among diverse networks, the
rate of repeated ties varied from about 50% to approximately 99%. This suggested
that repetition had become a norm across different fields.
The importance of repetition for strategic commitment has been found especially
in studies on market transactions, where ties are frequently modelled as one-shot
exchanges. These results have inspired the theory of the social embeddedness of
the economy (Granovetter 1985). Even big corporations (Baker 1990), investment
banks (Podolny 1994) and large law firms (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004) appear to engage
in ongoing relationships with a core set of financial partners, adding others on an
ad-hoc basis for extraordinary or specific deals. Although focusing on corporate
actors, network research in economic sociology provides interesting results also for
interpersonal exchanges, as it can cast some light on processes that are enabled by
individual actors who engage in relationships on behalf of their firms (see also Brailly
et al. 2015).
Finally, other empirical studies have testified to the importance of repetition
mechanisms for other kinds of exchange. Besides being a measure of the strength
of a relationship (Friedkin 1990), repetition is also considered as an indicator of
trust (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004), altruism and information
exchange in intraorganizational networks (Uzzi 1996).
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Empirical network research has found that repetition is key to understand com-
mitment in instrumental exchange relations, where frequent one-shot transactions
identify a stable relation. However, other types of social relations are characterized
by one’s attribution of some status (e.g., friendship or other affective relationships)
or discrete transfers of resources (e.g., advice-giving or social support). In order to
understand the dynamic of these kinds of social relations, tie direction must be taken
into consideration.
2.5.3 Reciprocation
Reciprocation seems to be a basic tendency of most social relations (Blau 1964). This
means that an important predictor of some tie formation between an individual, i,
and another one, j, is whether or not j previously had a directed tie with i. Yet,
reciprocation is possible if the character of a social relation is directional, e.g., an
individual transferring a resource to another. The character of the exchanged resource
affects the tendency of reciprocating in social relations. More precisely, some relations
occur in situations of resource asymmetry or signal the attribution of social status.
These processes might prevent reciprocation.
Social network research has extensively studied the dynamic of tie reciprocation
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, Chap. 13; Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi 2010). This holds
especially for positive expressive ties, such as affective relationships (Ibarra 1992; Lin
1999). By analysing longitudinal data of small groups of previously unacquainted
individuals, Doreian et al. (1996) have found that reciprocation is one of the most
important drivers of the growth of friendship networks. Moreover, Mollica, Gray, and
Trevino (2003) showed that reciprocation observed in empirical friendship networks
is much higher than what computer simulations of randomly generated similar
networks would predict. Therefore, state-of-the-art statistical models always assume
a positive tendency towards reciprocation for the analysis of empirical social networks
(e.g. Snijders, Van de Bunt, and Steglich 2010; Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013).
Empirical research has also dealt with unreciprocated ties. This might be affected
by underlying dynamics of status attribution and recognition. In case of friendship,
if ego does not reciprocate an incoming tie from alter, he/she would signal weaker
commitment to alter (Gould 2002). Thereby, if alter does not withdraw his/her
friendship offer, he/she expresses deference to ego’s claimed higher status (see also
Lynn, Podolny, and Tao 2009). For example, in a recent study, Ball and Newman
(2013) have found that unilateral friendship ties among young people are likely to be
directed towards people who rank higher in social status.
Furthermore, non-reciprocation can also be related to differences in resources
between individuals. Concerning social support, material help can be provided only
by individuals who can provide it, because they own the needed resource. At the
same time, people who do not own a specific resource are more likely to ask for
material help. Therefore, the reciprocation of material support might be prevented by
a static distribution of resources.
2.5. Social structure and solidarity 27
These two sources of non-reciprocation may be mixed in actual social systems.
Research on social networks has tried to disentangle status and resource comple-
mentarity by studying advice exchange within organizations. On the one hand,
advice-seeking is important for the individual mobilization of social capital (Coleman
1990; Lin 1999). On the other hand, advice-seeking is also related to social status,
as nodes who are sought out for advice are likely to be recognized as high status
members by other individuals (Lazega and Duijn 1997; Lazega et al. 2012). This
implies that seeking advice from a peer and not being reciprocated means implicitly
the establishment of a hierarchical relation between two actors. For instance, in a
longitudinal study of an organization, Agneessens and Wittek (2012) found that,
although social status bias is at work, advice-seeking among peers can indeed show
a positive tendency towards reciprocation.
Finally, all exchange relations face the risk of non-reciprocation at some degree, as
noted in Section 2.4. Although repeated interaction may discourage opportunistic
behaviour, the risk of non-reciprocation is especially critical for reciprocal exchanges.
Unidirectional positive expressive relationships are fragile if they fail to become
reciprocal. Indeed, for some types of direct relationships, such as the ones involving
solidarity, their directional character is a double-edge sword. If a positive expressive
tie is reciprocated, actors can develop a stable bond. However, if a tie from ego to alter
is not reciprocated, ego usually reacts by withdrawing his/her outgoing tie.
Therefore, solidarity between individuals is in itself a fragile social formation,
because it faces the risk of non-reciprocation that is typical of any reciprocal forms
of exchange. This implies that looking at dyadic interdependencies between actors,
e.g., repeated interaction, is not sufficient to understand why solidarity relations can
emerge from other exchange relations.
2.5.4 Closure and clustering
Considering an exchange network, it is important to look at the structural interde-
pendencies that constrain actors beyond dyadic relations. More precisely, individuals’
motives and beliefs might be conditioned by their embeddedness in wider relational
structures.
Similarly to reciprocation, most social relations show also a strong tendency
towards network closure. This means that if there is a tie between i and j and another tie
between j and k (i.e., a two-path), then it is likely that a tie between i and kwill close the
path (Davis 1970; Holland and Leinhardt 1971). This would generate a local triangular
structure within the network. Moreover, closed triads can cumulate and generate a
process of "multiple triangulation", where triadic closure cumulatively occurs within
the same subset of nodes, rather than spreading evenly across the network. This
process of network clustering is at the basis of the formation of "community structures"
(Newman and Park 2003) or "cohesive subgroups" (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
Network closure occurs in both undirected (e.g., collaboration) and directed
(e.g., friendship) social relations. In the latter case, it occurs in several different
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versions, according to tie direction. For example, let us consider "transitive closure"
(or "transitivity"). In this case, as an example, if i considers j a friend and j considers
k a friend, then i is likely to consider k a friend as well. Alternatively, we would call it
"cyclic closure" if k is likely to become friends with i in the same triad (e.g. Bearman
1997).
Closure and clustering are especially relevant to understand the emergence and
maintenance of cooperation within social systems. First, individuals can learn to trust
others by getting information about their reputation from third parties. Similarly, part-
ners’ behaviour can be controlled by third parties, who may sanction opportunism
even if they are not directly involved in it (Buskens and Raub 2002; see Chapter 4 for
more details). Concerning friendship and other affective relationships, explanations
of tendency towards closure can be distinguished between opportunity-driven and
preference-driven. In the former case, people are expected to create ties preferably
with their tie neighbours’ neighbours because there is higher probability of encoun-
tering them (e.g. Granovetter 1973). In the latter case, triadic closure might reflect
in-group biased preferences for similar others or the result of exposure to information
about positive reputation from an intermediary (e.g. Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris
2009).
Empirical research has found various economic and social networks that show
closure and clustering properties. One of the best examples is a study by Newman
and Park (2003), who testified to the importance of clustering. By comparing various
kinds of human social networks (f.i., interlocking corporate directorates, the World
Wide Web, food exchange), they showed that clustering occurs significantly more
than in biological and technological networks.
Classic social network studies provided robust evidence on triadic closure. Be-
sides the famous study by Granovetter on weak ties and job finding (1973), clustering
has been observed in cross-cultural settings by Hammer (1980), who found that vari-
ously located social networks tend to exhibit higher likelihood of tie creation between
unacquainted individuals who shared a common link neighbour. Concerning infor-
mation sharing within organizations, clustering mechanisms have been observed in a
vast digital communication network through the analysis of email exchange among
students and faculty members of a large US university. This study found that having
a mutual contact dramatically increased the probability of communication between
two formerly unconnected students (Kossinets and Watts 2006).
Much research has involved collaboration network. There, evidence of clustering
has been collected among members of corporation boards (Davis, Yoo, and Baker
2003), in the cultural industry (Watts 1999; Uzzi and Spiro 2005), in technology and
innovation (Fleming, King, and Juda 2007), in scientific research (Newman 2001a)
and law firms (Lazega and Pattison 1999; Lazega 2001). Furthermore, triadic closure
may have a dramatical effect also in professional collaboration networks, where
the need for control via reputation is highly relevant. For instance, by examining a
collaboration network among 1.6 million of researchers in biology, physics, medicine
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and computer science over 4 years, Newman (2001b) found that sharing a common
previous co-author increased the probability of collaboration between two researchers
by about 30%. Moreover, the effect of sharing a mutual acquaintance in collaboration
networks appears to be additive and non-linear, so that the overall network dynamics
of scientific collaboration networks often approximate a preferential attachment
growth model (Newman 2001b; Barabási and Albert 1999).
It is important to note that clustering effects interact with network distance be-
tween nodes. Research has found that closure mechanisms are detectable also among
nodes whose distances are greater than 1, though it decreases according to the dis-
tance. Kossinets and Watts (2006)’s study on email exchange networks between
students found that distance at one point in time is negatively related to the probabil-
ity of attachment. Among those who did not share one class, dyads separated by two
intermediaries were less likely to initiate a new tie than were individuals separated
by only one. However, clustering effects were still remarkable. Coherently, current
statistical models for social networks assume that the effect of network distance on
attachment decays rapidly as the number of intermediaries grows (see also Pattison
and Robins 2002; Snijders et al. 2006).
This said, it must also be considered that not all social networks exhibit clustering.
In fact, the opposite tendency has been observed in social networks where norms
or structural constraints prohibit or hinder some patterns of interaction. Kinship
networks where ties represent genealogical descent are an obvious example of taboo
norms against closure. Besides kinship systems, however, an interesting study was
conducted by collecting data on the romantic and sexual networks of more than
800 students of a US high school. Bearman, Moody, and Stovel (2004) found that
closed triads or four-cycles2 were rare. By simulating a series of agent-based models
which implemented different hypothetical micro-level mechanisms, they were able to
reproduce the observed spanning-tree network configuration by assuming that an
unrecognized norm prohibited actors to engage in a romantic relationship with the
former lover of his/her current lover’s ex-lover.
To summarize, repeated interaction, reciprocation and triadic closure can explain
the formation of social relations between previously unrelated individuals. However,
this ’within-the-network’ approach cannot overcome the limitations of considering
only one kind of relation at a time. Therefore, it cannot account for more complex in-
terdependencies between different kinds of exchanged resources, which are probably
more relevant empirically.
2.5.5 Multiplexity
In order to understand how solidarity can emerge from other types of relations, it
must be looked at the multiplex dimension of social networks. This means to consider
2. A four-cycle is a pattern where there is a tie between i and j, a tie between j and k, a tie between k
and l and a tie between l and i.
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that different kinds of relations may exist simultaneously within the same set of
individuals. For example, i can consider j a friend but trusts k as business partner.
Besides the content of ties, the same logic of ’within-the-network’ approaches
apply to multiplex relations. The fact that repetition, reciprocity and clustering can
generate stabilization of ties of different resource exchanges, suggests the possibility
that iterated frequency of a tie between two actors could lead to the creation and
maintenance of a different overlapping tie between the same actors (Gould 1991,
1995).
Here, it is relevant to cite one research that has explicitly linked solidarity with the
analysis of multiplex relational mechanisms. After an extensive preliminary and pos-
terior ethnographic analysis, Lazega (2001) has studied the structure of cooperation
among 71 lawyers who worked in a US lawyering firm (see also Lazega and Pattison
1999). He collected empirical data about the exchange of three different resources,
such as: a) coworkers’ goodwill, defined as strong commitment to collaborate, b) basic
advice seeking (see also Cross, Borgatti, and Parker 2001), c) friendship. The study
was guided by the hypothesis that a balance between competition among coworkers
for internal status and successful collective action in achieving organizational effi-
ciency were possible only when actors were bounded by structural interdependencies
due to their needs for some crucial resources and the constraints for action given by
the unequal distribution of those resources. Free-riding temptations to free-ride were
neutralized by expectations of reciprocity that actors had in the exchange of various
kinds of resources. This created a multiplex internal exchange system. More inter-
estingly, ethnographic study suggested that in order for such a complex cooperation
structure to remain stable, exchanges were unlikely to flow within dyads. So, the
exchange system was expected to be a generalized one.
By analysing interdependencies among the three different networks through Ex-
ponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) (Pattison and Wasserman 1999; Robins
et al. 2007; Lusher et al. 2012), Lazega and Pattison (1999) assessed the structural
properties of the multiplex exchange system emerging from coworkers’ relations.
First, they found that the three different kinds of relations were driven by different
relational mechanisms. While co-work ties were strongly governed by reciprocation
and clustering, which generated a mixed system of restricted and generalized ex-
change, advice and friendship ties exhibited patterns of local clustering. Secondly,
despite diversity between networks, different types of exchange tended to overlap,
particularly concerning advice-seeking, which aligned with the other two. Finally,
they found some level of direct exchange between different relations. These results
strongly support the idea of a multiplex exchange system, where cooperation and
solidarity are backed by structural interdependencies among different types of re-
source exchange, where one type appears to serve as a bridge supporting the other.
The combination of advice with either co-work or friendship showed the most robust
effect. Moreover, advice ties were observed to connect actors who were indirectly
connected through asymmetric co-work ties. Therefore, such an exchange system
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may be functional to the stability of solidarity internal to a group of peer coworkers,
by neutralizing centrifugal tendencies driven by opportunism and status competition.
Finally, other recent network studies have shown the importance of multiplex
network analysis when groups and organizations are seen as complex exchange sys-
tems. More precisely, advice-seeking in organizations has been analysed in different
analytic dimensions, by identifying interdependencies between different kinds of
advice and their relation with job satisfaction (Cross, Borgatti, and Parker 2001; Soltis
et al. 2013). Trust ties have also been analysed through a full-network study, in order
to understand the relations between perceived and expressed trust (Lomi et al. 2014).
In conclusion, social network research points out the possibility of testing theories
of solidarity by analysing the actual exchange systems that emerge within multiplex
social networks. In particular, by looking at social systems as multiplex exchange
networks, it is possible to understand the mechanisms that make certain exchange
relations develop into expressive ties.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has tried to understand why solidarity can emerge between peers who do
not share any group identity. To do so, studies in sociology and behavioural sciences
have been reviewed to identify important "relational mechanisms" (Simpson and
Willer 2015). Here, we explored the idea that actors interacting for certain purposes
may develop beliefs on the interaction partners that go beyond the specific content of
the exchange. This may eventually change their motives, develop an expressive value
out of an instrumental purpose and transform their relation into another kind of tie.
First of all, classic sociological theories of solidarity have been analysed and a
micro-level definition of solidarity as "solidary behaviour" (Lindenberg 1998) has been
suggested. This approach is particularly fruitful to analyse relational mechanisms,
because it focuses on the behavioural aspects of solidarity within dyadic relations.
We found that social exchange scholars have provided two main theories about
the emergence of solidarity from exchange relations, namely the Affect Theory of Social
Exchange (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008) and the Reciprocity Theory of Solidarity (Molm,
Collett, and Schaefer 2007). They suggested that individuals find it difficult to develop
solidarity between each other if the context of their exchange relation is informed by
conflict rather than cooperation (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Lawler, Thye, and
Yoon 2008; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009; Kuwabara 2011). Besides this, these two
theories did not produce univocal results about the link between different forms of
exchange and solidarity. In particular, RTS suggested that economic exchanges with
bounded agreement might be detrimental for solidarity, because they do not allow
partners to learn to trust each other. This would occur especially if actors compete
with each other, as this increases the salience of conflict. Nevertheless, RTS suggested
that trust is fundamental for the emergence of solidarity.
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Although research in Social Exchange Theory has provided insights about rela-
tional mechanisms of solidarity, empirical research is needed to look into the content
of social relations and their interplay with actors’ motives in more detail. Here, social
network research has been reviewed to understand which structural configurations
can help certain relations to develop into different kinds of ties. These studies sug-
gested the importance of considering the complex interdependencies of actors within
exchange networks, which affect the stability of social relations.
In conclusion, our review indicated that the problem of solidarity is twofold. On
the one hand, solidary behaviour in the context of other exchange relations needs to
overcome conflict of interests. This facet of solidarity shares some critical points with
cooperation and prosocial behaviour. On the other hand, emergent solidarity must
avoid the risk of disruption brought by the divergence between actors’ interests.
Concerning the first aspect, it is probable that trust can trigger the development
of solidarity. It is an empirical question whether it is possible to elicit trust in various
exchange relations. Interaction contexts where individuals are free to learn about
each other’s trustworthiness could be favourable for trust formation. More precisely,
actors who hold beliefs about exchange partners’ trustworthiness might expect that
they are available for support as well. At the same time, trust-based solidarity relies
upon an inherent conflict of interests. This might prevent expectations of solidarity
to be fulfilled and reciprocated, especially in situations of resource asymmetry or
competition. For both dimensions of the problem, empirically-grounded research is
needed that helps disentangle these mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
Solidarity as Byproduct of
Professional Collaboration1
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between economic exchange and solidarity is still a subject of debate
in social sciences. On the one hand, some scholars suggest that successful economic
interactions structured as "negotiated exchanges" (Blau 1964; Emerson 1981; Molm
2003) can generate solidarity, provided that joint bargaining promotes coordination of
common interests between partners. The perception of cooperative attitudes would
confer expressive value to the relationship (Lawler 2001; Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002;
Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008; Kuwabara 2011). On the other hand, other scholars
argue that economic exchanges cannot easily generate solidarity, because negotiated
agreements binding subjects’ interaction tend to exacerbate conflict between their
mutual interests. Moreover, by preventing individuals from mutually exploiting each
other, an economic exchange would not allow partners to show their trustworthiness,
thereby hindering the development of mutual trust, a crucial component of solidarity
(Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000; Molm 2003; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2006,
2007; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009).
This paper aims to contribute to this debate, by analysing the multiplex network
of relations of economic exchange, trust and solidarity within a group of freelance
professionals. In order to measure solidarity at a dyadic level, we studied the subjects’
expectations of receiving social support from other members when they were in a
situation of need (Lindenberg 1998; see also Flache and Hegselmann 1999a, 1999b).
As a proxy for economic exchange, we analysed professional collaboration between
partners, resulting from the joint participation of two or more actors to the provision
of a good or service for a customer.
In order to disentangle the effects of exchange interactions from particular institu-
tional and organizational contexts, we selected a group of ICT professionals working
as independent freelancers, while sharing the same coworking space (DeGuzman
and Tang 2011). This setting provided us with the opportunity to observe economic
1. A different version of this chapter, co-authored with Niccolò Casnici and Flaminio Squazzoni, has
been submitted with the same title to an international journal as a peer-reviewed article.
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exchanges among peers who were free to select their partners outside the constraints
of a formal organizational or hierarchical structure. Moreover, the absence of a formal
organization allowed us to study emergent solidary behaviour among subjects who
did not share any group-related collective interest.
At the same time, we also analysed the structural logic (Markovsky, Willer, and
Patton 1988; Rank, Robins, and Pattison 2010) of the network of expected social
support emerging among collaborating partners. To do so, we assessed the impact
of reciprocity (Wasserman and Faust 1994) and closure (Davis 1970; Holland and
Leinhardt 1971) independent of the multiplex effects of collaboration and trust.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents our
research background, while Section 3.3 describes data collection and analysis. Section
3.4 discusses our results, while the final section summarizes the main findings and
discusses limitations and prospects.
3.2 Research background
The importance of the embeddedness of the economy within social structures is a key
point of sociological analysis (Granovetter 1985). Social network research has shown
that the control and exchange of social resources, such as advice or information, affect
the performance of entrepreneurs and organizations through informal interpersonal
relationships (e.g. Krackhardt 1992; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Lazega 2001; Brass et al.
2004; Rank, Robins, and Pattison 2010; Brailly et al. 2015), which often entail trust
and support (Coleman 1988, 1990; Granovetter 2002). Though it is acknowledged
that "most forms of social capital are created or destroyed as a byproduct of other
activities" (Coleman 1990, p. 317), we know less about the structural conditions
under which instrumental relations, such as professional collaboration, develop into
expressive ties (Ibarra 1992), such as social support.
Various institutional and organizational contexts may enhance prosocial be-
haviour among self-interested individuals by eliciting and enforcing norms or favour-
ing the diffusion of reputation (see Simpson and Willer 2015, for a review). Yet, we
still know little about those mechanisms which bring about social support between
two individuals within the context of another type of relation.
Social support mainly encompasses a material (or tangible) along with an emotional
(or intangible) component, according to the nature of the resources which one is
asked to mobilize in order to help the recipient (van der Poel 1993; see also Lin 1986).
Research on personal social support networks (Hall and Wellman 1985) has identified
certain regularities in the determinants of social support relations along individual
lines. Different kinds of support are expected by Ego according to Alter’s role status
in Ego’s personal network (Agneessens, Waege, and Lievens 2006).
While kinship members are usually considered more important as a source of
emotional support, workmates are often recognized to play a prominent role in the
provision of minor material support (Wellman and Wortley 1989; Wellman et al. 2001).
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Moreover, previous research has found gender differences in the provision of material
and emotional support (Vaux 1985; Wellman and Wortley 1990), as well as age and
gender homophily effects (Feld 1982; Marsden 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and
Cook 2001). Finally, social status affects the size and composition of one’s social
support network, with higher educated individuals being more likely to rely more on
non-kin contacts rather than others (Fischer 1982).
Aside from the literature on personal social support networks (e.g. Fischer 1982;
Wellman and Wortley 1989, 1990; Wellman et al. 2001), one of the most important
facets of solidary behaviour is that its scope goes beyond one’s kinship or proximate
social circle. Dyadic exchange relations provide individuals with opportunities to
develop beliefs about each other that may trigger the change of that relation into a
different one, or to develop new relations of different nature (Emerson 1976; Molm
and Cook 1995). Following Granovetter’s claim that "[c]ontinuing economic relations
often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust"
(1985, p. 490), we argue that solidary behaviour in the form of social support between
two otherwise unrelated individuals might arise as the byproduct of an economic
exchange relation between them.
Exchange theorists (Homans [1961] 1974; Blau 1964; Emerson 1976; Molm and
Cook 1995) have provided a sound conceptualization of economic exchange as a spe-
cialized form of social exchange (Homans [1961] 1974), which is often referred to as
negotiated exchange (Blau 1964; Lawler 2001; Molm 2003). In this conceptualization,
economic exchange between two partners is defined as a bilateral transfer of resources
which benefits both, upon a jointly negotiated agreement. The benefits yielded to
both partners occur as two paired events, although the agreement is reached through
a joint bargaining process. The terms of the agreement can be either binding or
non-binding (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009; Kuwabara 2011).
This process implies that the ongoing engagement in exchange relations elicits
subjects’ attribution of expressive value to the relation, which in turn reinforces the
duration of the exchange (Blau 1964; Emerson 1976). The repetition of the exchange
is key here to provide an opportunity for the development of mutual trust and
regard. Beyond forward-looking, "shadow of the future"-like rationality (Axelrod
1984), long-term commitment to exchange partners in market-like situations can
emerge as an effect of strategic uncertainty reduction, despite the presence of more
profitable exchange partners (Cook and Emerson 1978; Kollock 1994; Yamagishi, Cook,
and Watabe 1998). Computer simulations have also shown that commitment is more
efficient than other strategies in reducing risk of exploitation by opportunistic partners
(Back and Flache 2006). Finally, studies on empirical business networks showed that
the repetition of exchanges reinforces strategic commitment between partners (e.g.
Podolny 2001; Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004). Especially relevant for
our study is research on interdependency between instrumental and expressive ties
(Ibarra 1992) in intraorganizational networks. A seminal study by Lazega and Pattison
1999 (see also Lazega 2001) has shown that the collective efficiency of an organization
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made by associated professionals rests upon complex interdependencies between
collaboration ties, instrumental exchange of valuable resources and friendship. In
a similar vein, Rank, Robins, and Pattison (2010) have shown that employees who
collaborate frequently are more likely than other employees to exchange information
and support each other.
Experimental research in social psychology has provided evidence on the effects
of economic exchange on solidarity (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000; Thye, Yoon,
and Lawler 2002; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Barrera 2007; Lawler, Thye, and
Yoon 2008; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009; Kuwabara 2011). Some scholars suggest
that economic exchange does not provide sufficient structural conditions for solidarity
to emerge (see Molm 2010 for a comprehensive account). The joint character of the
decision-making process inherent in the the negotiating activity and bilateral transfer
of benefits during transactions, while providing room for cooperation, may also
exacerbate the salience of conflict between the two partners’ interests (Molm, Collett,
and Schaefer 2006). First, the bilateral structure of exchange heightens the perception
of competition between partners, who can frame splitting benefits as a zero-sum
game. Secondly, the instrumental and strategic nature of other partners’ commitment
is made explicit by constraining exchange within the terms of a negotiated agreement
(Molm 2003; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007). Finally, the most relevant point is
that the act of establishing an agreement in itself reduces the risk of being exploited
by an opportunistic partner (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000; Molm 2003; Molm,
Collett, and Schaefer 2007).
The risk of exploitation is a necessary condition for trust to develop within an
exchange relation. This is because it provides individuals with the opportunity
to prove to be trustworthy (Gambetta 1988; Hardin 2002; see also Kollock 1994;
Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998). If subjects succeed in finding an agreement, trust
is not particularly necessary for a positive outcome, as they can rely on assurance
provided by the agreement (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994; Malhotra and Murnighan
2002).
Nonetheless, other studies suggest that the structure of joint negotiation entailed
by economic exchanges generates solidarity between the partners. This is achieved
through a cognitive mechanism, which allows them to attribute the positive out-
comes to each other and to the relation as a unit (see Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002
for a review; see also Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008). First, Lawler, Thye, and Yoon
(2008) show that the character of ‘jointness’ entailed by bargaining activity promotes
coordination and the partners’ collective responsibility, which eventually increases
the chances to reach an agreement. In theses cases, the benefit of exchange can trigger
positive emotions that subjects tend to link to collective responsibility. The relation-
ship in itself is made more salient by the task-interdependence of the negotiating
process, which makes individual contributions difficult to separate (Lawler 2001).
However, laboratory experiments have found conflicting evidence of the effects of
economic exchange on solidarity (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2008; Molm, Collett, and
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Schaefer 2007).
Other laboratory experiments have questioned the existence of a negative effect
of economic exchange on trust, by providing more flexible versions of the negotiated
exchange model. For instance, Barrera (2007) has shown that repeated economic
exchange generates trust between subjects with equal distribution of resources. How-
ever, it is unclear whether this is due to learning a partner’s trustworthiness or to
personal characteristics. By loosening the terms of agreement between partners,
Molm, Schaefer, and Collett (2009) showed that non-binding economic exchange can
successfully generate trust, as partners can prove their trustworthiness to each other.
However, the higher risk of opportunistic behaviour undermines the likelihood of
success of such exchanges. Finally, Kuwabara (2011) suggests that the structure of
joint negotiation underlying economic exchange may either generate solidarity or
exacerbate conflict depending on contextual factors. More precisely, varying levels of
perceptions of risk-taking, conflict and expressive value entailed by various forms of
economic exchanges yield different results in terms of trust and solidarity.
Our aim here is to empirically test the effect of the economic exchange on solidarity.
We also wanted to understand the role of trust as a causal mechanism that accounts
for the formation of expectations of social support. Here, we hypothesized that
where there is no hierarchical structure or formal organization providing top-down
incentives, engaging in a professional collaboration among peers is not sufficient
alone to develop expectations of support. However, if a trust relation develops
between partners, this is enough to develop expectations of social support. Therefore,
expectations of social support could emerge from professional collaborations as long
as trust develops between partners.
Thus, assuming a group of peers who are independent from each other, we
formulated the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: There is no net association between successful collaboration and
expectations of social support.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between business-related trust and
expectations of social support.
3.3 Research design and method
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a full-network study on a group
of 29 independent workers sharing the same "coworking space". Our empirical
strategy included the collection of relational and individual survey data on the entire
population.
3.3.1 Empirical setting
Coworking spaces are office-like working environments where freelancers, entrepreneurs,
or employees of small companies are allowed to pursue independent activities while
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sharing the same working space (DeGuzman and Tang 2011). Members of a cowork-
ing space usually get access to self-managed goods (e.g., personal desk, mailbox) and
collective goods and services (e.g., kitchen, reception, wi-fi internet connection, etc.).
Although the basic entry motivation in coworking spaces is usually cost reduction,
sharing a common space generates the opportunity for independent workers to de-
velop business relationships such as professional collaborations or subcontracting, as
well as the exchange of information and various social resources.
It is important to note that, since they mostly work as freelancers, members of a
coworking space do not usually share any collective economic interest. Moreover,
unlike employees in a company, members of a coworking space are not embedded
in any formal organizational structure. Thus, the selection of collaboration partners
is by no means related to any superimposed directive. Finally, the absence of any
hierarchy makes members of a coworking space peers to each other. Thus, studying a
coworking space allows us to disentangle the effects of professional collaboration on
trust and expectations of social support from confounding factors of an institutional
or organizational nature.
As a suitable case, we collected data on the whole population of "Talent Garden
Brescia" (TaG), a coworking space located in Brescia, Northwestern Italy. TaG is
owned by private shareholders, whose mission is to create and manage coworking
spaces for ICT freelancers and small innovative companies. Unlike more politically-
oriented coworking spaces, which are explicitly aiming at building forms of solidarity
between freelancers, TaG was founded in 2012 with an explicit business-like orienta-
tion and attracted an original core of mainly previously unrelated ICT professionals.
The lack of a shared collective identity allowed us to control a priori for self-selected
orientation towards solidarity among the subjects. Moreover, as all TaG members
were ICT professionals, skill complementarity allowed us to observe a sufficiently
dense network of professional collaborations.
3.3.2 Qualitative fieldwork
Before collecting network data, we conducted a qualitative study of the empirical
setting, in order to shed light on the content of interaction between coworkers and
the institutional and organizational context in which they worked. This was accom-
plished through a 4-month participating observation, during which casual contacts
with coworkers were established. The aim was twofold: (i) establishing a rapport
with the subjects in order to maximize the rate of participation to the survey (e.g.
Johnson 1990); (ii) calibrating the survey questionnaire with a meaningful content for
subjects in order to maximize validity and reliability of the data. During the fieldwork,
qualitative information about organizational and contextual characteristics of TaG
were collected via interviewing managers of the holding company. Together with
observation, this has contributed to understand the basic mechanisms of collaboration
between coworkers. Since the institutional context of the coworking space provided
no top-down incentives for cooperation, all collaborations between coworkers were
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self-organized. They mainly took the form of subcontracting and were enhanced
by skill complementarity among coworkers. Besides this, small companies typically
tended to outsource a portion of their projects to internal rather than external partners
in order to reduce transaction costs, because partner control could be performed
easier. As indicated by some interviewees, this occurs even in the presence of more
profitable alternatives with external partners (Cook and Emerson 1978; Kollock 1994).
By means of direct observation and administrative data, we reconstructed the
structure of company co-membership within TaG. While 10 out of 29 subjects worked
as independent freelancers, 19 TaG members were distributed among 7 small compa-
nies of 2, 3, or 4 members each. Figure 3.1 shows the network of co-membership to
the same company among TaG members.
FIGURE 3.1: The Company co-membership network. Node colours repre-
sent actors’ gender (blue = male, red = female). Node size represents
seniority in the group.
3.3.3 Data: variables and measures
We collected relational and individual-level data by means of a CAPI questionnaire
personally and individually administered to all 29 members of TaG by one interviewer.
Since we could not apply leverage on any formal hierarchy to ensure participation
to the survey, respondents were invited by casual contact during the fieldwork.
Twenty-eight out of 29 interviews were conducted through a 2-week time period,
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Number of coworkers 29
Gender Male = 24, Female = 5
Age (years) Mean = 31.83 (SD = 6.04)
Family status Single = 4
In a stable relationship = 6
Cohabitant with partner = 11
Married = 8
Seniority in coworking space (months) Mean = 29.34 (SD = 14.26)
Educational degree Middle school or vocational training = 2
High school = 10
Bachelor = 7
Master = 10
TABLE 3.1: Members of Talent Garden Brescia coworking space: Main
characteristics.
while one interview was conducted with a 2-month delay. Respondents filled out the
questionnaire independently, although the interviewer was always available to help
respondents and improve respondent recall (e.g. Brewer 2000). Response rate was
100%.
In order to control for the interplay between coworkers’ individual properties
and the relationships between them, we collected node-level attribute data about
both sociodemographic and business-related characteristics: Gender, age, family status,
seniority in TaG, educational degree. Table 3.1 summarizes the main characteristics of
respondents.
Gender distribution was highly skewed in the population, as women were only 5
out of 29. The distribution of age was also consistently skewed, as 11 out of 29 were
below 30, 15 were between 30 and 39 and only 3 of them were 40 or older. The group
was also quite homogeneous in terms of seniority, which was measured as the number
of months from the beginning of their membership at the time all the interviews were
completed. 24 out of 29 subjects had been members for at least 6 months, with nobody
with a membership lasting less than 3 months; 20 coworkers had been members for
more than 12 months, while a core of 13 of them had a membership of at least 24
months.
Relational data were collected by means of sociometric questions formatted ac-
cording to the conventional repeated roster method (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008).
English translations of the questions are provided in the Appendix A.
Social support is the explanandum of this study (see Figure 3.2). A tie-variable was
built by merging the answers to two different questions, addressing respectively the
mobilization of material and emotional resources in the context of out-of-work private
life (van der Poel 1993; Lin 1999), so that xij = 1 if i expects j to support him/her
with either material or emotional resources and xij = 0 otherwise2. Both questions
2. We merged the adjacency matrices of material and emotional support through a Boolean aggregation
procedure, so that the aggregate tie-variable Social support was equal to 1 for a given dyad if the same
dyad had an edge at least on one of the two original matrices
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were formulated as passive and attitudinal measures, in order to minimize social
desirability and avoid the biasing effect of the opportunity of being in a situation of
need (van der Poel 1993; De Lange, Agneessens, and Waege 2004).
FIGURE 3.2: The Social support network. Node colours represent com-
pany co-membership (dark green = freelancers).
In the Trust in business variable, xij = 1 if i considered j to be trustworthy for a
hypothetical risky business partnership and xij = 0 otherwise. This was to relate
our measure to the concept of trust in a risky situation (Gambetta 1988; Hardin 2002).
Figure 3.4 shows the Trust in business network.
Data concerning professional collaboration between TaG members, by asking
three questions, according to the types of collaboration observed during the fieldwork.
Firstly, we asked about "incoming commissions", where respondents had to select
other members offering one or more effectively completed commissions. Secondly, a
similar question was asked to measure "outgoing commissions". Thirdly, respondents
were asked about other members with whom they worked at jointly designed new
projects. We then merged the adjacency matrices relative to the collaboration-related
questions and the matrix of Company co-membership to build a Collaboration network,
where xij = 1 if i had collaborated in any form or was company colleague with j and
xij = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, we measured subjects’ satisfaction levels of their collaboration
partners by asking them to express how much they would recommend them as
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FIGURE 3.3: The Social support network with reciprocated ties only.
Node colours represent company co-membership (dark green = free-
lancers); node size represents seniority in the group. Node coordinates
are the same as in Figure 3.2
business partners to others on the basis of their own past experience through a 1-7
Likert scale. We then built a Positive collaboration network, where xij = 1 if i has
collaborated with j and evaluated her with a value > 4. Otherwise, xij = 0. This was
made to create a proxy for "successful" economic exchange relations (Lawler, Thye,
and Yoon 2008). Figure 3.5 shows the Positive collaboration network.
Finally, as a control variable, we asked subjects to cite those TaG members whom
they had already known in person before becoming a TaG member. The resulting
answers constitute the Previous acquaintance network, which is reported in Figure 3.6.
Table 3.2 reports descriptive graph-level statistics of the Social support, Trust in
business and Positive collaboration networks.
3.3.4 Model specification
In order to test our hypotheses, we estimated univariate and multivariate Exponential
Random Graph (p∗) Models (ERGMs) for the Social support and Trust in business
networks (Pattison and Wasserman 1999; Snijders et al. 2006; Robins et al. 2007, n.d.;
Robins, Pattison, and Wang 2009; Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013). Univariate
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FIGURE 3.4: The Trust in business network. Node colours represent
company co-membership (dark green = freelancers). Node size rep-
resents seniority in the group. Node coordinates are the same as in
Figure 3.2
ERGMs for social network analysis have the following general form:
Pr(Y = y) =
1
k
exp
[∑
A
λAzA(y)
]
, (3.1)
where, Pr(Y = y) represents the probability of the tie-variable Y taking the
observed value y, 1k is a normalizing quantity, A represents a potential network
substructure, λA is the parameter corresponding to configuration A and zA(y) is the
graph statistic corresponding to configuration A, which indicates the presence of
configuration A in the observed network.
In case of the multivariate model, the statistics zA(y) are defined within and
among ties from different types of networks (Pattison and Wasserman 1999), such
that:
zk(y) =
∑
A∈Ak
∏
(i,j,m)∈A
xijm , (3.2)
where Ak is a collection of isomorphic configurations A of tie-variables.
For the multivariate ERGMs, we simulated the emergence of the observed net-
works of Social support and Trust in business simultaneously, assuming the exogenous
occurrence of the observed network of Positive collaboration. In order to test our
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FIGURE 3.5: The Positive collaboration network. Node colours repre-
sent company co-membership (dark green = freelancers). Node size
represents seniority in the group. Node coordinates are the same as in
Figure 3.2.
hypotheses, we calculated estimates of the entrainment effect of Positive collaboration
and Trust in business on Social support. In the former case, the effect measures how
likely i expects support from j if i and j have collaborated and i would recommend
j as a partner. In the latter case, the effect measures how likely it is that i expects
support from j and considers her trustworthy in business as well. In order to con-
trol for the co-occurrence of other confounding processes, we specified the models
with endogenous structural effects, exogenous actor-relation effects and exogenous
network covariate effects.
For within-network structural effects, we specified the model with basic reci-
procity, closure and connectivity parameters for non-directed networks (Robins,
Pattison, and Wang 2009; Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013). As regards to actor-
relation effects, we included parameters concerning individual demographic prop-
erties, namely gender and age, along with the subjects’ working experience, namely
seniority in the coworking space. For each attribute, the value of the sender effect mea-
sured the likelihood for a tie to be directed from a subject with a particular attribute
rather than another, while the receiver effect expressed the likelihood of a tie to be
received by a subject with that attribute. The homophily effect statistics measure the
propensity for subjects to form ties with others of the same categorial attribute. In
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FIGURE 3.6: The Previous acquaintance network. Node colours repre-
sent company co-membership (dark green = freelancers). Node size
represents seniority in the group. Node coordinates are the same as in
Figure 3.1
multivariate models, actor-relation effects were also estimated for both Social support
and Trust in business networks.
Finally, the entrainment effect of Previous acquaintance as covariate network was
estimated as a control factor. We dropped the specification of a similar effect for
Company co-membership on Social support because it was not significant in any of the
model configurations.
We estimated our models through Monte Carlo Markov Chain Maximum Likeli-
hood Estimation (MCMCMLE) (Snijders et al. 2006) using the Pnet software (Wang,
Robins, and Pattison 2005) for the univariate models and the XPnet software (Wang,
Robins, and Pattison 2006) for the multivariate model.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.3 shows that both Positive collaboration and Trust in business were significantly
correlated with Social support, with slight differences between the two values (Krack-
hardt 1987). By considering the number of entrained arcs between the three networks,
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Social support Trust in busi-
ness
Positive collab-
oration
Number of ties 99 235 130
Density 0.122 0.290 0.160
Mean in/outdegree 3.414 8.103 4.483
Minimum outdegree 0 0 0
Maximum outdegree 8 20 12
Outdegree centralization 0.170 0.440 0.278
Minimum indegree 0 0 0
Maximum indegree 7 16 11
Indegree centralization 0.133 0.292 0.241
Number of reciprocated pairs 25 64 58
Number of transitive triads (030T) 11 89 0
Number of cyclic triads (030C) 0 1 0
TABLE 3.2: Basic statistics for Social support, Trust in business and
Positive collaboration networks
TABLE 3.3: Pearson graph correlations of Social support, Positive col-
laboration and Trust in business with Quadratic Assignment Procedure
(QAP) tests.
Network 1 2
1. Social support
2. Positive collaboration 0.433∗
3. Trust 0.443∗ 0.410∗
* p < 0.001, QAP test with 1,000 repeti-
tions.
Table 3.4 shows that out of 130 ties of Positive collaboration, 58 co-occur with ties of
Social support, while 72 do not, with a Multiplexity Index υ = 0.712 (z-score=11.676)
(Skvoretz and Agneessens 2007)3. A higher multiplexity was observed between
Trust in business and Social support, as 82 out of 99 ties of social support expectations
co-occur with trust in business-related situations, with υ = 0.821 (z-score=12.788).
However, due to complex interdependencies within the data, we were unable to
draw any relevant conclusions on our hypotheses on the basis of these descriptive
statistics.
3. The index depends on the calculation of the maximum number of multiplex pairs that could occur
and of the expected number conditioned on outdegree.
TABLE 3.4: Number of entrained arcs for Social support, Trust in business
and Positive collaboration
.
1 2
1. Social support
2. Positive collaboration 58
3. Trust in business 82 93
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3.4.2 ERGM results
Table 3.5 shows estimates and standard errors of univariate ERGMS of Social support,
while Table 3.6 reports the same values estimated in multivariate ERGMs of Social
support and Trust in business. Good convergence of the MCMCMLE algorithm were
reported by all estimates. Following Wang et al. (2008), the goodness of fit of the
models are very good, as convergence statistics for the conventional range of non-
modelled effects was less than twice the absolute value of the estimated coefficient in
all but two effects (see Appendix B).
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we first looked at the entrainment effect of Positive
collaboration on Social support, as estimated in Model 1.1 (see Table 3.5). Our results
showed that the estimated coefficient was positive and significant. This would mean
that the observed proportion of positive collaboration ties which overlapped with ex-
pectations of social support was greater than we would expect by chance, controlling
for exogenous actor-relation effects and other structural within-network effects of the
Social support network. Model 1.2 (see Table 3.5) shows that such effect held true even
when controlling for the subjects’ previous acquaintance. More precisely, the model
shows that, although expectations of social support were directed preferably towards
those with whom i was previously acquainted, a positively evaluated collaboration
made it more probable that i expected support from a partner j rather than from
others, even if i did not already know j previously.
Hypothesis 2 can be tested by looking at the entrainment effect of Trust in business
and Social support in the multivariate models reported in Table 3.6. Model 2.1 shows
that i was more likely to expect social support from j if the former trusted the latter
for business-related issues, beyond the effect of all other processes specified in the
model. This effect remained positive and significant even when we controlled for
the entrainment effect of Positive collaboration (Model 2.2) and Previous acquaintance
(Model 2.3) on both Social support and Trust in business.
Our results showed that the likelihood that i expected social support from j if
the latter was considered trustworthy by i was greater than we would have expected
by chance. This was true even when the two actors had no previous successful
collaboration nor were they previously acquainted for any other reasons. These
results provide clear support for Hypothesis 2.
In addition, the multivariate models reported in Table 3.6 show that the effect
of Positive collaboration on Social support was not significant when we controlled for
the endogenous emergence of Trust in business. By comparing the entrainment effect
of Positive collaboration on Social support in Models 2.1 and 2.2, we noticed that the
estimate was not significant once we controlled for the effect of positive collaboration
ties on those pairs with overlapping Social support and Trust in business ties. More
precisely, Model 2.2 shows that Positive collaboration yielded a positive and significant
effect on Trust in business. This means that, beyond other effects in the model, if i
had collaborated satisfactorily with j, it was more likely that i trusted j for business-
related issues rather than others. Indeed, after including this in the model, the
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TABLE 3.5: Parameter estimates and standard errors for multivariate ERGMs of
Social support.
Parameters
Estimates (S.E.)
Model 1.1 Model 1.2
Structural effects (endogenous)
Arc -3.843 (1.429)∗ -3.938 (1.487)∗
Reciprocity 1.905 (0.551)∗ 1.708 (0.532)∗
Simple 2-path -0.409 (0.166)∗ -0.340 (0.173)
Popularity (in-degree) -0.442 (0.519) -0.435 (0.513)
Activity (out-degree) -0.087 (0.373) -0.063 (0.420)
Path closure (transitivity) 0.918 (0.228)∗ 0.762 (0.240)∗
Cyclic closure -0.118 (0.196) -0.138 (0.179)
Multiple connectivity 0.117 (0.189) 0.037 (0.195)
Actor-relation effects (exogenous)
Gender (sender) -0.551 (0.529) -0.527 (0.578)
Gender (receiver) -0.943 (0.567) -0.752 (0.597)
Gender (homophily) 0.811 (0.561) 0.552 (0.645)
Age (sender) 0.017 (0.023) 0.025 (0.024)
Age (receiver) 0.070 (0.025)∗ 0.073 (0.025)
Age (difference) -0.028 (0.024) -0.041 (0.028)
Seniority (sender) 0.002 (0.011) 0.005 (0.013)
Seniority (receiver) 0.023 (0.015) 0.027 (0.016)
Seniority (difference) -0.009 (0.010) -0.025 (0.011)∗
Covariate network effects (exogenous)
Positive collaboration (entrainment) 1.833 (0.294)∗ 1.447 (0.312)∗
Previous acquaintance (entrainment) 1.530 (0.388)∗
∗ |Est.|/S.E. > 2
λ = 2.00
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proportion of ties of Positive collaboration which co-occurred with expectations of
social support was not greater than expected by chance, given other processes at
work. More precisely, in 55 out of 58 pairs with entrained ties of Positive collaboration
and Social support, ties of Trust in business occurred as well4. Furthermore, results did
not qualitatively change when we controlled for the entrainment effect of Previous
acquaintance on both emergent networks (see Model 2.3). Finally, it is also worth
mentioning that being previously acquainted with j made i more likely to trust
him/her or to expect social support, beyond all other factors, as is shown by Model
2.3 (see Table 3.6).
Therefore, our results suggest that, once we account for the endogenous effect
of trust, there is no net association between a successful collaboration and the ex-
pectation of social support from the partner, beyond other confounding processes.
This would confirm Hypothesis 1. This would also imply that there is an association
between positive collaborations and expectations of social support, but only as long
as the collaboration generates trust for the partner. If i’s collaboration with j, though
positively evaluated, does not generate business-related trust for the partner, then i is
not more likely to expect social support from j than from other subjects.
An additional point to mentions is the importance of looking at the structural logic
of the Social support network by examining the endogenous structural parameters
of the ERGMs, concerning the structural logic (Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988;
Rank, Robins, and Pattison 2010) of the Social support network.Reciprocity is one
of the most interesting effects of the model. In the multivariate models reported in
Table 3.6, the estimate is positive but not significant, which allows us to conclude that
the amount of reciprocated ties in the Social support network was not significantly
different from what we would expect by chance. It is interesting to notice that
reciprocity was significant if the model was specified without controlling for the
emergence of Trust in business (see Table 3.5). When not controlling for the presence
of other ties, we found a tendency of subjects to reciprocate expectations of social
support. However, by taking into account the positive effects of reciprocity within
Trust in business and entrainment between the latter and Social support, we could say
that this data supports the view that the direct reciprocation of expectations of social
support is mainly due to the co-occurrence of trust ties.
Concerning closure, the model reported the values of two effects. First, the
estimate of path closure was positive and statistically significant. This means that
there was a tendency for a subject i to expect social support from another subject j,
if the same was done by other people who were expected by i to provide support.
Moreover, the likelihood of i expecting support from j increased non-linearly with
the number of two-paths between i and j, following a law of diminishing returns.
Secondly, the value of the cyclic closure effect was negative and non-significant. This
4. It is also meaningful that simulations of Model 2.2 without including the effect of Positive collabora-
tion on entrained Trust in business and Social support ties were sufficient to generate networks with an
average of 54.74 overlapping ties of Trust in business and Social support (see Table B.2 in Appendix B).
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would indicate that peers did not share social support because of indirect reciprocity.
However, this was also not significantly different from chance, controlling for the
other specified parameters, which prevents us from concluding that there was a
tendency against cyclic closure. The joint interpretation of the two closure parameters
indicates that there was a tendency towards transitivity.
Another interesting point is that the estimates for degree-related parameters were
not significant. This would indicate that the in- and out-degree centralization of
Social support was not significantly different from what we would expect by chance,
controlling for other effects.
Finally, certain interesting effects were shown by the multivariate models on the
emergence of the Trust in business network. The reciprocity effect was positive and
significant, in addition to the path closure value, while cyclic closure was negative
and significant. This is consistent with previous studies of trust in intraorganizational
networks, which found that trust is often reciprocated at the dyadic level, while
showing high transitivity closure and anti-cyclicality (e.g. Robins, Pattison, and Wang
2009; Lusher et al. 2012).
3.5 Discussion and conclusions
Eliciting solidarity between strangers is of particular importance in modern complex
societies, where an increasing number of individuals interact without necessarily
sharing a group identity. Economic exchanges, such as business relations or profes-
sional collaborations, can be a means of developing social relations as byproducts of
professional or economic interests. However, the conflict between individual inter-
ests, intrinsic to strategic motivations and uncertainty, may prevent the formation of
expressive ties that can magnify collective outcomes even beyond the original scope
of the interaction.
In this paper, we aimed to address this problem by analyzing expectations of
social support between independent professionals occasionally collaborating for
business-related reasons. We found that successful professional collaborations did
not determine support expectations. Yet, our results showed that such expectations
are associated with trust that individuals develop while collaborating professionally.
This supports the hypothesis that solidarity can emerge from economic interactions
only if the partner is considered to be trustworthy for risky exchanges (Molm, Collett,
and Schaefer 2007; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009).
More importantly, our study shows that the formation of trust-based solidarity can
be triggered by professional collaboration. First, learning partners’ trustworthiness
typically occurs during professional collaboration. This would confirm the positive
effect of negotiated exchanges on trust (Barrera 2007; Molm, Schaefer, and Collett
2009). On the one hand, expectations of social support between collaborators require
the formation of trust. On the other, the development of business-related trust is
mainly triggered by successful professional collaboration.
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Although accepting caveats concerning the context-specific nature of the work,
our study has general implications on the analysis of the interplay of economic moti-
vations and social outcomes. First, studying social support among business partners
is relevant to understand the microfoundations of cooperation. Along the same lines,
Baldassarri (2015) recently suggested looking at how interactions change individuals’
motives and expectations towards prosocial behaviour as the key to understand
cooperation and social relations. Simpson and Willer (2015) suggested that relational
mechanisms of cooperation are critical for the emergence and maintenance of large-
scale social formations. This is because social relations can amplify the effect of norms
and reputations beyond individual-level characteristics, so contributing to establish
contexts that can sustain cooperation.
Secondly, by analyzing solidarity within a network of economic exchanges, we
suggest that trust can have a mediating function of turning professional collaboration
into ties with expressive value and so even being self-reinforcing (Granovetter 1985).
Indeed, it is probable that trust developed while individuals professionally collaborate
side-by-side could have expressive value as individuals not only appreciate each
other’s expertise and skills during a collaborative project but also observe each other’s
standards of conduct and moral attitude.
Finally, our results imply that solidarity among peers in an organization can
emerge from their spontaneous economic interaction. However, this is conditional
on decentralized partner selection (see also Grimm and Mengel 2009; Chiang 2010;
Bravo, Squazzoni, and Boero 2012). Indeed, the lack of formal enforcement, e.g.,
top-down directives or hierarchical roles, exposes peers to the risk of exploitation
and so requires mutual learning of each others’ trustworthiness in direct or mediated
relations. Our results suggest that organizational policies aiming to create social
relations through top-down incentives might not be the only appropriate design for
nurturing social relations. An understanding of the appropriate mix of top-down and
bottom-up forces to stimulate collaboration, trust and social support is an important
topic to be investigated in the future (Squazzoni 2014).
More research is also needed to further investigate the emergence of solidarity
from economic exchange as a general socio-economic phenomenon. Here, synthesiz-
ing economic and social analysis is also key to understand the link between individual
behaviour and social constraints. In particular, other empirical studies are needed
to test existing theories on various organizational contexts, where specific forms of
economic exchange could yield different combinations of cooperation and conflict
affecting individuals’ framing of their partner’s motivations (Molm, Schaefer, and
Collett 2009; Kuwabara 2011). A potential extension of our study would be to recon-
struct the link between collaboration, trust and solidarity in organizational contexts
with different degrees of top-down constraints, e.g., hierarchical roles, over-imposed
collaboration and the presence of more established status dynamics within a work-
place. This would give a more comprehensive picture of the factors which stimulate
or inhibit the pivotal function of collaboration-driven trust found here.
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Chapter 4
Agent-Based Models in Sociology1
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are computer simulations of social interaction between
heterogeneous agents (e.g., individuals, firms or states), embedded in social structures
(e.g., social networks, spatial neighbourhoods or institutional scaffolds). These are
built to observe and analyse the emergence of aggregate outcomes (Gilbert 2008;
Squazzoni 2012). By manipulating behavioural or interaction model parameters,
whether guided by empirical evidence or theory, micro-level mechanisms can be
explored that can account for macro-level system behaviour, that is an existing time
series of aggregate data or certain stylized facts (Epstein 2006; Hedström and Ylikoski
2010).
The origins of ABMs in sociology can be traced back to pioneering contributions
by James S. Coleman (1964, 1964) and Raymond Boudon (1964) and the publication of
the first two volumes of The Journal of Mathematical Sociology in 1971. These included
two important articles by Sakoda (1971) and Schelling (1971) on segregation dynamics.
In these contributions, studying social outcomes by modelling agent behaviour and
interaction in a computer was considered an alternative to the functionalistic, hyper-
theoretical, macro-oriented social system theories that dominated sociology at that
time.
However, it was only from the 1990s that ABM applications reached a critical
mass. This development was thanks to the increasing computing power and the
diffusion of the first open source ABM platforms. These platforms made explicitly
individual behaviour models possible for the first time, without requiring excessive
computing skills by the modeller. Initial sociological applications in the late 1990s
covered the following areas: cooperation and social norms, diffusion, social influence,
culture dynamics, residential ethnic segregation, political coalitions and collective
opinions, to name but a few (Gilbert and Doran 1994; Gilbert and Conte 1995; Epstein
and Axtell 1996; Axelrod 1997; Conte, Hegselmann, and Terna 1997).
All these applications demonstrated that computational models can look at the
dynamic nature of social facts better than most other social scientific methods. These
include analytical equation-based models, used in standard economics and game
theory, statistical regression models, used in macro-sociology and unformalised,
1. A slightly different version of this chapter has been published as a peer-reviewed journal article in
WIREs Computational Statistics, Vol. 7, n. 4, pp. 284–306, doi: 10.1002/wics.1356, co-authored with
Flaminio Squazzoni.
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descriptive accounts, used in qualitative sociology. Due to mathematical restrictions,
standard game theory and analytical modelling cannot account for the irreducible
heterogeneity of social behaviour or look at out-of-equilibrium social dynamics,
which are both intrinsic to the ABM approach. In this sense, the ABM approach
is closer to behavioural game theory, which studies a variety of preferences and
motivations through experiments, rather than standard rational choice theory, where
homogeneous individual selfishness is assumed. While variable-based statistical
models cannot easily deal with micro-generative processes, which are key to ABMs,
descriptive, qualitative accounts cannot disentangle the effects of social networks and
at the same time look at space, time and large scale social processes in the same way
ABMs can.
By reviewing the first wave of ABMs in sociology in the 1990s, Macy and Willer
(2002) emphasized that ABMs are instrumental when the macro patterns of socio-
logical interest are not the simple aggregation of individual attributes but the result
of bottom-up processes at a relational level. Time has progressed since this influ-
ential review and advances have been made both in the extent and scope of ABM
applications, in the number of sociological publications and in their methodological
rigour. This article aims to report on these recent advances by considering examples,
which looked at the importance of behavioural factors, cases that tested the effect
of structural factors and models that pointed to the dynamic interplay of individual
behaviour and social structures.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 looks at ABMs, which investigated
social norms in cooperation and competition processes among individuals in stylized
interaction contexts. This is one of the most vibrant ABM fields, where sociology and
behavioural game theory have usefully interacted (Corten 2014). Their results showed
the importance of considering the fundamental heterogeneity of social behaviour,
the subtle nuances of individual rationality and the influence of social contexts in
understanding aggregate behaviour. They also showed that sociological relevance
increases when the interplay between individual behaviour and social networks is
looked at in a more dynamic, co-evolutionary way.
Section 2 looks at examples of ABMs, which investigated social influence mecha-
nisms and the influence of certain structural constraints on social outcomes, such as
residential segregation, stratification and collective opinions. These examples help us
to understand that certain facets of the social structure might influence social connec-
tions among individuals. As a result they may have wider implications, including
not only pressure towards social uniformity and convergence but also persistence of
diversity in culture, norms or attitudes. At the same time, they allow to conceive the
constructive role of the interplay of behavioural mechanisms and social structures in
understanding the emergence of collective phenomena.
Finally, in Section 3 the key findings are summarized, while methodological
implications are discussed.
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4.1 Cooperation and social norms
Social life is rich with complex forms of cooperation between unrelated individuals
that are channelled through social norms and institutions. Donating blood, being a
witness at a trial or reviewing an article for a journal would not be possible if we were
not able to overcome the temptation of self-interest to benefit others with our own
effort. Given that natural and social selection tend to encourage competition, social
norms and institutions must exist to provide a context for cooperation. Understanding
in which contexts and for what reasons individuals can collectively generate social
welfare despite self-interest, is one of the most important missions of social science.
The social sciences have looked at the importance of certain social mechanisms
in promoting cooperation in hostile environments, where there is a conflict between
individual self-interest and group outcomes. Examples of these mechanisms could be
direct and indirect reciprocity, reputation, social punishment, trust and social conven-
tions. In this field, fruitful cross-fertilization already exists between behavioural game
theory and ABM sociological analysis of social norms, with interesting extensions and
modifications of standard game theory. Here, simulations were used to complement
problems of analytic tractability of standard game theory as well as for exploring
departures from its deductive, equilibrium-dominated framework.
4.1.1 Direct reciprocity
A key mechanism of social life is reciprocity, i.e., a form of conditional cooperation
between related or unrelated individuals, which can be both direct or indirect (Bowles
and Gintis 2011). Direct reciprocity means that two individuals are expected to
cooperate if the probability of their future encounter exceeds the cost/benefit ratio of
the altruistic act at an individual level. In this case, it is likely that certain aspects of
social structure can have significant implications for cooperation as they influence
the probability of encounters between two individuals and so the type of behaviour
to which they are exposed (Macy and Flache 2009).
It is widely acknowledged that the embeddedness of agents in a spatial structure,
dramatically increases cooperation, as this determines a higher probability of en-
counter between correlated agents (Németh and Takács 2007). An interesting problem
is to understand whether this can also happen in non-spatially related structures. A
good ABM example of this is a study by Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod (2001) on an
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (see also Nowak and Sigmund 1992)). They simulated a
population of agents, who could cooperate or defect, reciprocate their opponent’s be-
haviour (i.e., cooperating with cooperators and defecting with defectors) and imitate
the behaviour of the highest fitted individual they encountered (with some noise),
thus learning behavioural strategies from the social environment. They manipulated
the initial network topology that connected agents to each other, by testing ran-
dom encounters, spatial neighbourhoods, small-world networks and fixed networks.
Results showed that even the sole persistence of interaction patterns from initially
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random encounters could make cooperation possible between selfish agents as it
preserves favourable conditions for direct reciprocity, e.g., cooperators interacting
more frequently among each other and receiving higher payoffs. This situation did
not vary when agent behaviour was spatially correlated, i.e., spatial effects existed
between neighbouring agents (see also Axelrod et al. 2002).
Although important, these examples neither assume a considerable influence of
the social structure in shaping individual behaviour nor look at social mechanisms
that exist to help individuals predict other agents’ behaviour. If we consider that
our life is mostly structured into social groups, it is probable that cooperation is
influenced by group identity, so that we prefer to cooperate with in-group members
and are less fair with outsiders. Coherently, in many circumstances, we tend to use
tags or etiquettes (e.g., colour of skin, group dress style, or any other observational
trait) to predict behaviour (Riolo, Cohen, and Axelrod 2001), which can even make
us unconscious victims of stereotypes. The point here is that group identity or tags
could substitute or magnify direct reciprocity.
Hales (2000) built an evolutionary model which showed that cooperation could
emerge in a mixed population of cooperators and defectors with randomly distributed
tags playing one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games with in-group members. Results
showed that the formation of same-tag local clusters, in which cooperative groups
eventually outperformed non-cooperative ones, could work even without assuming
the memory of past experience, nor reciprocity-oriented strategies. Hammond and
Axelrod (2006a, 2006b) modelled a population of agents with different tags who
could decide whether to cooperate or defect with in-group and out-group agents.
Without building in-group favouritism in the model, simulations showed that the
evolution of cooperation in a spatial structure could be sustained by the emergence
of a dominant "ethnocentric" strategy. That is, by which agents cooperated with in-
group members and defected with outsiders, through the formation of local clusters
of same-tag agents. Recently, Bausch (2014) has questioned the tag-driven nature of
Hammond and Axelrod’s results, arguing that higher levels of cooperation might
even be obtained by simply constraining interaction and reproduction to occur locally,
without modelling different tags and preferential cooperation.
While these examples examined the importance of forward-looking strategies in
repeated dyadic interaction, cooperation may also emerge from backward-looking
strategies, with individuals capable of learning from past experience and adjusting
their behaviour dynamically. Building on previous work on stochastic learning
algorithms (Macy 1991), Macy and Flache (2002) built a series of models that included
a variety of two-person cooperation dilemmas. Their results showed that adapting
backward-looking agents could generate a self-reinforcing cooperative equilibrium
but only within a narrow range of intermediate levels of the agents’ aspiration.
Mutual defection was more likely if agents had low or high aspiration levels as
in these cases the context made defection worth-while, due to agent inertia (low
aspiration) or individual dissatisfaction (high aspiration).
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The situation can change if agents could exploit forms of interpersonal com-
mitment against the risk of being cheated. In this respect, following experimental
research about commitment in dyadic exchange, Back and Flache (2006) looked at
the viability of committing – i.e., acting unconditionally cooperatively with some
partners who have previously proved to be reliable – against a wide spectrum of other
exchange strategies in a competitive environment. Results showed that commitment-
based strategies are more viable than even tolerant versions of direct reciprocity, as
they allow agents to create wider and more efficient exchange networks, while avoid-
ing the vicious cycle of "keeping the books balanced", which makes reciprocity-based
strategies vulnerable to cascades of mutual retaliatory defection. It is worth noting
that recent ABM studies have analysed the impact of reciprocity also in peer review
and found a possible negative side of reciprocity when social sanctioning is absent or
weak. Squazzoni and Gandelli (2013) modelled the strategic behaviour of referees
in a population of scientists called on to act as authors and referees during the peer
review process in different competitive publication environments. Scenarios where
referees were randomly reliable (i.e., providing more or less pertinent evaluation
of author submissions’ quality) were compared with others in which referees could
strategically reciprocate past experience as authors by being more or less reliable with
new authors. Their simulations showed that if referees’ reciprocity is not inspired
by fairness (contributing to scientific progress as a public good), but only by past
publication or rejection when authors, peer review generates dramatic publication
bias and allocates resources inefficiently (see also Thurner and Hanel 2011; Squazzoni
and Gandelli 2012).
4.1.2 Indirect reciprocity and reputation
It is worth noting that individuals can also cooperate indirectly via third parties. In
these cases, individuals could expect future benefits by cooperating with a counterpart
from other partners, e.g., other group members, or by accessing or being subject to
reputational information, e.g., cooperating with someone establishes good reputation
that will be awarded by others (Nowak 2006).
Behavioural and evolutionary research has recently shown that the complex
cooperation scaffolds that characterise social life seem to primarily depend on these
complex forms of indirect reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2011). This has interesting
sociological implications as social relationships pass from a dyadic to a triadic form
and network effects are also included. This can help us to understand why social
evolution involves the establishment of generalised forms of social exchange and
large groups of unrelated individuals beyond direct reciprocity motives.
In this respect, many ABM studies have looked at the impact of reputation as
a form of indirect reciprocity (Janssen 2006; Pinyol and Sabater-Mir 2013). These
studies emphasised two important functions of reputation: a) learning, i.e., accessing
information about unknown partners via third parties which was not previously
available and/or was too costly and b) social control, i.e., monitoring and punishing
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norm violators through socially shared reputational signals (Raub and Weesie 1990;
Buskens and Raub 2002).
As regards to learning, Boero et al. (2010) developed an ABM calibrated on
behavioural data gathered from a lab experiment where subjects were asked to take
investment decisions in a simulated financial market characterized by asymmetries of
information and uncertainty. Subjects had different investment options, which were
more or less risky and could receive/send information by/to others, so mimicking
the formation and circulation of reputational information. Results showed, firstly,
that subjects followed three types of behaviour, coherent with behavioural game
theory findings, i.e., always cooperating with others by sharing reliable information,
reciprocating reliable information only with reliable partners, cheating by always
providing unreliable information to others. Secondly, results showed that socially
sharing reputational information was beneficial for the exploration capabilities of
agents in situations of uncertainty, independent of the quality of the information
shared. Finally, they showed that reputation (social sharing of personal evaluation,
even if potentially biased) was more effective than personal experience (formation of
an opinion on the counterpart in direct interaction) in detecting reliable information
partners and reducing the amount of false reputational information in the system.
In regards to social control, Conte and Paolucci (2002) developed a model that
also distinguished "image" from "reputation" and focused on social processes of
reputation formation and transmission. They simulated a population of agents that
followed heterogeneous behaviour, i.e., self-interest, altruism and norm compliance,
in a social dilemma situation and manipulated simulation scenarios to add socially
shared evaluation of other agents’ behaviour. Results showed that, by allowing
individuals to share the social cost of sanctioning against self-interested behaviour,
reputation provided room for evolutionary stability of cooperation at levels hardly
achievable by other mechanisms, e.g., direct reciprocity or cognitively sophisticated
trustful partners’ detection. Furthermore, they found that the circulation of false bad
reputation tended to protect normative behaviour more than leniency (false good
reputation) or silence. This work has influenced a large body of ABM research on
reputation as a social control device for group behaviour (Hales 2002; Hahn et al.
2007; Wierzbicki and Nielek 2011).
4.1.3 Social punishment
Another form of indirect reciprocity is social punishment. Indeed, while reciprocating
bad behaviour with a bad behaviour in some circumstances can create the conditions
for cooperation, social life is full of examples of individuals bearing a personal cost
for punishing wrongdoers, e.g., an individual reporting misbehaviour to the police
to benefit a victim. This behaviour is called "strong reciprocity" as it implies a direct
reduction of payoffs imposed on the cheater at the expenses of the punisher without
direct reciprocal benefits for the latter (Gintis 2000).
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Empirically inspired by the case of mobile hunter-gatherer groups in the Late
Pleistocene, Bowles and Gintis (2004) have developed an ABM where a population of
agents played an n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma that mimicked cooperation problems
in hunting, food gathering and common defence without any centralised institution.
They explored a mixed population of egoists, cooperators and strong reciprocators.
Due to the presence of self-interested agents, group benefits could be eroded by the
fact that certain individuals could exploit the collaborative work of others without
contributing themselves. They found that the robustness of cooperation depended
on the co-existence of these behaviours at a group level and that strong reciprocators
were functional in keeping the level of cheating under control in each group. This
was due to the fact that the higher the number of cooperators in a group without
reciprocators, the higher the chance that the group disbanded due to high payoffs
for shirking. This means that group structure may be the key to evolutionary social
selection, even more than individual strategies (see also the test on the case of team
collaboration in organizations by Carpenter et al. (2009)). This is a relevant finding as
it paves the way to consider whether social selection can be multi-level, working not
only at a genetic-individual level but also at a social group level.
These findings were extended by Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles (2010) to situations of
public punishment (i.e., the establishment of an institution, which monitors people’s
behaviour and punishes wrongdoers by exploiting economies of scale). Their results
showed that also in the case of institutional punishment, the presence of a minimal
fraction of strong reciprocators intrinsically motivated by social norms to support
institutional punishment by paying fees and help social monitoring is instrumental
to maintain cooperation over time.
More recently, Andrighetto et al. (2013) built an interesting ABM based on ex-
perimental data in a public goods game similar to the previous examples, where
punishment was combined with normative signalling. In this case, agents were called
on to decide whether to cooperate by contributing to the public good or defect by
exploiting other agents’ contribution, punish defectors and send signals to others
about the appropriate amount of contribution expected (i.e., the norm). As it is a focal
point for what others expect as an appropriate contribution, signalling could affect
individual preferences. Their simulations showed that punishment accompanied by
norm signalling can ensure more robust cooperation at a lower cost for the group than
when acting alone. They also showed that punishment is more effective when norm
communication has already proved to be important for the perception of the norm by
individuals. This socio-cognitive approach has been followed by other ABM studies
to examine the cognitive counterpart of social norms and the importance of social
contexts. These provide normative meaning and signals for individuals in typical
social dilemmas, using an interesting mix of ABM, experimental and qualitative
methods (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010; Conte, Andrighetto, and Campennì
2013; Elsenbroich and Gilbert 2014; Xenitidou and Edmonds 2014).
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4.1.4 Trust
In many cases, we provide relevant information, time or money to others when we
trust they will honour our help. However, in competitive environments and in situa-
tions of information asymmetry, distrust could prevail given that the potential benefit
of interacting with others could be lower than the future cost of being cheated. On
the other hand, when interaction is between strangers, with no previous experience
of each other, a set of communication signals or tags might exist. These in turn could
help individuals to convey and recognise the degree of trustworthiness of a potential
partner and so risk cooperation. This is the case of taxi drivers and their relationships
with customers, brilliantly documented by Gambetta and Hamill (2005).
In order to look at the emergence of trust among strangers, Macy and Skvoretz
(1998) built a model in which agents could decide whether to engage or not in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game by learning to display or mimic and recognise actual or
fake signals of trustworthiness and eventually imitating successful strategies from
others. They assumed that agents were embedded in a social network structure with
neighbours and strangers through strong and weak ties respectively. Couples were
randomly paired with a probability correlated with the social distance of agents. They
tested the effect of different payoffs for not engaging in a risky exchange (i.e., an
exit option) and the degree of the agents’ network embeddedness. Results showed
that cooperation between strangers could emerge in the long run, due to less costly
exit payoffs that allowed agents to build clusters of trustful relationships locally that
gradually diffused via weak ties, depending on the level of agent embeddedness.
Following experimental studies on cross-cultural differences on trust and com-
mitment (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994), Macy and Sato (2002, 2010), tested the
effect of spatial mobility on the emergence of trust and cooperation in a simulated
population of learning agents. These played a repeated version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma with an exit option and the possibility to choose to play with a neighbour
or a stranger with different opportunity and transaction costs. Simulations found
a curvilinear effect of mobility on trust. Indeed, the ability to detect trustworthy
partners emerged only beyond moderate levels of mobility, which allowed agents
to meet other partners. In case of higher levels of mobility, trust decreased because
agents could not appropriately discriminate trust any more.
These studies indicate that one of the main challenges for cooperation in trust
situations is the capability of agents to detect trustworthy partners and build stable
forms of interaction around them. In this respect, some studies have looked at partner
selection in dynamic networks (Santos, Pacheco, and Lenaerts 2006; Pacheco, Traulsen,
and Nowak 2006). The idea here is that not only might individual behaviour vary
from person to person and within the same person over time, but social networks are
also constantly changing. This reflects new opportunities or constraints for a person
when connected with another one. Behaviour and networks can change dynamically
in a complex regime of possibilities/constraints that could have dramatic implications
for macro behaviour.
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Dynamic networks are also important factors in establishing trust. Bravo, Squaz-
zoni, and Boero (2012) calibrated an ABM on experimental data on the behaviour of
real subjects in a repeated trust game. They compared scenarios where agents were
embedded in exogenously fixed networks (e.g., random, scale-free and small-world
networks) and scenarios with endogenous networks, where agents could select their
partners according to a simple happiness function. They found that cooperation
dramatically increases in dynamic networks. Trustworthy agents tended to cluster
around emerging cooperators, who had more ties and ensured higher profit to their
respective partners. On the other hand, "bad apples" tended to be isolated over time
losing both profit and opportunities for exchange. Furthermore, while different initial
network conditions did not affect this endogenous dynamics, with more cooperative
agents benefiting from an exponential growth of number of ties independently of the
initial network constraints, the final network topology in case of initial random or
regular networks, was different.
These results were confirmed experimentally in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Fehl, Post, and Semmann 2011). It was also confirmed in a model on a helping game
where Chiang (2013) allowed agents to use information of network characteristics
(e.g., the structural attribute of the nodes) to strategize whether to cooperate or not.
The co-evolution of behaviour and network created a crystallized configuration where
cooperators had more ties and achieve higher profit so that cooperation outperformed
defection over time.
This fact would indicate that social structure can endogenously generate role
differentiation that may be relevant in generating conditions favourable to coopera-
tion. For instance, Eguíluz et al. (2005) simulated a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma model
where diverse social roles emerged from dynamic networks with "leaders", i.e., agents
obtaining a large payoff, who were then imitated by many others, "conformists", that
is unsatisfied cooperative agents, who keep cooperating and finally, "exploiters", i.e.,
defectors who have a larger payoff than the average obtained by cooperators. By
endogenously converging towards a small-world topology, the network achieved
a strong hierarchical structure in which the leaders played an essential role in sus-
taining cooperation. On the other hand, they found that once disruptions affecting
leaders was introduced, a dynamic cascade was found, which propagated defection
throughout the network.
4.1.5 Conventions
Social life is full of examples of social interaction where it is of mutual interest for
individuals to converge towards a dominant behaviour, rather than compete on
certain rewards at stake. We develop certain habits or conventions, e.g., language,
monogamy vs. polygamy in marriage, a particular dress-code, that help us coordinate
with each other more or less efficiently. Once established, these conventions can even
be institutionally enforced, e.g., traffic rules. The challenge here is to understand the
origins of these social artefacts, given that any coordination game may have multiple
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possible equilibria, no initial preferable options exist and outcomes are extremely
sensitive to initial conditions, path dependence and increasing returns (Durlauf and
Young 2004).
In order to understand this, Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) modelled a population
of agents randomly located in a 100 x 2 cell ring that had to decide whether to
drive clockwise or counter-clockwise around a ring to avoid collision. Agents were
characterised by a limited vision of space, inertia and a habituation level, i.e. the
tendency to repeat past behaviour. Their simulations showed that the convergence
of agents toward a right/left convention is higher when the level of habituation
increases, independent of the error at the agent-level when estimating other agents’
behaviour. Furthermore, they confronted agents with different cognitive capabilities
of monitoring the environment. They found that although habit had a positive
effect on the emergence of conventions even for omniscient agents, the most striking
influence was found when agents were boundedly rational, thus showing how habit
can complement individuals’ cognitive limitations in achieving coordination at a
collective level.
Epstein (2001) built a similar model to investigate the link between the strength of
a convention and the cognitive costs that individuals have to pay to decide what to
do. He simulated a population of agents in a ring, similar to the previous example,
which had a heterogeneous sampling radius (i.e., space of vision). They could observe
other agents’ behaviour within their radius and could generalise global attributes
by reducing or extending the search process around it. His simulations showed that
two conventions could co-exist, with local conformity vs. global diversity patterns.
However, this required considerable cognitive costs for intermediate agents, i.e.,
agents who continued to shift from one convention to another one. He also found
that when a given convention equilibrium emerges, it feeds back to the agent-level
by minimising cognitive decision costs and therefore a macro-micro self-reinforcing
path.
However, it is reasonable to presume that the emergence of conventions is also
influenced by network effects, i.e., how agents are connected. Many studies have ex-
amined the influence of exogenous network structures on the diffusion of conventions
(Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2005). It is probable that, while engaged in coordination
problems, agents try to avoid those who behave differently and prefer relationships
with agents similar to themselves. The consequences of these endogenous mecha-
nisms of the formation of a social environment were explored by Buskens, Corten,
and Weesie (2008) in a repeated coordination game model. Here, agents were called
on to decide which opinion to endorse and their payoffs depended on the choices
of other agents they were tied to. The authors examined the importance of initial
network conditions on the emergence of conventions. They found that the density of
the network had a crucial impact on the final conventions’ equilibrium. The more
segmented the network was, the higher the likelihood that two groups with different
conventions emerged over time. This was due to the fact that certain agents preferred
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to have ties with agents similar to themselves, rather than adapting their behaviour
to dissimilar ones.
The importance of these endogenous network formation mechanisms was also
confirmed by Corten and Buskens (2010). Their findings from a repeated, multi-
person coordination game model with network embeddedness were tested in a
laboratory experiment. Here, subjects played a coordination game with payoffs
depending on the choices of other neighbouring agents while they could create,
maintain or break their ties depending on a certain cost. Results showed that agents
were more efficient in terms of coordination, where the initial networks were less
dense and they could endogenously adjust their networks.
Finally, it is worth noting that these results were also empirically tested on a lon-
gitudinal survey about alcohol use among adolescents in fourteen Dutch secondary
schools, conducted in 2003 and 2004. Here, alcohol use was modelled as a risk domi-
nant inefficient behaviour in a coordination game. Adolescents were motivated to
align their behaviour with that of their friends to be approved socially (Ormerod and
Wiltshire 2009). While initial alcohol use propensity per class had a positive effect on
average alcohol use at a later stage, the initial network density dramatically amplified
this tendency (Corten and Knecht 2013).
4.2 Social influence
Individuals rarely make decisions in complete isolation of their social context (Gra-
novetter 2005). The influence of social contexts on individual decisions is something
that supporters of rational choice theory often tend to underestimate or conceive
simply as information bias. However, in situations of uncertainty, the exposure to
social signals from the behaviour of other people might influence our behaviour, as
we presume that others know more than we do. At the same time, in group-life, we
know that our behaviour is a signal for others who are observing and judging us.
This is particularly important when the opinion of others can influence our access to
important resources, e.g., economic benefits and social approval.
When the decisions of individuals are not independent but interdependent,
choices do not simply aggregate at the macro level. This makes any micro-macro or
macro-micro mapping potentially misleading if we do not consider the meso-level
between individual choices and social outcomes. For instance, macro patterns can
be the result of unintended consequences given that they do not reflect individual
preferences but only interaction or propagation effects.
4.2.1 Segregation patterns
A classic example of the analysis of social interdependence is the famous Schelling’s
segregation model (Schelling 1971). Here, a population of households of two groups,
say black and white, was located in a two-dimensional space, characterised by regu-
lar neighbourhood structures, representing an idealised urban space. Households
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had a threshold preference about the group of their neighbours and could stay or
move randomly towards new locations in case the number of similar neighbours
was below the threshold. Results showed that even moderate preference for similar
neighbours could tip a society into a segregated pattern. This was due to the inter-
dependent nature of choices and their spatial and temporal effect on changing the
context. Indeed, any household that reached its threshold and moved out of its neigh-
bourhood reduced the number of similar neighbours in the original neighbourhood,
leaving whoever was left closer to its threshold. Any movement of households also
changed the receiving neighbourhood and indirectly also the neighbourhoods of the
neighbourhoods, thus triggering a cascade of reactions towards an equilibrium of
household distribution far from the original households’ preferences.
If we only looked at the individual level, we could predict macro segregation but
with a more mixed residential distribution. If we only looked at the macro level, we
should presume the segregational preferences of households, which was not the case.
This abstract model allows us to understand that social context is typically a nexus of
interdependence, e.g., the choice of A influences the choice of B, which influences the
choice of C and subsequently that of A again. This makes it difficult for any linear
micro-macro mapping (see also Sakoda 1971). This reminds us of the classic lessons of
complex adaptive systems theory: even with simple agent interaction, there is always
a possible gap between individual choices and aggregate processes so that looking
only at individual levels, whether micro or macro, can lead us to draw illusionary
conclusions (Miller and Page 2009).
Thanks to its simplicity and ability to be generalised, the Schelling’s model has
contributed to a prolific stream of ABM research. Certain authors have extended
this original version by modifying important model parameters, e.g., preference
thresholds, search for new locations, intentional household preferences toward inte-
gration, size of the neighbourhoods or spatial network topologies (Epstein and Axtell
1996; Laurie and Jaggi 2003; Zhang 2004; Fossett and Waren 2005; Fagiolo, Valente,
and Vriend 2007; Clark and Fossett 2008). Gilbert (2002) examined the influence of
certain social attributes of neighbourhoods, such as crime rate, the neighbourhoods’
perceived prestige and certain economic constraints, by providing households with
more sophisticated cognitive processes of social environment’s detection. Benito et al.
(2011) provided an experimental test of the Schelling’s findings in a laboratory exper-
iment. In all these cases, the original findings were corroborated and this contributed
to make Schelling’s model a general example of the unintended consequences of
individual choices in social situations.
In a recent article, Bruch and Mare (2006) started from empirical evidence that
indicated that individuals tend to respond continuously to variations in the racial
makeup of their neighbourhoods. They replicated the Schelling’s model, but assumed
that households could experience a small increase in desirability of their location
for each given percentage increase in the proportion of similar households in their
neighbourhood, so removing the threshold shape of households’ preference. Their
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results showed that linear function preferences could soften residential segregation.
In response to Bruch and Mare (2006)’s model, Van de Rijt, Siegel, and Macy
(2009) examined the rules that determined how households moved when they were
unsatisfied. They showed that in a multicultural population with integrative pref-
erences, threshold preferences at a micro level might help to prevent tipping, on
condition that households made mistakes and moved to neighbourhoods that did not
necessarily correspond to their preferences. This presumed that they did not have
complete information about the real composition of the new targeted neighbourhood.
They showed that once agents have a clear preference toward diversity, move to
undesirable neighbourhoods or promptly react to the changes in their neighbour-
hood, segregation is likely to occur. On the contrary, once households have a clear
preference toward ethnicity, react promptly to their neighbourhood’s changes and
rarely make mistakes in selecting their new neighbourhood, integration is more likely.
This indicates that the shape of preferences does not have unequivocal implications,
but rather that this depends on household preferences. It is worth noting that the
importance of the contextual nature of preferences and the possible heterogeneous
nature of neighbourhood composition was also found in an empirical calibration
of Schelling’s model in Israel (Benenson, Hatna, and Or 2009; Hatna and Benenson
2012).
More recently, Bruch (2014) calibrated a segregation model by using empirical
data on three cities in the U.S., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the 1980-2000
U.S. census data. She found that income inequality affects racial segregation. Given
that higher between-group income inequality increases the salience of economic
factors in residential mobility decisions, she found that high income blacks live
in whiter neighbourhoods than they would otherwise, whereas poorer blacks are
racially and economically isolated. The focal mechanism is called "offsetting": under
sufficiently high levels of within-race income heterogeneity, increasing between-race
income inequality can have opposite effects at the high and low ends of the income
distribution. Whether these offsetting processes cause a net increase or decrease in
segregation depends on the relative size of the black population, the salience of racial
versus economic factors in residential mobility decisions and the shape of the income
distribution.
Finally, it is worth noting that Schelling’s findings have also been extended into
policy and health fields. For instance, Auchincloss et al. (2011) showed that residential
segregation might play a role in determining the diffusion of obesity and related
illnesses in low-income families. By adding food price and preferences and locating
stores across the neighbourhoods in the model, they showed that ceteris paribus,
residential segregation alone could increase income differential in diet, independent
of the low-income households’ food preferences. Negative implications of residential
segregation were also found in public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
1999), income distribution (Reardon and Bischoff 2011) and quality of schools and
labour market (Nechyba 2003).
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4.2.2 Cultural and opinion dynamics
Although social influence would lead us to expect a dominant tendency towards
convergence in collective behaviour, social systems often display persistent dynamics
of cultural and opinion diversity. Minority beliefs or opinions tend to persist over
time, independent of any social force pushing them towards uniformity. This is
especially relevant when we observe the persistence of collective misbeliefs and
discriminatory stereotypes in certain societies or the impact of extremist groups in
politics.
Influenced by Latané’s social psychological theory of social impact (Latané 1981),
Nowak, Szamrej, and Latané (1990) modelled a population of agents in a lattice with
randomly assigned binary values of an opinion variable and heterogeneous levels
of persuasiveness and supportiveness. These levels were defined respectively as
the ability to make out-group agents change their opinion and in-group agents to
resist outsiders’ persuasiveness. Agents changed their opinion value according to
the relative impact of total persuasiveness or supportiveness exerted on them by
other agents, weighted by their distance from the agent within the matrix. Simu-
lations showed that, besides the emergence of a dominant opinion, the formation
of strong local minority clusters prevented in-group agents being influenced by the
majority. This determined the emergence of a polarized stable equilibrium, with local
convergence and global polarization of cultural traits, due to the high sensitivity of
persuasiveness and supportiveness to structural embeddedness factors.
This avenue was further explored by Axelrod (1997), who built a more sophisti-
cated model to test the effects of structural embeddedness, cultural heterogeneity and
interpersonal influence on convergence and polarization outcomes. Adaptive agents
were modelled with heterogeneous cultural characteristics, defined as a combination
of a fixed number of cultural features (e.g., language, religion, etc.), each taking n
possible trait values (e.g., English, German, Italian; Christian, Muslim, etc.). Agents
interacted with neighbours with a probability dependent on the number of identical
cultural features they shared. A mechanism of interpersonal influence was added
to align one randomly selected dissimilar cultural feature of an agent to that of the
partner, after interaction. The author manipulated certain parameters of cultural het-
erogeneity (number of features and number of traits) and structural embeddedness
(interaction range and environment size). Confirming previous studies, Axelrod’s
simulations showed that global convergence towards a single culture did not occur,
despite interpersonal influence mechanism. Moreover, they showed that the number
of emergent cultural groups positively correlated with the number of cultural features
and negatively correlated with the interaction range. This was because large-distance
interaction amplified the effect of interpersonal influence from the local to the global
scale. However, cultural diversity was unexpectedly found to negatively correlate
with both the number of possible traits and the environment size. More recently,
Klemm et al. (2003) found that cultural homogeneity could eventually emerge due to
low rates of random cultural perturbations, which caused the collapse of boundaries
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between otherwise dissimilar neighbours. Moreover, by looking at the co-evolution
of network structure and agents’ partner selection, Centola et al. (2007) identified
a certain size-dependent perturbation parameter region for which interpersonal in-
fluence and homophily prevented the evolution of the system into monoculture or
unstable global cultural diversity. This in turn generated a stable polarized global
equilibrium.
However, the unrealistic narrowness of such parameter region was pointed out
by Flache and Macy (2011a), who found a stabilising mechanism for the emergence
of a bipolarized global equilibrium. They questioned the assumption of the dyadic
character of social influence in favour of a multilateral model of that mechanism
(Kuperman 2006). Their results showed that multilateral interaction could be a more
robust mechanism for the persistence of cultural diversity, especially in large popula-
tions, as local clusters could better resist deviant agent influence under conditions of
perturbation and eventually prevent it from spreading globally.
It is worth considering that the local convergence and global diversity pattern
can also be generated when homophily or social influence are not expected to play a
crucial role. Combining standard game theory and ABMs, Bednar and Page (2007)
showed that certain structural characteristics of cultural dynamics might be gener-
ated by purposive agents playing multiple games without reacting to evolutionary
pressures. Similarly, Bednar et al. (2010) showed that a certain level of diversity
could persist within local cultural clusters. By assuming that culturally heteroge-
neous agents, besides facing social pressure to conformity, also strive for internal
consistency among their own different features, they showed that global convergence
could emerge in the long run, yet allowed for an intermediate phase in which cultural
heterogeneity persisted.
Social influence is also important for the formation and diffusion of political
opinions, including the rise and propagation of minority political positions. By
extending previous studies on opinion dynamics (Deffuant et al. 2000; Hegselmann
and Krause 2002), Deffuant et al. (2002) built a model in which a continuous opinion
variable x (−1 < x < 1) was distributed within a population of adaptive agents. In
this way, moderate and extreme positions on a political issue could be contemplated.
Agents were also equipped with an uncertainty value, negatively correlated with the
level of the agents’ political radicalism, following the assumption that radicals are
more confident of their own opinions. Both opinion and uncertainty could change
over time through interaction, so that agents randomly coupled and influenced
each other if their opinion distance was lower than a threshold, eventually leading
to converging opinions. The agents’ influence negatively depended on their level
of uncertainty. By manipulating the uncertainty distribution and the proportion of
radicals in the population, they showed that for low levels of uncertainty, the influence
of radicals was effective only on a small proportion of closer agents, eventually
leading to convergence around moderate levels. However, for high uncertainty levels,
radicals prevailed, causing concentration of opinion distribution either on a single
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extreme or on both (bipolarization).
By adding a social network structure to the previous model, Amblard and Def-
fuant (2004) showed that extremists could exploit low connected networks better, as
they could spread in local clusters and co-exist with the rest of the population. On the
other hand, when connectivity increased around a critical value, the extremists were
confined to peripheral regions by core moderate agents. Furthermore, Deffuant (2006)
compared different formal models of opinion and uncertainty across three network
structures, pointing out that extreme convergence was possible in certain network
configurations which favoured the isolation of clusters of moderates and permitted
radicals to influence other agents without being influenced in turn.
Polarization can be further influenced by the fact that in social life partner selec-
tion might be driven by xenophobia (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). This
implies that negative interpersonal influence could even exacerbate this tendency.
In order to consider this, Macy et al. (2003) developed a model of adaptive agents
with binary cultural states, which were embedded in a full-connected network of
weighted undirected ties. Weights, w (−1 < w < 1), incorporated information about
the strength and the valence (positive or negative) of the influence between agents in
dyadic interaction, were randomly distributed among the ties and could evolve ac-
cording to changes in the number of similar traits. By manipulating decision-making
flexibility and number of cultural states, results showed that a bifurcating network
equilibrium emerged. A stable outcome towards homogeneity would not occur,
unless only positive valence of partner selection and social influence were assumed.
In a development of this model, Flache and Macy (2011b) tested the effect of the
bridging role of "long-range ties" (Granovetter 1973) in fostering cultural convergence,
by allowing agents to create dynamic networks within different exogenous network
structures. Results showed that long-range ties did generate cultural homogeneity but
only when interaction was limited to positive selection and influence. On the contrary,
in cases of bivalent influence, long-range ties induced a polarized equilibrium.
By looking at U.S. American public opinion, Baldassarri and Bearman (2007)
investigated the bivalent nature of partner selection and social influence mechanisms
to explain the mismatch between perceived and actual polarization both at a local
and global level. They modelled a population of agents with heterogeneous opinions
about multiple political issues, attaching different levels of interest to each of them,
whose sign represented the opinion on them (either positive or negative). Interaction
partners were selected with a probability inversely depending on the perceived
ideological distance between the agents. Moreover, interaction directly depended on
the absolute value of the interest level that agents attached to different issues. Agents
then interacted by focusing only on the issue in which they were interested in the
most and could then update their opinions. Simulation results showed that bivalent
selection and influence across multiple issues caused clustered polarization in the
emergent interaction structure. However, the overall distribution across multiple
issues was not polarized, except for highly salient take-off issues. This can explain
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why individuals’ perception of opinion homogeneity in local interpersonal networks
emerges from gradual segregation of interaction partners around take-off political
issues, despite the fact that individuals still had heterogeneous opinions about other
issues.
Furthermore, it is probable that individualization mechanisms besides homophily-
driven social influence can affect collective dynamics, i.e., the tendency of certain
individuals to increase their own uniqueness when their group starts to become
overcrowded (Mark 2003). For instance, Mäs, Flache, and Helbing (2010) tested the
effect of individualization on cultural convergence by building a simple model with
mechanisms of choice homophily and non-negative social influence. By assuming a
noise parameter that imposed agents’ changes of opinion depending on other similar
agents in the group, they showed that a phase of stable clusters with diversity between
and consensus within tended to emerge. In this same vein, Mäs and Flache (2013)
developed and experimentally tested a model of homophily and social influence
in which agents interacted through the exchange of arguments instead of adjusting
to each other’s opinions. Their results showed that interpersonal communication
generated a bipolarized equilibrium but only for high levels of choice homophily.
This approach has also been applied to diffusion dynamics of innovation. Def-
fuant, Huet, and Amblard (2005) extended the continuous opinion dynamic models
by simulating agents who held dynamic opinion values about the impact of a par-
ticular innovation on society – i.e., its social value. Agents could collect and share
information for the assessment of expected individual payoff, only when the social
value was considered to be high enough. Their results suggested that under these
conditions, innovations with overall high social value but low expected payoffs were
more likely to succeed than innovations with low social value but higher individual
benefits. Moreover, diffusion dynamics are significantly influenced by at least a
minority of radical innovators.
More recently, Van Eck, Jager, and Leeflang (2011) developed an empirically-
grounded ABM to study the effects of opinion leaders on the diffusion of innovation
via normative and informational influence. The basic concept was that agents could
adopt innovation either stemming from social pressure or from social information
about quality. A sample of free online game consumers was used to calibrate the
behaviour and position of opinion leaders. Opinion leaders were situated in central
positions within the network. They were more prone to adopt innovations, could
assess the quality of a product better and were also less permeable to normative
influence. Comparing network configurations with and without opinion leaders, the
authors found a significant effect of opinion leaders on the rapid spread of diffusion.
This was because they could spread positive information about the quality of the
products and were less likely to be affected by the normative influence exerted by
more conservative agents.
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4.2.3 Collective behaviour
Our decision to join a social movement or spread a cultural fad depends heavily on
the effects of social influence. This is because we are often influenced by observing
other people’s behaviour before deciding what to do. It is often hard to understand
empirically how certain collective behaviour are produced when individuals are
subjected to social influence without analysing the effect of social structural factors,
such as complex network configurations.
In this field, a seminal model was published by Granovetter (1978), who analysed
the dynamics of a type of collective behaviour, such as a riot, by simulating agents
deciding whether to join it depending on the decisions of other agents. Agents were
modelled to make a binary choice, according to an expected benefit dependent on
a heterogeneously distributed threshold value of how many agents were already
participating. In a simulation scenario, he added the impact of previous decisions
of relevant agents connected to the individual. His results showed that whenever
network externalities are added, collective behaviour becomes extremely dependent
on non-linear dynamics, which make any prediction of macro behaviour on single
individual preferences very hard to make.
Threshold models of collective behaviour have also been used to analyse innova-
tion diffusion dynamics. By integrating Granovetter’s classic model with a network
structural component, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) and Rosenkopf and Abra-
hamson (1999) looked at the differences in bandwagon effects due to certain network
communication properties. They found that bandwagon effects in innovation diffu-
sion within a network also depend on particular structural characteristics of nodes
that bridge core and peripheral components and the permeability of their boundaries.
Furthermore, by weighting social influence with exogenously distributed opinions
about the reputation of innovations, they showed that bandwagon effects could over-
ride information about their unprofitability, eventually leading agents to converge on
inefficient practices.
Hedström (1994) relaxed Granovetter’s original assumption of homogeneity of
interpersonal influence and added the more realistic dimension of spatial embed-
dedness to this model. He assumed that agents were more influenced by spatially
closer connections. He used data on the extraordinarily rapid diffusion of trade
union organizations in Sweden between 1890 and 1940 to test this model. Simula-
tions showed that the spatial-based structures of social contacts could explain the
empirically observed behaviour.
A more complex model was elaborated by Kim and Bearman (1997) to explain
the participation to social movements. Their model showed that there was no need to
assume agents’ irrationality to explain why individuals voluntarily engaged in collec-
tive action even when this was risky or costly. They simulated the interaction between
agents with different interest levels in providing a public good – from whose benefits
no agents could be excluded – and the different amounts of resources to produce
it, which shaped a dynamic network. Agents decided whether or not to contribute
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according to the expected marginal benefit, which they calculated upon their inter-
ests, the cost of participation and the amount of resources they possessed. However,
the agents’ interest in the good varied either upward or downward depending on
whether their ties had previously contributed or defected. By manipulating various
structural parameters, simulations showed that a critical mass of highly interested
agents situated in central network positions, even if guided by self-interest, could
create a local dense cluster, which eventually neutralised the influence of defecting
agents. In particular, network density was more decisive to achieve this critical mass
than high concentration of resources.
Chwe (1999) proposed a model in which strategic agents chose to participate in
a collective action depending on the expected number of participants among their
neighbours. Consequently, expectations of neighbours’ participation depended in
turn on expectations of neighbours of neighbours’ participation and so on. The
agents were assigned a fixed number of partners for the whole simulation cycle.
By examining the effect of network transitivity on social influence, results showed
that transitivity was particularly effective in triggering bandwagon effects among
agents with low thresholds, as they could get information from locally small and yet
dense clusters. For agents with high thresholds, however, weak ties were especially
important as they transmitted information about a larger amount of agents.
4.2.4 Social inequality
It is probable that social influence is responsible for a variety of dysfunctional col-
lective patterns typically observed in macro quantitative sociology. These include
inequality in educational opportunities, social stratification, employment traps in the
labour market and the co-evolution of social and workplace segregation (Abdou and
Gilbert 2009).
For instance, by looking at the labour market, Hedström (2005) built an empirically
calibrated ABM to examine how social influence mechanisms can explain aggregate
youth unemployment rates. Their hypothesis was that levels of unemployment
among neighbourhood peers had an effect on youth unemployment by lowering their
expectations of finding a job, reducing the psychological costs of being unemployed
and preventing outsiders accessing insider information about job opportunities.
Large-scale observational data on youth unemployment in Stockholm between 1993-
1999 was used to calibrate the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and
the structural features of the neighbourhood network clusters. Transition probabilities
of leaving unemployment were also estimated through maximum-likelihood statis-
tical modelling. The author assumed that agents decided to leave unemployment
according to their own socio-demographic characteristics, the unemployment rate
in their neighbourhood and the tightness of the job market. Simulations showed
that the combination of social influence and agents’ educational level provided the
most striking effect on the population’s rising unemployment rate. Furthermore,
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the effect of social influence was comparably higher than that exerted by the agents’
educational level per se.
When looking at social stratification, it is likely that there is a persisting effect
of social origin on educational attainment, which has traditionally been explained
through rational choice approaches (Breen and Jonsson 2005). Recently, Manzo (2013)
proposed an ABM to improve the realism of standard rational choice models by
introducing a social influence mechanism within friendship networks. Agents were
assigned into four groups, representing background social classes. They were then
embedded in a small-world network and took decisions about transitions from an
educational level to the next one. These decisions were based on the evaluation
of their own ability, the perceived cost/benefit ratio, their probability of success in
function of their ability and the effect of the overall social influence exerted by others
with whom they were tied. Simulation findings were tested against observational
data about the French stratification of educational choices across social origin in 2003.
Results showed that only by considering a social influence mechanism could the
model generate outcomes sufficiently close to the empirical data.
Another interesting field includes the study of the social influence effects on the re-
production of status. Analytical theories explain the emergence of status hierarchies as
the result of a self-reinforcing process driven by the exchange of deference-conferring
gestures (i.e., the attribution of a perceived quality evaluation). This amplifies already
existing qualitative differences between individuals (Lynn, Podolny, and Tao 2009).
Recently, Manzo and Baldassarri (2015) tested the potential inequality-driving effect
of social influence on status attribution mechanisms, by hypothesizing a counter-
acting effect of reciprocity in the exchange of deference-conferring gestures. They
modelled a population of agents with heterogeneously distributed "quality" values,
assessing each othe’s quality and exchanging deference gestures. In addition, they
could become biased by other agents’ behaviour. The agents interacted on the basis
of status homophily, selecting partners within an acceptable range of status dissimi-
larity (corrected by a heterogeneously distributed "heterophily" constant). They also
assessed partners’ quality, by considering the partner’s previously acquired status,
their own tendency to rely on social influence and a noise value. Subsequently, the
agents transferred a deference value to their interaction partners, which was equal to
the partner’s perceived quality, unless the evaluating agent had previously received
less deference than expected from the partner. In the latter case, according to a hetero-
geneously distributed parameter for sensitivity to reciprocity, the evaluating agent
reciprocated the partner’s previous unfair behaviour by exchanging less deference.
Status values were then calculated for each agent as the average deference received.
The simulation results suggested that the interaction between the cumulative effects
driven by social influence and the counterbalancing effect of conditional deference
exchange, was sufficient to generate status hierarchies, qualitatively similar to those
observed in empirical research, that is, the increasing gap between actual quality
and status asymmetry. Furthermore, if low-status agents were more prone to have
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mixed interaction with similar and dissimilar agents rather than high-status agents,
outcomes tended towards a "winner-takes-all" status hierarchy.
Finally, Gabbriellini (2014) built an empirically-tested model of the emergence of
status hierarchies in task-oriented groups as the effect of a network of precedence
ties (Skvoretz and Fararo 1996). He modelled the interaction within a disconnected
network of agents, who could participate in a discussion with other members by
addressing precedence claims in the hierarchy to all others (i.e., asking everyone
to accomplish a task). Agents’ participation depended log-linearly on the expected
consequences of their claim. Permanent precedence ties were established with a
probability, which partially depended on comparing agents’ external status values,
which were activated according to a probabilistic value. He collected empirical data
on communication in an online task-oriented discussion forum of a role-playing game
community. His simulations showed that highly linear status hierarchies, – similar to
those observed – were due to the higher participation of agents in communication
and the deference generated by mutual observation of external status.
4.3 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter presents a number of sociologically relevant ABM studies that explain
complex social outcomes as effects of agent interaction. Table 4.1 summarises the
most important contributions and provides a systematic overview on their main
explanatory achievements. These cases combine abstract models, which look at
general mechanisms of social phenomena, e.g., cooperation and social norms. It
also looks at middle-range models, where specific social puzzles are analysed, such
as youth unemployment and education. Although the prevalence is for theoretical
approaches, some empirical applications of these models also exist, where important
behavioural or structural model parameters have been calibrated with available or
ad-hoc generated empirical data. In these cases, these models have been used to
complement empirical data by manipulating certain parameters (e.g., complex social
networks) that would be difficult to observe empirically (Bravo, Squazzoni, and
Boero 2012), or used to generate empirically tested hypotheses (Corten and Buskens
2010). In other cases, models have been used to reproduce certain macro empirical
regularity by a given theory (Manzo 2013; Gabbriellini 2014).
Although most sociologists shrink from abstract, formalised theories, these ex-
amples show that abstraction can have a crucial role for theory building even in
sociology when it is guided by modelling. On the other hand, empirically grounded
studies are fundamental to explain well-studied sociological puzzles and stimulate
cross-methodological approaches with mutual benefits between, for examples, stan-
dard quantitative sociology and ABMs. Furthermore, this type of study is pivotal in
persuading traditional sociologists about the advantages of this approach.
At a substantive level, these examples show that exploring the fundamental het-
erogeneity of individual behaviour is of paramount importance to understand the
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emergence of social patterns. Cross-fertilization between experimental and compu-
tational research is a useful process. It shows us that by conflating the concept of
rationality with that of self-interest, as in standard game theory and economics, we
cannot account for the subtle social nuances that characterise individual behaviour
in social contexts. In this respect, Gintis (2009) suggested that we questioned the
aprioristic assumption of common knowledge that lies behind standard game the-
ory. If we assume that individuals are rational, self-interested as they perceive their
counterparts, game equilibria of any social or economic exchange can be predicted.
The problem here is that experimental research has repeatedly found that social out-
comes are better explained if we recognize that people develop an epistemic knowledge
within the game based on implicit shared mind efforts. Culture, social norms and
learning as social scaffolds for individual rationality makes a wider set of behaviour
rationalizable, which would otherwise be far from standard self-interest (see also
neuro-scientific research on the positive role of emotions, e.g. De Quervain et al.
2004).
Behavioural game theory could help to explore departures from standard rational
choice models. Furthermore, they can be used to understand social norms in well
controlled experimental scenarios, relevant for sociological research. By concentrating
on interaction situations where self-interest is expected to prevail, we can understand
the genesis of social norms, their dynamics, in terms of fragility or robustness and
the factors that could condition their evolution. This is impossible if we assume that
individuals have no individual autonomy (also that of being self-interested) and
passively internalise norms by culture, education or social conformism, as in many
standard sociological accounts.
Interestingly, most ABM studies mainly look at the self-organization of social
groups around social norms and should not be seen as a naive exercise. No one
believes that institutions and top-down influences simply do not exist. At the same
time, the ABM approach is not a bottom-up "market" ideology. By focussing on
micro-macro aspects, ABM studies can offer relevant insights on how groups and
communities can coordinate and collaborate in our world. This is more and more
fragmented into cultures, contexts and domains and in constant evolution and change.
This is to say, the ABM approach is also sociologically timely and can contribute to
understanding social change.
These ABM studies show that, if we consider society as an evolutionary system in
constant change and adaptation, the co-existence of different behaviours and norms
over time is instrumental to promote and maintain social order. This means that
institutional policies, which typically assume that individuals are self-interested, end
up eliciting self-interest in people. This situation could actually worsen the long-
term sustainability of social systems for the following reasons: Firstly, they do not
nurture diversity and heterogeneity of behaviour and secondly, they can crowd out
pre-existing social norms and intrinsic motivations (Squazzoni 2014). In these cases,
ABM studies could be used to understand when incentives, regulations and external
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institutional design can work, when social norms are beneficial and when institutions
and social norms can work in synergy.
Secondly, these ABM studies can help us to understand the importance of social
contexts even when looking at individual behaviour in a more micro-oriented per-
spective. The role of social influence and the fact that we are embedded in complex
social networks have implications for the type of information we access and the
types of behaviour we are exposed to. At the same time, individual behaviour has a
constructive role in endogenously shaping these networks. While the literature on
social networks typically looks at structural factors, the ABM approach can enrich the
behavioural counterpart of these studies, providing a more dynamic picture of the
interplay of individual behaviour and networks. This could help us to understand
the evolutionary bases of network structures, ideally considering a complex set of
reciprocal influences between micro and macro levels. It is worth noting that this
interplay is difficult to understand using standard social science approaches, given
that a combination of qualitative and quantitative factors must be considered simul-
taneously. Furthermore, simulations can provide a vivid picture of space and time
processes that might unfold over a long time, also supporting intuitive understanding
of the complexity of social systems.
Here, the advent of the big data movement and the increasing convergence be-
tween data platforms in various domains of social life (for example, the public, private
and social sectors) could allow sociologists to have fine-grained, large-scale data on
individual choices but also on social network connections that were impossible even
to contemplate before. By applying sociologically-informed computational models to
these multi-source, layer data, we could reveal the complex mechanisms of social life
in a globally interconnected world (Conte et al. 2012).
Finally, one of the most important sociological advantages of ABMs is that they
can help sociologists to achieve more rigorous standards of theorization and empirical
analysis. ABM studies have developed a serious methodological debate on standards
to improve empirical calibration and validation of models, model documentation
and reporting and model replication and test (Grimm et al. 2006; Polhill et al. 2008).
Tools such as a public repository of models have been developed (e.g., ABM Open
2), where researchers are asked to make models public so that replication and model
extension is easier. This can increase cumulative findings and create the collective
dimension of any rigorous scientific endeavour (Squazzoni 2012).
ABMs can promote a modelling attitude in sociology, including more disciplined
theory building and a stronger "testing hypotheses" experimentalist culture. More-
over, they can make sociology a more collective effort, by undertaking the path
followed by more mature disciplines. In this regard, it is worth noting that there is
still a serious gap in computing skills in the education programmes of sociologists at
all levels, from Bachelors to PhD courses and even in top institutions. We need to fill
2. http://www.openabm.org/
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this gap in order to equip a new generation of sociologists towards cutting-edge, col-
laborative research. This is also essential for sociologists to collaborate and compete
with external experts, who are increasingly performing relevant sociological research.
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Chapter 5
Solidarity and Competition:
Simulating Social Support between
Competing Business Partners
5.1 Introduction
This study aims at understanding the consequences of competition between collabo-
rating partners on the emergence of solidarity between business partners. Previous
research has suggested that certain social mechanisms can elicit expectations of social
support between professional partners (see Chapter 4). Yet, emergent solidarity
within economic exchange networks might be favoured by some context-specific
properties. In particular, the lack of competition among exchange partners might
elicit cooperation rather than conflict. This could ease the production of trust in
loose forms of negotiated exchanges (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009) and generate
expressive relations between partners.
Here, we examined the effect of competition and resource distribution on social
support through a stochastic Agent-Based Model (ABM, Macy and Flache 2009;
see also Chapter 3) which includes a multiplex network of collaboration, trust and
expectations of support. The model allowed us to manipulate certain structural
conditions of the collaboration network and test their impact on the stability of the
social support network. By running computer simulations of the model, we looked at
the connectivity and integration of emergent networks of social support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduced the
theoretical background of this study. Section 3 shows a description of the model and
the simulation output measures. Then, Section 4 illustrates the design of the computer
simulations and shows our results. Finally, Section 5 discusses certain implications of
our study for the analysis of social and economic exchange and discusses limitations
and future developments.
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5.2 Research background
In case of professional collaborations, solidarity between partners can emerge as a
byproduct of trust formation within exchange interactions (see Chapter 3). At the
dyadic level, solidarity can arise if individuals are prone to provide support to each
other at a cost, when requested to do so (Lindenberg 1998; Flache and Hegselmann
1999a, 1999b). An enduring professional collaboration, such as a ‘negotiated exchange
with non-binding agreements’ (Blau 1964; Emerson 1976; Molm 2003; Molm, Schaefer,
and Collett 2009) might stimulate the emergence of expectations of support by elicit-
ing mutual trust between partners. Indeed, a trust relation requires a sufficient level
of structural risk to let partners prove their trustworthiness to each other (Gambetta
1988; Coleman 1990; Hardin 2002), which elicits trust formation. In fact, if exchanges
are too strictly bound by the terms of an agreement, opportunistic behaviour becomes
so costly that actors do not free ride on each other. Nevertheless, might perceive
cooperative behaviour by partners as due to formal constraints of an agreement rather
than revealing a partner’s genuine goodwill (Kollock 1994; Yamagishi, Cook, and
Watabe 1998; Barrera 2007). Bearing the cost of a cooperative behaviour intentionally
may be perceived by others as a sign of intrinsic motivation, which testifies to the gen-
uine interest in the value of a collaboration or a moral obligation of good behaviour
that can typically self-reinforce when reciprocated. If actors develop trust in each
other within the context of an economic exchange, then solidarity might arise (Molm,
Collett, and Schaefer 2007), as trust entails the expectation of getting costly support
from a partner in case of need.
Furthermore, besides being elicited through enduring collaboration relationships,
trust can also be generated by the diffusion of actors’ reputation of trustworthiness
(Buskens and Raub 2002; Boero et al. 2009). Here, empirical research on intraorgani-
zational social networks has shown that the evolution of trust between professionals
is usually driven by dynamics of transitive closure (e.g., i trusts j because the latter
is trusted by one or more persons whom i trusts) (Robins, Pattison, and Wang 2009;
Lusher et al. 2012).
In Chapter 3, we found that expectations of support were strongly associated
with business-related trust within a group of collaborating ICT freelance workers,
while the collaboration network provided the opportunity for partners to develop
trust in each other. However, this result might have been affected by the context-
specific configuration of the collaboration network. Moreover, the lack of competition
between partners, which characterised the empirical context under observation, might
have provided a favourable context for collaborations to turn into expectations of
support. Otherwise, it could be argued that collaboration relations would not have
elicited trust formation, which in turn would not have generated expectations of
social support between partners. This argument is consistent with the claim that
the structure of joint negotiation which underlies professional collaboration might
generate solidarity or exacerbate conflict depending on contextual factors affecting
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actors’ perception of risk-taking, conflict, and a partner’s goodwill (Molm, Schaefer,
and Collett 2009; Kuwabara 2011).
It is also important to note that differences in resources (f.i. skills, competencies,
time, financial capital, etc.) among collaboration partners may affect the dynamic of
collaboration and so the collaboration network structure. Actors tend to preferentially
select partners with a higher amount of resources, which makes more likely to
match one’s lack of skills that are needed to perform an activity. Therefore, an
unequal distribution of resources generates a competitive framework that makes
some collaboration partners looking more attractive than others (Markovsky, Willer,
and Patton 1988, e.g.). In these cases, establishing collaboration relations is probably
costly. Moreover, high-resource actors tend to become more central than low-resource
actors in a collaboration network.
At the same time, differences in resources may influence the dynamic of support
relations. For instance, in a series of computer simulation studies, Flache and Hegsel-
mann (1999a, 1999b) studied the emergence of solidarity between agents playing a
‘repeated support game’. They modelled solidarity relations as reciprocated social
support ties. In the former study, they analysed the effect of behavioural heterogene-
ity on the formation of social support. They showed that an efficient social support
network could emerge even among self-interested agents if resources were distributed
unevenly within the population. This was because agents varied in neediness – i.e.,
the need for social support – and capability of providing support. Low-resource
agents were more needy than high-resource ones. Then, neediness was inversely
related to provision capability. In the second work, they studied the effect of resource
distribution on cohesion and integration. They found that dense solidarity networks
could emerge among self-interested agents, but these showed patterns of segregation
along resource classes.
This suggests that the distribution of resources within a population may affect the
development of exchange relations. With regards to the link between collaboration
and social support, resource distribution and competition might have a ‘double-edge’
effect. On the one hand, resource distribution identifies different classes within the
population. Competition would make high-resource actors more attractive than those
with less resources. On the other hand, resource distribution would make lower-
resources actors more needy than those with higher-resources. This double-edge
effect of resource distribution would segregate the population in different overlapping
resource and neediness classes and yield different outcomes for collaboration and
social support.
Concerning social support, this situation could dramatically change the emergent
network. On the one hand, actors would tend to establish collaboration relations
with high-resource actors, so that these nodes will probably be the most central ones
in the collaboration network. This would bring trust to cluster within the same set of
nodes that are central in the collaboration network. Finally, the same nodes would
form expectations of social support from each other, being this process driven by
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the occurrence of trust ties. In sum, the disproportionate number of collaboration
relations that high-resource actors would establish between each other would prevent
low-resource actors to develop trust in others. This would in turn prevent low-
resource actors to develop expectations of social support from others. Therefore,
competition over most desirable collaborators could generate a highly segregated
social support network, where the most social support ties would be concentrated
among high-resource actors.
On the other hand, if we assume that low-resource actors are more needy, the
disruptive effect of competition could be counterbalanced. More precisely, low-
resource actors would tend to develop support expectations towards more partners.
This could avoid their isolation in the social support network and might generate a
more cohesive and integrated social support network.
The aim of this study was to test the effect of resource distribution on the process
observed in Chapter 3 if we assume that actors compete for most profitable collabora-
tions. First, we were interested into assessing the effect of competition with unequal
resources on the connectivity and integration of the emergent social support network.
Secondly, we looked at the possible effect of letting actors self-organize their social
support relations according to their level of resource-related neediness.
5.3 Method
In order to investigate our questions, we developed an ABM which incorporated
the empirically observed interplay between collaboration, trust and social support.
Therefore, the model is a theoretical ABM, although the specification of the micro-
level parameters that govern agent behaviour are grounded on empirical data.
In this way, ABM can complement to the limitations intrinsic to the case-based
nature of the study presented in Chapter 3 in a twofold way. Firstly, by this approach
context-specific characteristics of the observed mechanisms can be isolated. Then,
the robustness of empirical results to macro-level changes can be tested. Secondly,
manipulation of environmental configurations is key to understand outcomes of
applications of the micro-level processes in real settings, where abstract mechanisms
cannot be isolated by contextual factors (e.g., Boero et al. 2010; Bravo, Squazzoni,
and Boero 2012; see also Section 4.3). However, we did not calibrate the model with
empirical data (Boero and Squazzoni 2005) in order to avoid modelling noise from
context-specific properties of the analysed case.
5.3.1 Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models for network dynamics
Modelling the emergence of a network from another requires an approach that can
handle the complex interdependencies of a multiplex network. In a recent paper, Sni-
jders and Steglich (2015) have proposed the use of ‘Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models
for network dynamics’ (Snijders 1996, 2001; Snijders, Van de Bunt, and Steglich 2010)
as empirically-calibrated ABMs to study the emergence of social networks.
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SOAMs are a combination of theoretical and statistical models (Snijders 1996).
In fact, they are mainly used for statistical modelling of longitudinal network data
to assess the impact of certain network local configurations or nodes’ attributes on
the formation of an empirically observed network. The model weighted parameters
represent actors’ preferences for network local configurations in their own personal
networks (i.e., their neighbourhood). For example, a positive coefficient value for the
‘reciprocity’ parameter means that actors on average have a preference for sending
ties to those other nodes who already sent them a tie.
Similarly to most methods for statistical inference of network data, SOAMs are
not based on random sampling. Therefore, parameter estimates are computed by
artificially generating a stochastic distribution of networks. This is achieved by
a model component, which is a theoretical stochastic simulation algorithm. This
algorithm derives the expected evolution of the network ties from theoretically
specified assumptions about agents’ preferences and a decision-making mechanism.
For these reasons, the simulation algorithm of SOAMs can be considered an agent-
based computational model (Flache and Stark 2009; Snijders and Steglich 2015). The
algorithm parameters can be specified in a way that represents the assumed agent
micro-level behaviour. Computer simulations of the algorithm can then be performed
to generate macro-level network configurations.
Here, it is important to note that the model relies on a few relevant assumptions.
Firstly, provided that network ties denote states, the changing network can be in-
terpreted as a Markov process. This means that the current state of the network
determines probabilistically the following state, with all relevant information being
included in the current state. Secondly, it is assumed that agents control their outgo-
ing ties and have full information about their personal networks. Finally, network
changes are assumed to occur sequentially, which prevents actors to coordinate tie
changes.
Coming to the algorithm, SOAMs assume a population of n agents. First, at each
iteration, one agent i is selected randomly and decides whether to change one of
her/his outgoing ties or do nothing. In order to compute decision outcomes, i first
calculates the variation in her/his utility related to each possible tie change, according
to an objective function:
fi(x) =
∑
k
βksik(x), (5.1)
where
∑
k sik is a set of graph statistics calculated on i’s personal network. These
statistics represent local configurations of agents’ personal networks towards which
they can have positive or negative preferences of various magnitude, according to
the values of parameter coefficients, βk.
Secondly, i selects one of the n − 1 possible new states – including no change –
through a multinomial random experiment, in which each possible state has proba-
bility
p(change in xij) =
exp(fi(change in xij))∑
h exp(fi(change in xih))
. (5.2)
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In conclusion, SOAMs provide a useful tool to implement micro-level assumptions
about agent behaviour and generate emergent macro-level network configurations.
Behavioural assumptions are incorporated in the weighted parameters βksik(x).
Following the approach of random utility models, SOAMs assume that there is
a random component of the utility of an action. This loosens the assumption of agents
maximizing the utility of an action. Therefore, agent maximize utility through a
multinomial probabilistic choice. The choice of a new state in an agent’s personal
network is related to the outcome of Equation 5.2, but for all choices there is always
a positive probability. This is why the decision-making algorithm of SOAMs is
equivalent to a process of myopic stochastic optimization of the objective function
(Snijders 2001).
5.3.2 The model
The approach adopted in our work is slightly different from that proposed by Snijders
and Steglich (2015), as we did not calibrate our model with empirical data. In a
previous study, Flache and Stark (2009) have developed a ‘Stochastic Agent-Based
Model’ (SABM) based on the SOAM simulation algorithm (see also Stark 2011).
The main difference with the original SOAM algorithm is that one agent is selected
randomly at each iteration, instead of being picked according to a rate function λ.
Moreover, our model includes a multiplex network X with three layers: Collabo-
ration (X(C)), Trust (X(T )) and Social support (X(S)). In order to adapt the SABM to
our purpose, we implemented an ad hoc version based on the simulation algorithm of
the SOAM for multiplex network dynamics developed by Snijders, Lomi, and Torló
(2013). Figure 5.1 shows the main steps of the model algorithm. At each iteration, one
agent i is selected randomly and decides whether to change one of her/his outgo-
ing ties on one of the randomly selected network layers X(r), or do nothing. Each
network layer can be selected with fixed equal probability.
FIGURE 5.1: The algorithm of the multiplex Stochastic Agent-Based
Model.
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Concerning agent individual properties, we distributed two static vectors of
node attributes within the population. A first attribute, R, represented resources for
collaboration, while another attribute, N , represented neediness.
In order to implement the mechanisms observed in Chapter 3 and test the effect
of certain factors (i.e., competition and resource distribution), we specified the model
with parameters expressing both within-network (i.e., agent preferences for local
configurations) and multiplex effects (i.e., cross-network effects) for each of the
three network layers. Therefore, the model is composed by three different objective
functions.
Unfortunately, this increased the number of the model parameters, which is
usually avoided in the ‘KISS’ approach to ABM building (see Chapter 4). However,
modelling network emergence through micro-level behaviour requires simulations to
stochastically handle complex network interdependencies. Therefore, like statistical
models that require a certain degree of complexity to deal with confounding factors,
our stochastic ABM requires as many parameters as necessary to adequately represent
the mechanisms that bring about social networks (Snijders and Steglich 2015). In
the remainder of this section, we describe the model specification for each network
layer1.
5.3.3 Collaboration
The Collaboration network (X(C)) is a directed network where xij = 1 if i has sent a
request for collaboration to j and 0 otherwise. If xij = 1 and xji = 1, i.e., a request
for collaboration is reciprocated within a dyad, then we consider a collaboration tie
between i and j.
The objective function for X(C) is the following:
f
(C)
i (x) =
∑
j
β
(C)
0 x
(C)
ij + β
(C)
1 x
(C)
ij x
(C)
ji + β
(C)
2 x
(C)
ij Rj + β
(C)
3 x
(T )
ij x
(C)
ij (5.3)
The first term of the sum (outdegree) represents a baseline preference for sending
collaboration requests to other agents. Its coefficient was fixed at a negative value,
because we assumed that sending collaboration requests was costly, as it required
solving problems of cooperation and coordination. The second term (reciprocity)
represents agent preference towards incoming tie reciprocation. In order to model
the formation of collaboration ties, we set the coefficient to a high positive value.
This was to compensate the high cost of baseline request sending with the benefits of
accepting others’ requests.
The third term (resource popularity) represents agents’ attractiveness related to
their resources. By fixing its coefficient to a positive value, we assumed that agents
preferred to request collaborations to high-resource agents rather than to low-resource
1. See Appendix C for the main part of the software implementation code.
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ones. This was to model competition between agents for highly-skilled collaboration
partners.
Finally, we implemented feedback effects of trust on collaboration by specifying
the last term (direct association with Trust). By setting the related coefficient to a positive
value, agents preferred to send collaboration requests to other agents with whom
they already had a trust tie rather than to others.
5.3.4 Trust
The Trust network (X(T )) is a directed network where xij = 1 if i trusts j and 0
otherwise. The following is the objective function for X(T ):
f
(T )
i (x) =
∑
j,h
(β
(T )
0,0 +β
(T )
0,1 )x
(T )
ij +β
(T )
1 x
(T )
ij x
(T )
ji +β
(T )
2 x
(T )
ih x
(T )
ij x
(T )
jh +β
(T )
3 x
(C)
ij x
(T )
ij (5.4)
The first term of the sum (outdegree) represents the baseline preference for trust.
Here, we assumed that trusting other agents yielded marginal diminishing returns
(e.g. Flache and Stark 2009; Snijders, Van de Bunt, and Steglich 2010; Sutcliffe and
Wang 2012; Sutcliffe, Wang, and Dunbar 2012). This was achieved by setting β0,0
with a positive value and β0,1 with a negative value. More precisely, for agents with
a low outdegree, the marginal utility of an additional tie exceeded the marginal
costs. As outdegree increased, marginal costs grew so that utility for new ties was
too low above a certain threshold. The second term (reciprocity) represents agent
preference towards trust reciprocation. This was achieved by setting a positive value
for the related coefficient. The third term (transitive triplets), weighted by a positive
coefficient, represents agent preference towards transitive path closure, i.e., that i
would be more likely to trust j if the former already trusts h, who in turn trusts j.
These three parameters represent the agent within-network preferences and have
been specified in order to control for other mechanisms at work in the formation of
trust. It is worth noting that this specification was based on what has been found in
various studies (e.g., Robins, Pattison, and Wang 2009; Lusher et al. 2012; see also
Chapter 3).
Finally, we implemented the first step of the mechanism observed in Chapter
3 through the last term of the sum. This effect (direct association with Collaboration),
associated with a positive coefficient value, reproduced the agents’ tendency to trust
other agents to whom they have sent a collaboration request.
5.3.5 Social support
The Social support network (X(S)) is a directed network where xij = 1 if i expects
social support from j and 0 otherwise. If xij = 1 and xji = 1, i.e., an expectation of
social support is reciprocated within the same dyad, we considered a social support
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relation between i and j. The following is the objective function for X(S):
f
(S)
i (x) =
∑
j,h
(β
(S)
0,0 + β
(S)
0,1 +Ni)x
(S)
ij + β
(S)
1 x
(S)
ij x
(S)
ji + β
(S)
2 x
(T )
ih x
(T )
ij x
(S)
jh + β
(S)
3 x
(T )
ij x
(S)
ij
(5.5)
The first term of the sum (outdegree) is the baseline preference for trust. Similarly
to trust, we assumed that expecting social support from other agents yields marginal
diminishing returns (e.g. Flache and Stark 2009; Snijders, Van de Bunt, and Steglich
2010). Here as well, β0,0 was set to a positive value and β0,1 to a negative value. The
second term (reciprocity) represents agents’ tendency to reciprocate expectations of
social support. This was achieved by setting a positive value for the related coefficient.
The third term (transitive triplets), weighted by a positive coefficient, represents agent
preference towards the closure of transitive paths, i.e., that i would be more likely
to trust j if the former already trusts h, who in turn trusts j. These three parameters
represent the agent within-network preferences and have been specified in order to
control for other mechanisms at work in the formation of trust. Together, they are
based on results showed in Chapter 3.
Concerning neediness, we modelled this effect so that it changed the slope coeffi-
cient for the outdegree effect in Equation 5.5. In other words, i’s baseline tendency to
expect social support from other agents varied according to Ni (see next section for
more details).
Finally, the final term in the sum represents the implementation of the second
step of the mechanism observed in Chapter 3. This effect (direct association with Trust),
associated with a positive coefficient value, can be interpreted as the agents’ likely
expectations of social support from other agents whom they already trust.
5.4 Computer simulations
5.4.1 Simulation design and model specification
We ran computer simulations by manipulating the distribution of resources and
neediness within the population in a 2 X 2 factorial design. Table 5.1 shows the
resulting 4-scenario simulation design.
TABLE 5.1: 2 X 2 factorial simulation design.
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Concerning resources, we compared an equal distribution of R, where all agents
had the same level of resources, with an equal 2-class binary distribution, with R[0, 1].
In the former case, competition over resources was de facto removed from the model,
while in the latter case the population was split in two groups of high-resource and
low-resource agents of equal size.
Similarly, we tested an equal distribution of neediness and a 2-class binary distri-
bution, with N [−0.5, 0.5]. In the second case, the utility for high-resource agents to
establish new expectations of social support was decreased by 0.5, while utility was
increased by the same value for low-resource agents (see Equation 5.5).
In order to implement the ‘double-edge’ effect of resources (see Section 5.2), we
distributed R and N in the population so that the two vectors were inversely related
in Scenario 4, i.e., high-resource agents had low neediness values and low-resource
agents were more needy.
Coming to model specification, with regards to global parameters, simulations
were run on a population of n = 20 agents. This was done to resemble as much as
possible the small scale of the case analysed in Chapter 3. Sensitivity checks with
n = {30, 50} did not show significant qualitative differences in the results. Therefore,
we decided to set n = 20 to increase computational efficiency. Moreover, following
Flache and Stark (2009), network change rates parameters were kept fixed and equal,
so that
λ(C) = λ(T ) = λ(S) ≈ 0.33 (5.6)
This means that, at each iteration, the randomly selected agent had an equal
probability to pick one of the three network layers to change. For each network
statistic specified in the objective functions, parameters β(r)k have been fixed exoge-
nously and kept constant. Table 5.2 shows the parameter values used in our computer
simulations.
Calibration has been done by following three criteria. First, we tried to resemble
as much as possible the effect magnitude suggested by the ERGM interpretation
provided in Section 3.4.2. Secondly, parameters were set according to our theoretical
knowledge about micro-level mechanisms of network formation. Finally, values
related to outdegree slope and transitive triplets for Trust and Social support were also
set in order to avoid network degeneracy, by following best practices in statistical
modelling of network data (e.g. Snijders et al. 2006; Robins, Pattison, and Wang 2009;
Snijders and Steglich 2015).
In order to analyse simulation outcomes, we computed a non-directed graph for
each generated Social support network, by considering only reciprocated ties. This
was to analyse social support relations and not merely agent expectations of social
support.
The non-directed networks of social support have been analysed by calculating
three graph-level statistics concerning connectivity (Snijders and Steglich 2015). First,
we looked at density, d. This was done by dividing the number of ties in the network
by the number of all possible ties (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Furthermore, we
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Parameter Value
Collaboration
Outdegree -4
Reciprocity 3
Resource popularity 3
Association with Trust 1
Trust
Outdegree 5
Outdegree slope -1
Reciprocity 1
Transitive triplets 0.5
Association with Collaboration 1
Social support
Outdegree 5
Outdegree slope -1
Reciprocity 1
Transitive triplets 0.5
Association with Trust 1
TABLE 5.2: Model parameter values for micro-level network effects.
calculated the number and size of connected components, NC and C1. A connected
component of a non-directed network is a subset of nodes where each node can be
reached from all other nodes2.
5.4.2 Results
Table 5.3 shows results of computer simulations of the four scenarios. Results were
averaged over 100 replications for each scenario, by calculating outcome statistics at
equilibrium after 20,000 iterations for each replication. Simulations started from an
empty initial configuration. Sensitivity analysis of the results to other configurations
did not show significant differences qualitatively3.
Concerning the connectivity of the emergent networks, the distribution of re-
sources did not significantly affect the density of social support ties unless we as-
sumed that agents yielded different marginal returns from support ties depending
on their neediness. Unlike other scenarios, in these cases, some agents were more
in need of social support than others. This increased the global connectivity of the
network globally increase.
The number of strongly connected components showed a significant increase in
global connectivity if we assumed a 2-class distribution of resources and neediness
within the population. More precisely, the effect of resource inequality exacerbated
2. Graph-level statistics were computed through the igraph package (Csardi and Nepusz 2006) in the
statistical computing environment R (R Development Core Team 2008).
3. We tested the effect of initial random network configuration of X(C), by running simulations from
Erdo˝s-Renyi graphs with increasing density values. We also tested star-like configurations of X(C) with
increasing density values.
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Outcome
Equal R 2-class R
Equal N 2-class N Equal N 2-class N
Density
0.329 0.326 0.333 0.417
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Number of components
7.450 7.570 9.530 2.570
(2.271) (2.189) (1.732) (1.130)
Size of main component
13.440 13.350 11.420 18.360
(2.280) (2.222) (1.701) (1.291)
TABLE 5.3: Results of computer simulations with varying distributions
of resources (R) and neediness (N ): Mean and standard deviations
over 100 replications (20,000 iterations each).
th
(A) Equal N . (B) 2-class N .
FIGURE 5.2: Evolution of Collaboration (green), Trust (blue), and Social
support (red) networks over time with equal distribution of resources:
Density values over 20,000 iterations.
agents’ tendency towards segregation, due to the fact that expectations of support
inherited the patterns of collaboration. This can be seen by looking at the dynamic
of the network co-evolution over time (see Figure 5.3a), where the three networks
highly overlapped over time.
However, if we assumed that low-resource agents were also more needy than
others, results showed a striking reduction of the number of components in the
emergent networks. This indicates that the network was much more connected than
in other scenarios. These results are mirrored by the differences in size of the largest
component across scenarios, with the number of nodes in the core decreasing with
an unequal distribution of resources, while increasing strikingly when assuming
differences in neediness among agents.
Furthermore, the counteracting effect of differences in neediness is shown by the
evolution of expectations of support in Figure 5.3b. Here, it is important to note
that the Social supportnetwork grew beyond the initial core of trust associated with
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(A) Equal N . (B) 2-class N .
FIGURE 5.3: Evolution of Collaboration (green), Trust (blue), and Social
support (red) networks over time with 2-class resource distribution:
Density values over 20,000 iterations.
collaboration ties.
Finally, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show interesting results about class segregation within
the emergent support networks. In order to analyse segregation, we added node
attributes to the network also in those scenarios where one (Scenarios 2 and 3) or both
(Scenario 1) attributes were distributed equally within the population. This was to
study baseline effects of network segregation to be compared with relevant scenarios.
Figure 5.4 show that, when agents did not compete for more profitable collabora-
tions, the main connected component of the support network was composed by a
relatively balanced distribution of agents in terms of resource classes.
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(A) Equal N . (B) 2-class N .
FIGURE 5.4: Segregation in artificially generated Social support net-
works with reciprocated ties only with equal resource distribution
(100th replication). Node colours represent resource levels (Green:
R = 0, N = 0.5; Red: R = 1, N = −0.5).
The situation changed dramatically if we allowed agents to select each other for
collaboration based on resource control. This generated a highly segregated largest
component, with most of the less resourceful agents with no reciprocated support
relations, not even between each other (see Figure 5.5a). However, not only was
the support network in Scenario 4 (see Figure 5.5b) more connected, but even the
integration between the two classes is not significantly different from that generated
by an equal distribution of resources.
(A) Equal N . (B) 2-class N .
FIGURE 5.5: Segregation in artificially generated Social support net-
works with reciprocated ties only with 2-class resource distribution
(100th replication). Node colours represent resource levels (Green:
R = 0, N = 0.5; Red: R = 1, N = −0.5).
5.5. Discussion and conclusions 123
5.5 Discussion and conclusions
Our study aimed to discuss the possibility of generating stable and cohesive networks
of solidarity between collaborating business partners. Previous research has shown
that trust-driven solidarity might emerge as a byproduct of economic exchange
relations if the context makes cooperation more salient than conflict. We hypothesized
that social support networks arising from economic exchange relations could be stable
and cohesive even if actors compete with each other for more profitable collaborations
in a situation of resource inequality.
Computer simulations of a stochastic ABM supported our hypothesis. This is
because resources have a double-edge effect on the formation of social support
relations. On the one hand, low-resource agents are disadvantaged by competition in
collaboration, so developing less social support relations with other agents. On the
other hand, heterogeneity in neediness among agents counteracts the disruptive effect
of competition in collaboration, which otherwise would lead to a rather disconnected
and segregated support network.
Our simulations have important implications for theory and for applied organiza-
tional issues. First, our study found that allowing individuals to build social support
ties according resource inequalities is key not only for balancing the dysfunctional
effects of competition on solidarity, but also for generating even more integrated net-
works than with equal resource distribution. This is because resource heterogeneity
drives the formation of new ties of social support which create new clusters where
collaboration is generated as feedback effects. These results address the debate on the
link between the economic and the social, by showing that solidarity generated as
byproduct of economic exchange might be even resilient to competition.
Moreover, our results argue that economic relations are not necessarily detrimental
for social relations. This would be caused by the conflict of interests which is intrinsic
to the structure of economic interaction, where individuals would behave according
to mere self-interest. Our results show that business partners, even if they act upon
their own self-interest, might interact in a way that elicits cooperation instead of
conflict. This suggests that the discussion about the effects of the economic on the
social should be informed by empirical research that looks at the ways economic
interdependencies generate the possibility for individuals to self-organize and create
efficient social structures. Our study shows that this effect is theoretically possible.
Secondly, our results may be relevant for designing organizational settings. If
competition in decentralized collaboration networks elicits resource heterogeneity,
inequality could even be instrumental to keep the network relatively connected, given
that peers have to collaborate for requested activities.
Unfortunately, our study suffers from a few limitations that narrows the implica-
tions of our results. The assumptions about interaction sequentiality and homogeneity
of objective functions makes difficult to extend our results to larger-scale populations.
However, the aim of this study was primarily to stress the results obtained in Chapter
124
Chapter 5. Solidarity and Competition: Simulating Social Support between
Competing Business Partners
3, which were obtained by a statistical model which shares similar assumptions
and limitations. Moreover, the lack of behavioural heterogeneity in the model is a
trade-off of our model’s effectiveness in dealing with complex multiplex network
interdependencies.
References
Barrera, Davide. 2007. “The Impact of Negotiated Exchange on Trust and Trustworthi-
ness.” Social Networks 29 (4): 508–526. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2007.03.004.
Blau, Peter M. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York, NY: Wiley.
Boero, Riccardo, Giangiacomo Bravo, Marco Castellani, and Flaminio Squazzoni. 2009.
“Reputational Cues in Repeated Trust Games.” The Journal of Socio-Economics 38
(6): 871–877. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.004.
. 2010. “Why Bother With What Others Tell You? An Experimental Data-Driven
Agent-Based Model.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 13 (3): 6.
doi:http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/13/3/6.html.
Boero, Riccardo, and Flaminio Squazzoni. 2005. “Does Empirical Embeddedness
Matter? Methodological Issues on Agent-Based Models for Analytical Social
Science.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 8 (4): 6. doi:http:
//jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/6.html.
Bravo, Giangiacomo, Flaminio Squazzoni, and Riccardo Boero. 2012. “Trust and
Partner Selection in Social Networks: An Experimentally Grounded Model.”
Social Networks 34 (4): 481–492. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2012.03.001.
Buskens, Vincent, and Werner Raub. 2002. “Embedded Trust: Control and Learn-
ing.” Advances in Group Processes 19:167–202. doi:10.1016/S0742-6186(02)
11000-6.
Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Boston, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Csardi, Gabor, and Tamas Nepusz. 2006. “The igraph Software Package for Complex
Network Research.” InterJournal Complex Systems:1695.
Emerson, Richard M. 1976. “Social Exchange Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology
2:335–362. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.02.080176.002003.
Flache, Andreas, and Rainer Hegselmann. 1999a. “Altruism vs. Self-Interest in Social
Support. Computer Simulations of Social Support Networks in Cellular Worlds.”
Advances in Group Processes 16:61–97.
REFERENCES 125
. 1999b. “Rationality vs. Learning in the Evolution of Solidarity Networks: A
Theoretical Comparison.” Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 5 (2):
97–127. doi:10.1023/A:1009662602975.
Flache, Andreas, and Tobias Stark. 2009. “Preference or Opportunity? Why Do We
Find More Friendship Segregation in More Heterogeneous Schools?” arXiv
preprint: arXiv:0901.2825.
Gambetta, Diego. 1988. “Can We Trust Trust?” In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative
Relations, edited by Diego Gambetta, 213–237. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.
Hardin, Russell. 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York, NY: Russell Sage Founda-
tion.
Kollock, Peter. 1994. “The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study
of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust.” American Journal of Sociology 100 (2):
313–345. doi:10.1086/230539.
Kuwabara, Ko. 2011. “Cohesion, Cooperation, and the Value of Doing Things To-
gether: How Economic Exchange Creates Relational Bonds.” American Sociological
Review 76 (4): 560–580. doi:10.1177/0003122411414825.
Lindenberg, Siegwart. 1998. “Solidarity: Its Microfoundations and Macrodependence.
A Framing Approach.” In The Problem of Solidarity. Theories and Models, edited by
Patrick Doreian and Thomas Fararo, 61–112. Amsterdam: Gordon / Breach.
Lusher, Dean, Garry Robins, Philippa E. Pattison, and Alessandro Lomi. 2012. “Trust
Me: Differences in Expressed and Perceived Trust Relations in an Organization.”
Social Networks 34 (4): 410–424. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2012.01.004.
Macy, Michael, and Andreas Flache. 2009. “Social Dynamics from the Bottom Up:
Agent-Based Models of Social Interaction.” In The Oxford Handbook of Analytical
Sociology, edited by Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman, 245–268. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Markovsky, Barry, David Willer, and Travis Patton. 1988. “Power Relations in Ex-
change Networks.” American Sociological Review 53 (2). doi:10.2307/2095689.
Molm, Linda D. 2003. “Theoretical Comparisons of Forms of Exchange.” Sociological
Theory 21 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1111/1467-9558.00171.
Molm, Linda D., Jessica L. Collett, and David R. Schaefer. 2007. “Building Solidarity
through Generalized Exchange: A Theory of Reciprocity.” American Journal of
Sociology 113 (1): 205–242. doi:10.1086/517900.
Molm, Linda D., David R. Schaefer, and Jessica L. Collett. 2009. “Fragile and Resilient
Trust: Risk and Uncertainty in Negotiated and Reciprocal Exchange.” Sociological
Theory 27 (1): 1–32. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9558.2009.00336.x.
126
Chapter 5. Solidarity and Competition: Simulating Social Support between
Competing Business Partners
R Development Core Team. 2008. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Comput-
ing. ISBN 3-900051-07-0. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Robins, Garry, Pip Pattison, and Peng Wang. 2009. “Closure, Connectivity and De-
gree Distributions: Exponential Random Graph (p?) Models for Directed Social
Networks.” Social Networks 31 (2): 105–117. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2008.10.
006.
Snijders, Tom A. B. 1996. “Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models for Network Change.”
Journal of Mathematical Sociology 21 (1-2): 149–172. doi:10.1080/0022250X.
1996.9990178.
. 2001. “The Statistical Evaluation of Social Network Dynamics.” Sociological
Methodology 31 (1): 361–395. doi:10.1111/0081-1750.00099.
Snijders, Tom A. B., Alessandro Lomi, and Vanina Jasmine Torló. 2013. “A Model
for the Multiplex Dynamics of Two-Mode and One-Mode Networks, with an
Application to Employment Preference, Friendship, and Advice.” Social Networks
35 (2): 265–276. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2012.05.005.
Snijders, Tom A. B., Philippa E. Pattison, Garry L. Robins, and Mark S. Handcock.
2006. “New Specifications for Exponential Random Graph Models.” Sociological
Methodology 36 (1): 99–153. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9531.2006.00176.x.
Snijders, Tom A. B., and Christian E. G. Steglich. 2015. “Representing Micro-Macro
Linkages by Actor-Based Dynamic Network Models.” Sociological Methods &
Research 44 (2): 222–271. doi:10.1177/0049124113494573.
Snijders, Tom A. B., Gerhard G. Van de Bunt, and Christian E. G. Steglich. 2010.
“Introduction to Stochastic Actor-Based Models for Network Dynamics.” Social
Networks 32 (1): 44–60. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2009.02.004.
Stark, Tobias H. 2011. “Integration in Schools. A Process Perspective on Students’
Interethnic Attitudes and Interpersonal Relationships.” PhD Dissertation, ICS -
University of Groningen.
Sutcliffe, Alistair, and Di Wang. 2012. “Computational Modelling of Trust and Social
Relationships.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 15 (1): 3. doi:10.
18564/jasss.1912.
Sutcliffe, Alistair, Di Wang, and Robin Dunbar. 2012. “Social Relationships and the
Emergence of Social Networks.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
15 (4): 3. doi:10.18564/jasss.2059.
Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
REFERENCES 127
Yamagishi, Toshio, Karen S. Cook, and Motoki Watabe. 1998. “Uncertainty, Trust, and
Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan.” American Journal of
Sociology 104 (1): 165–194. doi:10.1086/210005.

129
Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we attempted to contribute to the discussion about the link
between the economic and the social. More specifically, we addressed the debate on
the consequences of economically-oriented interaction on social relations. Sociological
studies have mostly focused on understanding the opposite direction, i.e., the effect
of social relations on economic outcomes. Conversely, our work was motivated by the
idea that the consequences of the economic on the social is crucial for social sciences
and society in general. The reason of this is twofold.
First, interacting for economic purposes is an activity that takes a considerable
amount of time in individuals’ everyday social life. Working, trading, negotiating
are key activities of modern societies. These activities often provide a frame in which
people come across each other and interact with others who are not often part of their
most intimate social circles, such as family or friends. The relevance of economic
activities in everyday social life is an important reason for social sciences to study
their consequences on social structures. Here, it is worth to note that the expansion of
markets and online transactions in contemporary market economies might indeed
yield destabilizing effects on social solidarity. More specifically, the current globaliza-
tion dynamic could exacerbate the conflict-related content of economic exchanges
and so be detrimental for social expressive relations. Institutional deregulation of
business relations would amplify disruptive effects on solidarity, by ‘disembedding’
the economy from the social. However, economic exchanges do not necessarily gener-
ate negative consequences on social relations. On the contrary, the interaction frame
provided by the exchange allows actors to experience each other’s behaviour and
develop expressive relations beyond instrumental motives. For these reasons, it is
of great importance for social sciences to empirically study those contexts where the
social arises from the economic. This is relevant to build tools that can inform policy
and organizational design.
Secondly, our study testifies to the importance of empirically analysing economic
behaviour, rather than postulating unrealistic context-free assumptions on individ-
uals’ strategic rationality. We showed that this is key to disentangle instrumental
and expressive motivations in social mechanisms. Moreover, this is useful to inform
formal models that go beyond context-specific observations, while simultaneously
deriving consequences which are empirically grounded.
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In conclusion, our studies showed that economic relations per se are not detrimen-
tal for social relations. More specifically, we found that social support expectations can
arise as a byproduct of professional collaborations, which were originally generated
by instrumental motivations between socially unrelated individuals. Furthermore,
the development of solidarity expectations is made possible by the risk structure
which is intrinsic to the nature of economic exchange. More precisely, our work
suggests that if individuals are allowed to choose their partners independently and
are exposed to the risk of being exploited, they might learn to identify trustworthy
partners. This would eventually bring them to translate their trust in the expectation
of getting social support from them. Therefore, economic interaction could nur-
ture interaction contexts that let solidarity emerge outside the boundaries of group
identity.
Moreover, our study has shown that solidarity as byproduct of collaboration
may be robust to competition between partners. While collaborating because of skill
complementarity, competition for the most attractive partners might generate a col-
laboration structure disproportionately centred on most attractive professionals. This
in turn makes it difficult for lower-resource individuals to develop trust relations and,
eventually, social support ties. Nevertheless, our research suggested that resource
inequality can have a positive effect on keeping the emergent social support network
connected and integrated. More precisely, actors’ different neediness levels, due to
resource inequality, not only integrates weaker collaborators in the social support
network, it also increases the network global connectivity.
By studying the link between the economic and the social, we also attempted
to contribute to the analysis of the microfoundations of solidarity. In particular, we
aimed to understand relational mechanisms that might elicit prosocial behaviour. Al-
though it applied observational techniques, our empirical study was highly inspired
by experimental research. This testifies to the importance of designing empirical
research that goes beyond methodological boundaries, in order to shed light on
substantial issues in a more fruitful way.
In this respect, this dissertation helps to discuss another important methodological
point, in that it showed how insightful may be to cross-fertilize ABM computational
methods with social network analysis. More specifically, recent advancements in
statistical modelling of social network data have addressed the focus of network anal-
ysis on microfoundations of network emergence. Unfortunately, these methods often
rely on rather strict assumptions about social system equilibria and actors’ behaviour.
ABM computer simulations can complement to the use of statistical modelling for so-
cial networks by either loosening model assumptions or exploring possible scenarios.
In this way, statistical analysis can inform with empirical content formal models. On
the one hand ABM computer simulations can be auxiliary in widening the scope of
statistical models which rely on narrow behavioural assumptions. On the other hand,
simulations can go beyond explanation and explore possible scenarios.
Finally, our study provides some insights for organizational design. Studying
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relational mechanisms provides insights on processes of self-organization that are
analytically isolated from hierarchical organizational structures. This suggests that
top-down policies aiming at community building in organizations or neighbourhoods
might not be the only way to ensure collaboration. This may depend on two condi-
tions. First, people have to be free to choose their interaction partners independently.
This might lead to a dynamic of learning about one’s trustworthiness and diffusion
of reputation, which eventually might generate expressive relations. Secondly, self-
organization might be hindered by centralized incentives and norm enforcement
which create ambiguity in the interpretation of others’ motives. This might eventually
neutralize individuals’ prosocial motivations and exacerbate collectively inefficient
tendencies towards self-interest. Our study shows that conditions for the emergence
of social relations can be found in economically-oriented interactions from the bottom
up.
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Sociometric questionnaire
This questionnaire was administered in Italian, the mother tongue of all interviewees.
Here, all the questions related to data analysed in Chapter 3 are shown in the original
version (ITA)1, each followed by an English translation (ENG).
Previous acquaintance
ITA:
Quali delle/degli abitanti conosceva già prima di entrare in TaG Brescia? Per "conoscenza"
si intende l’essersi conosciuti personalmente, indipendentemente dal contesto. Ad es-
empio: amico/a, ex collega, familiare, ex compagna/o di scuola o università, semplice
conoscente.
ENG:
With which TaG members were you already acquainted before joining TaG? As "acquain-
tance" we mean having met in person, independent of the context. E.g., friends, relatives,
former colleagues or school mates, simple acquaintance.
Professional collaboration
Incoming commission
ITA:
Lei o la Sua agenzia ha mai ricevuto una commessa o un’offerta di collaborazione da
un(a) abitante o un’agenzia di TaG Brescia? Se sì, indichi i nomi soltanto nei casi in cui
abbiano accettato la proposta. Consideri soltanto le attività regolate da un chiaro accordo
(formale o informale) sulla ripartizione delle attività e dei compensi.
ENG:
Have you ever been offered a commission or a collaboration opportunity by another
TaG member? If so, please select their names only in case you accepted the offer. Please
consider only those cases that were regulated by an explicit (formal or informal) agreement
about timing, resources, and payment.
1. TaG members call themselves "abitanti" (sing., "abitante"), which means "resident" in Italian.
134 Appendix A. Sociometric questionnaire
Outgoing commission
ITA:
Lei o la Sua agenzia ha mai offerto una commessa o un’opportunità di collaborazione a
un(a) abitante o un’agenzia di TaG Brescia? Se sì, indichi i nomi soltanto nei casi in cui
abbiano accettato la proposta. Consideri soltanto le attività regolate da un chiaro accordo
(formale o informale) sulla ripartizione delle attività e dei compensi. Non consideri i casi
di informazione o intermediazione offerta gratuitamente a un membro o un’agenzia di
TaG Brescia.
ENG:
Have you ever offered a commission or a collaboration opportunity to another TaG
member? If so, please select their names only in case they accepted the offer. Please
consider only those cases that were regulated by an explicit agreement about timing,
resources, and payment. Please do not consider simple information sharing with other
TaaG members.
Common projects
ITA:
Lei o la Sua agenzia ha mai intrapreso un progetto comune con un(a) altra/o abitante o
agenzia (es. una nuova attività in partnership, una nuova iniziativa imprenditoriale)?
Se sì, indichi i nomi, indipendentemente dal successo finale. Consideri soltanto le attività
regolate da un chiaro accordo (formale o informale) sulla ripartizione delle attività e dei
compensi.
ENG:
Have you ever started a new common project with another TaG member (e.g., a new
partnership, a joint venture, etc.)? If so, please select their names, independently of the
outcome. Please consider only those cases that were regulated by an explicit agreement
about time, resources, and payment.
Partner evaluation
ITA:
Consideri le/gli abitanti di TaG Brescia citate/i finora con cui ha collaborato professional-
mente (commesse ricevute, commesse offerte, progetti comuni). Sulla base dell’esperienza
diretta maturata nell’ambito di tali collaborazioni, quanto raccomanderebbe ad altri
queste persone come potenziali partner professionali? Nel caso di collaborazioni con agen-
zie, risponda solo per quelle persone con le quali ha effettivamente interagito nell’ambito
delle collaborazioni avvenute.[1 = “Assolutamente no” - 7 = “Assolutamente sì”]
ENG:
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Please consider all TaG members whom you cited so far as collaborators (incoming or
outgoing commissions, common projects). Based on your personal experience, how much
would you recommend them as business partners to others? In case you collaborated
with agencies, please rate only those people with whom you actually interacted. [1 =
“Absolutely not” - 7 = “Yes, absolutely”]
Social support
Material support
ITA:
Immagini di avere un problema pratico che riguarda la Sua vita quotidiana. Per risolverlo,
immagini di avere bisogno di un aiuto da parte di un’altra persona, che implichi tempo,
impegno o il prestito di attrezzature (es. un aiuto per un trasloco o piccole riparazioni in
casa). A quali delle/degli abitanti si rivolgerebbe?
ENG:
Suppose that you need to solve some practical problems related to your private life. In
order to accomplish this, you needed help from another person, who will provide time,
effort, or tools. To which TaG member would you turn?
Emotional support
ITA:
Immagini di avere un problema relativo alla Sua vita privata e di volerne parlare con
qualcuna/o per ricevere un consiglio o del conforto. A quali tra le/gli abitanti si rivol-
gerebbe?
ENG:
Suppose that you have a problem related to your private life and you needed to talk about
it with someone for advice or comfort. To which TaG member would you turn?
Trust in business
ITA:
Immagini di poter coinvolgere le/gli abitanti in un Suo progetto lavorativo personale,
potenzialmente aperto a tutte le competenze presenti all’interno di TaG Brescia. Di quali
abitanti si fiderebbe come eventuali partner o collaboratori? Non consideri, per favore, la
compatibilità delle competenze delle/degli abitanti.
ENG:
Suppose that you needed to involve other TaG members in a new personal business
project, potentially open to all competencies supplied within TaG. Whom would you trust
as business partners? Please, do not consider the competencies needed for your actual
business.
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ERGM goodness of fit
In this appendix, we provide tables for assessing goodness of fit of the ERGMs
showed in Chapter 3.
Univariate ERGM
Parameter (PNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
Arc 99 99.183 6.283 -0.029
Reciprocity 25 25.061 3.431 -0.018
2-In-Star 190 198.59 32.647 -0.263
2-Out-Star 179 176.227 24.882 0.111
3-In-Star 240 297.832 110.244 -0.525
3-Out-Star 217 208.115 59.67 0.149
Mixed-2-Star 306 306.789 39.5 -0.02
030T 114 111.159 19.447 0.146
030C 25 26.336 6.42 -0.208
Sink 0 1.417 1.109 -1.277
Source 1 1.789 1.144 -0.69
Isolates 1 0.187 0.415 1.959
K-In-Star(2.00) 108.375 108.568 11.06 -0.017
K-Out-Star(2.00) 105.266 105.455 10.438 -0.018
K-L-Star(2.00) 72.859 71.423 5.003 0.287
K-1-Star(2.00) 150.797 149.178 14.187 0.114
1-L-Star(2.00) 154.758 154.036 14.843 0.049
AKT-T(2.00) 86.5 86.518 12.071 -0.001
AKT-C(2.00) 62.375 62.434 12.664 -0.005
AKT-D(2.00) 81.344 81.428 11.368 -0.007
AKT-U(2.00) 86.75 84.295 11.825 0.208
A2P-T(2.00) 259.625 260.261 30.82 -0.021
A2P-D(2.00) 145.344 144.425 18.515 0.05
A2P-U(2.00) 154.688 165.438 25.248 -0.426
Continued on following page
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Parameter (PNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
Interaction (gender) 67 67.324 5.604 -0.058
Sender (gender) 80 80.203 6.336 -0.032
Receiver (gender) 76 76.287 5.928 -0.048
T2u11 (gender) 18 16.585 2.987 0.474
T1u11 (gender) 22 20.945 3.335 0.316
T1au14 (gender) 140 144.955 29.451 -0.168
T1au13 (gender) 239 227.891 33.745 0.329
T1au12 (gender) 145 141.944 24.561 0.124
Sender (age) 3107 3110.8 199.906 -0.019
Sender (seniority) 3195 3183.338 207.256 0.056
Receiver (age) 3261 3266.29 220.673 -0.024
Receiver (seniority) 3458 3470.842 233.313 -0.055
Single Sum (age) 6368 6377.09 413.234 -0.022
Single Sum (seniority) 6653 6654.18 410.792 -0.003
Single Difference (age) 580 581.754 65.418 -0.027
Single Difference (seniority) 1131 1137.274 153.983 -0.041
Single Product (age) 103048 102735.861 7004.307 0.045
Single Product (seniority) 115719 114859.503 7806.12 0.11
Mutual Sum (age) 1599 1600.261 224.067 -0.006
Mutual Sum (seniority) 1714 1797.349 240.269 -0.347
Mutual Difference (age) 125 124.543 29.079 0.016
Mutual Difference (seniority) 264 222.243 62.569 0.667
Mutual Product (age) 25692 25667.497 3792.406 0.006
Mutual Product (seniority) 30599 33164.653 4662.229 -0.55
CovariateArc (Positive collaboration) 58 57.85 5.031 0.03
Std. Dev. in-degree dist. 2.205 2.298 0.303 -0.306
Skew in-degree dist. 0.26 0.699 0.455 -0.966
Std. Dev. out-degree dist. 2.026 1.942 0.243 0.346
Skew out-degree dist. 0.424 0.343 0.368 0.22
Global Clustering Cto 0.318 0.317 0.043 0.043
Global Clustering Cti 0.3 0.282 0.043 0.409
Global Clustering Ctm 0.373 0.362 0.043 0.237
Global Clustering Ccm 0.245 0.257 0.051 -0.233
TABLE B.1: Goodness of fit of Model 1.1. Observed values (Obs.)
relate to empirical data, while mean and standard deviations (Std.
Dev.) relate to simulated networks.
Appendix B. ERGM goodness of fit 139
Multivariate ERGM
Parameter (XPNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
Social Support (S)
Arc 99 98.956 7.759 0.006
Reciprocity 25 24.745 3.68 0.069
2-In-Star 190 202.335 39.496 -0.312
2-Out-Star 179 178.813 30.448 0.006
3-In-Star 240 323.422 143.082 -0.583
3-Out-Star 217 222.626 77.354 -0.073
Mixed-2-Star 306 304.054 42.341 0.046
030T 114 110.731 19.145 0.171
030C 25 25.68 6.214 -0.109
Sink 0 1.395 1.128 -1.237
Source 1 1.743 1.197 -0.621
Isolates 1 0.187 0.452 1.799
K-In-Star (2.00) 108.375 108.375 13.282 0
K-Out-Star (2.00) 105.266 105.338 12.705 -0.006
K-L-Star (2.00) 72.859 71.093 5.748 0.307
K-1-Star (2.00) 150.797 148.608 16.155 0.136
1-L-Star (2.00) 154.758 153.262 16.905 0.088
AKT-T (2.00) 86.5 86.188 12.755 0.024
AKT-C (2.00) 62.375 61.722 12.702 0.051
AKT-D (2.00) 81.344 81.29 11.864 0.005
AKT-U (2.00) 86.75 84.192 12.504 0.205
A2P-T (2.00) 259.625 258.056 34.41 0.046
A2P-D (2.00) 145.344 146.011 22.927 -0.029
A2P-U (2.00) 154.688 167.954 30.735 -0.432
Interaction (gender) 67 67.072 6.789 -0.011
Sender (gender) 80 80.097 7.889 -0.012
Receiver (gender) 76 75.936 7.09 0.009
T2u11 (gender) 18 16.494 3.205 0.47
T1u11 (gender) 22 20.843 3.571 0.324
T1au14 (gender) 140 146.94 35.252 -0.197
T1au13 (gender) 239 226.655 37.054 0.333
T1au12 (gender) 145 144.968 30.692 0.001
Sender (age) 3107 3102.865 244.173 0.017
Sender (seniority) 3195 3194.875 229.79 0.001
Receiver (age) 3261 3263.14 275.065 -0.008
Receiver (seniority) 3458 3449.828 266.409 0.031
Single Sum (age) 6368 6366.005 512.288 0.004
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Parameter (XPNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
Single Sum (seniority) 6653 6644.703 469.256 0.018
Single Difference (age) 580 580.951 76.11 -0.012
Single Difference (seniority) 1131 1126.441 168.186 0.027
Single Product (age) 103048 102669.023 8617.597 0.044
Single Product (seniority) 115719 114882.142 8108.209 0.103
Mutual Sum (age) 1599 1583.479 243.173 0.064
Mutual Sum (seniority) 1714 1756.718 253.027 -0.169
Mutual Difference (age) 125 123.155 31.936 0.058
Mutual Difference (seniority) 264 226.834 68.519 0.542
Mutual Product (age) 25692 25475.012 4137.941 0.052
Mutual Product (seniority) 30599 32135.806 4898.239 -0.314
Covariate Arc (Positive Collaboration) 58 57.724 4.72 0.058
Trust in Business (T)
Arc 235 234.511 37.112 0.013
Reciprocity 64 63.885 13.099 0.009
2-In-Star 1117 1082.513 301.306 0.114
2-Out-Star 1272 1053.804 284.091 0.768
3-In-Star 3795 3487.628 1361.527 0.226
3-Out-Star 5321 3180.507 1222.039 1.752
Mixed-2-Star 2035 2028.035 577.11 0.012
030T 1016 878.978 283.677 0.483
030C 256 252.885 92.48 0.034
Sink 0 1.502 1.271 -1.182
Source 0 0.476 0.696 -0.684
Isolates 1 0.109 0.342 2.602
K-In-Star (2.00) 361.773 360.786 70.809 0.014
K-Out-Star (2.00) 364.252 363.242 69.337 0.015
K-L-Star (2.00) 101.976 99.647 8.293 0.281
K-1-Star (2.00) 452.906 446.531 79.58 0.08
1-L-Star (2.00) 443.899 443.749 82.064 0.002
AKT-T (2.00) 386.483 385.088 84.723 0.016
AKT-C (2.00) 337.897 336.355 88.949 0.017
AKT-D (2.00) 387.013 367.925 84.673 0.225
AKT-U (2.00) 381.768 378.235 86.622 0.041
A2P-T (2.00) 1005.271 1001.814 179.191 0.019
A2P-D (2.00) 588.603 515.491 86.392 0.846
A2P-U (2.00) 496.693 522.431 96.259 -0.267
Interaction (gender) 152 151.913 27.711 0.003
Continued on following page
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Parameter (XPNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
Sender (gender) 188 187.798 32.593 0.006
Receiver (gender) 184 183.585 31.501 0.013
T2u11 (gender) 44 39.731 9.669 0.442
T1u11 (gender) 58 57.395 12.81 0.047
T1au14 (gender) 836 821.152 245.382 0.061
T1au13 (gender) 1602 1552.817 477.868 0.103
T1au12 (gender) 1030 834.611 242.315 0.806
Sender (age) 7301 7287.379 1186.675 0.011
Sender (seniority) 7169 7145.751 1004.079 0.023
Receiver (age) 7351 7333.256 1174.509 0.015
Receiver (seniority) 7935 7920.101 1095.391 0.014
Single Sum (age) 14652 14620.635 2358.295 0.013
Single Sum (seniority) 15104 15065.852 2081.84 0.018
Single Difference (age) 1368 1362.361 258.828 0.022
Single Difference (seniority) 2984 2972.606 595.907 0.019
Single Product (age) 228472 227739.29 37588.917 0.019
Single Product (seniority) 248713 249839.812 30809.089 -0.037
Mutual Sum (age) 3933 3952.397 823.167 -0.024
Mutual Sum (seniority) 4331 4389.353 773.956 -0.075
Mutual Difference (age) 341 350.231 91.486 -0.101
Mutual Difference (seniority) 733 634.439 198.038 0.498
Mutual Product (age) 60050 61112.376 13011.957 -0.082
Mutual Product (seniority) 75315 78607.431 12489.15 -0.264
Covariate Arc (Positive Collaboration) 93 92.885 7.057 0.016
Multiplex effects ST
Arc ST 82 81.909 9.157 0.01
Reciprocity ST 70 69.939 8.936 0.007
Reciprocity SST 45 45.573 7.195 -0.08
Reciprocity STT 60 63.619 8.951 -0.404
Reciprocity SSTT 20 21.383 3.658 -0.378
In2Star ST 886 878.443 174.135 0.043
Out2Star ST 801 837.669 163.768 -0.224
Mix2Star ST 762 797.135 158.519 -0.222
Mix2Star TS 805 841.067 166.763 -0.216
T-STS 174 160.968 26.969 0.483
T-STT 336 361.45 85.138 -0.299
T-TTS 466 381.339 88.335 0.958
T-TST 354 362.896 88.978 -0.1
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Parameter (XPNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
T-SST 178 177.441 33.486 0.017
T-TSS 186 194.141 39.241 -0.207
C-SST 768 768.153 26.845 -0.006
C-TTS 319 330.427 83.956 -0.136
Isolates ST 1 0.017 0.129 7.6
TKT-STS (2.00) 140.875 129.503 20.522 0.554
CKT-STS (2.00) 119.625 118.503 20.519 0.055
DKT-STS (2.00) 135.063 135.097 23.791 -0.001
UKT-STS (2.00) 144.938 152.081 29.003 -0.246
TKT-TST (2.00) 154.552 155.258 23.206 -0.03
CKT-TST (2.00) 148.003 145.254 23.752 0.116
DKT-TST (2.00) 169.73 155.119 22.365 0.653
UKT-TST (2.00) 150.421 154.343 23.643 -0.166
mrs (gender) 65 64.777 8.967 0.025
mrr (gender) 62 61.107 8.264 0.108
ex ST (gender) 56 53.94 8.491 0.243
ex TS (gender) 54 51.556 7.967 0.307
mrb (gender) 55 53.707 7.859 0.165
mrbm (gender) 49 45.022 7.629 0.521
mSum (age) 5921 5952.229 611.506 -0.051
mSum (seniority) 6114 6256.93 541.738 -0.264
mdiff (age) 539 558.999 79.736 -0.251
mdiff (seniority) 1032 991.322 174.534 0.233
mSumm Miss. Attr. (age) 3683 3665.371 590.461 0.03
mSumm Miss. Attr. (seniority) 4165 4369.018 547.694 -0.373
mdiffm Miss. Attr. (age) 267 265.647 76.603 0.018
mdiffm Miss. Attr. (seniority) 569 500.394 161.101 0.426
Covariate Arc ST (Positive Collaboration) 55 54.739 4.873 0.054
Std. Dev. in-degree dist. S 2.205 2.352 0.348 -0.42
Skew in-degree dist. S 0.26 0.826 0.497 -1.138
Std. Dev. out-degree dist. S 2.026 1.989 0.269 0.137
Skew out-degree dist. S 0.424 0.464 0.429 -0.094
Global Clustering Cto S 0.318 0.312 0.045 0.134
Global Clustering Cti S 0.3 0.278 0.044 0.502
Global Clustering Ctm S 0.373 0.365 0.043 0.18
Global Clustering Ccm S 0.245 0.254 0.052 -0.163
Std. Dev. in-degree dist. T 4.413 3.94 0.439 1.077
Skew in-degree dist. T 0.22 0.013 0.294 0.701
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Parameter (XPNet name) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
Std. Dev. out-degree dist. T 5.492 3.679 0.447 4.058
Skew out-degree dist. T 0.645 -0.324 0.354 2.741
Global Clustering Cto T 0.399 0.412 0.032 -0.394
Global Clustering Cti T 0.455 0.402 0.03 1.774
Global Clustering Ctm T 0.499 0.43 0.026 2.655
Global Clustering Ccm T 0.377 0.367 0.037 0.278
TABLE B.2: Goodness of fit of Model 2.2. Observed values (Obs.)
relate to empirical data, while mean and standard deviations (Std.
Dev.) relate to simulated networks.

145
Appendix C
Model code
Here follows the part of the software code that implemented the main algorithm of
the model. The software has been written in Delphi 5 by Andreas Flache.
1 const
2 _X = 3 ;
3 _N = 1 0 0 ;
4
5 { ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ }
6 { ∗∗ G l o b a l V a r i a b l e s : ∗∗ }
7 { ∗∗ S t a t e v a r i a b l e s o f MODEL ∗∗ }
8 { ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ }
9 a t t r i b u t e 1 , a t t r i b u t e 2 : array [ 1 . . _N] of extended ;
10
11 net : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
12
13 / / graph s t a t i s t i c s w i t h i n network
14 outDi : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
15 r e c T i : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
16 popRecTi : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
17 a c t C l o s T r i a d s I : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
18 genExTriadsI : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
19 t r a n s T r i p l e t s I : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
20 r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N] of extended ;
21
22 / / ne twork s t a t i s t i c s c r o s s ne twork
23 a s s C o l l T r u s t : array [ 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
24 a s s T r u s t C o l l : array [ 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
25 multTrustSupp : array [ 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
26 recTrustSupp : array [ 1 . . _N] of i n t e g e r ;
27
28 / / o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n e t c
29 f i j : array [ 0 . . _N] of extended ;
30 prI J , pr I JChoice : array [ 0 . . _N] of extended ;
31 netProb , netProbAv : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N , 1 . . _N] of double ;
32 netProb , netProbAv : array [ 1 . . _X , 1 . . _N , 1 . . _N] of double ;
33
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34 { ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ }
35 { ∗∗ G l o b a l V a r i a b l e s : ∗∗ }
36 { ∗∗ P a r a m e t e r s o f MODEL ∗∗ }
37 { ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ }
38 N: i n t e g e r ;
39 rateT , rateC : extended ;
40 odIntc , odSlope , rec , popRecT , actClosTr iads ,
41 genExTriads , t r a n s T r i p l e t s : array [ 1 . . _X ] of extended ;
42 aCT , aTC , mTS, rTS : extended ;
43 resPopC : extended ;
44
45 odSlopHetS : boolean ;
46 odSlopeIndS : array [ 1 . . _N] of extended ;
48 begin
49
50 Synchronize ( SetParameters ) ;
51 wri teCountS ta t i c : = 1 ;
52
53 expCount := in i tExp ;
54 experimentFinished := f a l s e ;
55 para1 := p1Min ;
56 while para1 <= (p1Max+1/1000000) do
57
58 begin
59 para2 := p2Min ;
60 while para2 <= p2Max do
61 begin
62 para3 := p3Min ;
63 while para3 <= p3Max do
64 begin
65 para4 := p4Min ;
66 while para4 <= p4Max do
67 begin
68
69 rep := in i tRep ;
70
71 dataSet . ini tOutputData ;
72
73 for xNet := 2 to 3 do
74 for k := 1 to N do for j := 1 to N do
75 netProbAv [ xNet , k , j ] : = 0 ;
76
77 repeat
78 controlForm . edCurRep . t e x t := IntToStr ( rep ) ;
79
80 odIntc [ 2 ] : = para1 ;
81 rec [ 2 ] : = para2 ;
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82 ac tClosTr iads [ 2 ] : = para3 ;
83 odIntc [ 3 ] : = para4 ;
84 odIntc [ 1 ] : = para17 ;
85 rec [ 1 ] : = para19 ;
86 popRecT [ 1 ] : = para20 ;
87
88 / / Trus t ne twork
89 odSlope [ 2 ] : = para15 ;
90 t r a n s T r i p l e t s [ 2 ] : = para13 ;
91
92 / / s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n network
93 odSlope [ 3 ] : = para16 ;
94 for i :=1 to N do odSlopeIndS [ i ] : = odSlope [ 3 ] ;
95 rec [ 3 ] : = para5 ;
96 genExTriads [ 3 ] : = para6 ;
97 t r a n s T r i p l e t s [ 3 ] : = para14 ;
98 odSlopHetS := controlForm . ckHetNeediness . checked ;
99
100 / / c r o s s ne twork e f f e c t s
101 aCT:= para7 ;
102 aTC:= para22 ;
103 mTS:= para8 ;
104 genExTriads [ 2 ] : = para9 ;
105 rTS := para10 ;
106
107 / / a c t o r a t t r i b u t e e f f e c t s
108 resPopC := para24 ;
109
110 / / change r a t e s
111 rateC := para21 ;
112 rateT := para12 ;
113
114 I n i t S t a t e ;
115
116 i t e r : = 0 ; writeCount : = 1 ;
117 updateOutputMeasures ;
118
119 i t e r : = 1 ; writeCount : = 1 ;
120
121 repeat
122
123 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
124 / / HERE FOLLOWS THE ACTUAL SIMULATION ENGINE∗∗∗∗ / /
125 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
126
127 i := Random(N) + 1 ;
128 ranNum2 := Random ;
129 i f ranNum2 <= rateC then xNet := 1 e lse
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130 i f ranNum2 <= rateC+rateT then xNet :=2 e lse xNet := 3 ;
131
132 / / count a c t i v i t y c l o s u r e t r i a d s i k−j k−i j ,
133 / / on ly ne e ded f o r t r u s t ne twork
134 i f xNet=2 then a c t C l o s T r i a d s I [ xNet , i ] : =
135 countActCloseTriadsI ( i , xNet ) ;
136
137 / / count " g e n e r a l i z e d exchange " t r i a d s j k−k i−i j ,
138 / / n e ed ed f o r b o t h t r u s t and s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n network
139 i f ( ( xNet =2) or ( xNet = 3) ) then genExTriadsI [ xNet , i ] : =
140 countGenExTriadsI ( i , xNet ) ;
141
142 / / count " t r a n s i t i v e t r i p l e t s " t r i a d s i j−ih−hj ,
143 / / n e e ded f o r b o t h t r u s t and s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n network
144 i f ( ( xNet =2) or ( xNet = 3) ) then t r a n s T r i p l e t s I [ xNet , i ] : =
145 c o u n t T r a n s T r i p l e t s I ( i , xNet ) ;
146
147 / / up da t e count o f r e c i p r o c a t e d dyads o f t h e j ’ s t o which
148 / / t h e r e i s i−>j
149 / / t h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r e c T i s t a t i s t i c i s up t o d a t e
150 i f xNet=1 then popRecTi [ xNet , i ] : = countPopRecI ( i , xNet ) ;
151
152 / / compute v a l u e o f o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n f o r t i e
153 / / change c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o j .
154 cumPrIJ := 0 ;
155 for j := 0 to N do
156 begin
157 i f j >0 then
158 begin
159 o l d I J := net [ xNet , i , j ] ;
160 newIJ := Abs ( net [ xNet , i , j ]−1) ;
161
162 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
163 / / Below h e r e : c a l c u l a t e c h a n g e s o f r e l e v a n t ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
164 / / graph s t a t i s t i c s t h a t would r e s u l t i f i j were t o g g l e d ∗ / /
165 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
166
167 outDiNew := outDi [ xNet , i ] + ( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
168 recTiNew := r e c T i [ xNet , i ] + ( ( newIJ∗net [ xNet , j , i ] )
169 −( o l d I J ∗net [ xNet , j , i ] ) ) ;
170
171 / / c a l c u l a t e change in popRecTi and r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I
172 / / s t a t i s t i c i f dyad i j were t o g g l e d , on ly ne eded f o r
173 / / c o l l a b o r a t i o n network
174 i f xNet=1 then
175 begin
176 popRecTiNew := popRecTi [ xNet , i ] + ( newIJ−o l d I J )∗ r e c T i [ xNet , j ] ;
177 i f newIJ=0 then popRecTiNew := popRecTiNew +1;
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178 resourcesCollabINew := r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I [ xNet , i ]+
179 ( newIJ−o l d I J )∗ a t t r i b u t e 1 [ j ] ;
180 end ; / / i f xNet=1
181
182 / / c a l c u l a t e change in number o f a c t C l o s T r i a d s I i j−i k−j k
183 / / i f dyad i j were t o g g l e d , on ly ne eded f o r t r u s t ne twork
184 i f xNet=2 then
185 begin
186 actClosTriadsINew := 0 ;
187 for k := 1 to N do
188 i f ( k<> i ) and ( k<> j ) then
189 begin
190 i f ( net [ xNet , j , k ] =1 ) and ( net [ xNet , i , k ] =1 ) then
191 actClosTriadsINew := actClosTriadsINew +( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
192 end ;
193 actClosTriadsINew := a c t C l o s T r i a d s I [ xNet , i ]+ actClosTriadsINew ;
194 end ;
195
196 / / c a l c u l a t e change in number o f g e n E x T r i a d s I i j−j k−k i
197 / / i f dyad i j were t o g g l e d , b o t h t r u s t and
198 / / s u p p o r t exp network
199 i f ( xNet =2) or ( xNet =3) then
200 begin
201 genExTriadsINew := 0 ;
202 for k := 1 to N do
203 i f ( k<> i ) and ( k<> j ) then
204 begin
205 i f ( net [ xNet , j , k ] =1 ) and ( net [ xNet , k , i ] =1 ) then
206 genExTriadsINew := genExTriadsINew +( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
207 end ;
208 genExTriadsINew := genExTriadsI [ xNet , i ]+ genExTriadsINew ;
209 end ;
210
211 / / c a l c u l a t e change in number o f t r a n s T r i p l e t s I i j−ih−h j
212 / / i f dyad i j were t o g g l e d , b o t h t r u s t and
213 / / s u p p o r t exp network
214 i f ( xNet =2) or ( xNet =3) then
215 begin
216 t ransTr iple ts INew := 0 ;
217 for k := 1 to N do
218 i f ( k<> i ) and ( k<> j ) then
219 begin
220 i f ( net [ xNet , i , k ] =1 ) and ( net [ xNet , k , j ] =1 ) then
221 t ransTr iple ts INew := transTr iple ts INew +( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
222 end ;
223 t ransTr iple ts INew := t r a n s T r i p l e t s I [ xNet , i ]+ transTr iple ts INew ;
224 end ;
225
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226 / / Below h e r e c h a n g e s in c r o s s−n e t graph s t a t i s t i c s
227 / / i f dyad i j in xNet were t o g g l e d
228
229 / / a s s C o l l T r u s t : number o f dyads in t r u s t ne twork
230 / / in which i jC−i j T
231 i f ( xNet =2) then assCollTrustNew := a s s C o l l T r u s t [ i ]+
232 net [ 1 , i , j ] ∗ ( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
233
234 / / a s s T r u s t C o l l : number o f dyads in c o l l a b o r a t i o n network
235 / / in which i j T−i j C
236 i f ( xNet =1) then assTrustCollNew := a s s T r u s t C o l l [ i ]+
237 net [ 2 , i , j ] ∗ ( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
238
239 / / multTrustSuppNew : number o f dyads in s u p p o r t ne twork
240 / / in which i j T−i j S
241 i f ( xNet =3) then multTrustSuppNew := multTrustSupp [ i ]+
242 net [ 2 , i , j ] ∗ ( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
243
244 / / recTrustSuppNew : number o f dyads in s u p p o r t ne twork
245 / / in which j i T−i j S
246 i f ( xNet =3) then recTrustSuppNew := recTrustSupp [ i ]+
247 net [ 2 , j , i ] ∗ ( newIJ−o l d I J ) ;
248 end
249 e lse
250
251 begin
252 o l d I J := 0 ;
253 newIJ : = 0 ;
254 outDiNew := outDi [ xNet , i ] ;
255 recTiNew := r e c T i [ xNet , i ] ;
256 i f ( xNet =1) then popRecTiNew := popRecTi [ xNet , i ] ;
257 i f ( xNet =1) then resourcesCollabINew :=
258 r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I [ xNet , i ] ;
259 i f ( xNet =1) then assTrustCollNew := a s s T r u s t C o l l [ i ] ;
260 i f ( xNet =2) then actClosTriadsINew :=
261 a c t C l o s T r i a d s I [ xNet , i ] ;
262 i f ( xNet =2) or ( xNet =3) then genExTriadsINew :=
263 genExTriadsI [ xNet , i ] ;
264 i f ( xNet =2) or ( xNet =3) then t ransTr iple ts INew :=
265 t r a n s T r i p l e t s I [ xNet , i ] ;
266 i f ( xNet =2) then assCollTrustNew := a s s C o l l T r u s t [ i ] ;
267 i f ( xNet =3) then multTrustSuppNew := multTrustSupp [ i ] ;
268 i f ( xNet =3) then recTrustSuppNew := recTrustSupp [ i ] ;
269 end ;
270
271 / / C a l c u l a t e r e s u l t i n g v a l u e o f o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n
272 / / f o r p o t e n t i a l i j dyad s t a t e change :
273
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274 / / f i r s t p a r t t h a t i s e q u a l f o r a l l n e t w o r k s :
275 / / e x c e p t t h a t in s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n network t h e s l o p e
276 / / p a r a m e t e r can vary be tween i n d i v d i u a l s i
277 i f ( xNet =3) then odSlopePara := odSlopeIndS [ i ] e lse
278 odSlopePara := odSlope [ xNet ] ;
279 f i j [ j ] : = ( odIntc [ xNet ]+ odSlopePara∗outDiNew )∗outDiNew+
280 rec [ xNet ]∗ recTiNew+
281 genExTriads [ xNet ]∗ genExTriadsINew+
282 t r a n s T r i p l e t s [ xNet ]∗ t ransTr iple ts INew ;
283
284 / / Now add e l e m e n t s t h a t a r e s p e c i f i c f o r c o l l a b o r a t i o n
285 / / ne twork t o o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n :
286 i f ( xNet =1) then f i j [ j ] : = f i j [ j ]+
287 popRecT [ xNet ]∗popRecTiNew +
288 aTC∗assTrustCollNew +
289 resPopC∗ resourcesCollabINew ;
290
291 / / Now add e l e m e n t s t h a t a r e s p e c i f i c f o r t r u s t ne twork
292 / / t o o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n :
293 i f ( xNet =2) then f i j [ j ] : = f i j [ j ]+
294 ac tClosTr iads [ xNet ]∗ actClosTriadsINew +
295 aCT ∗ assCollTrustNew ;
296
297 / / Now add e l e m e n t s t h a t a r e s p e c i f i c f o r s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n
298 / / ne twork t o o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n :
299 i f ( xNet =3) then f i j [ j ] : = f i j [ j ]+
300 mTS ∗ multTrustSuppNew +
301 rTS ∗ recTrustSuppNew ;
302
303 / / Now s t o r e c o r r e s p o n d i n g exp ( . . . ) v a l u e s and
304 / / up da t e c u m u l a t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y
305 / / p r I J [ j ] i s t o h o l d c u m u l a t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y
306 / / f o r t o g g l i n g i j , t hus p r I J [ j ]− p r I J [ j −1]
307 / / i s p r o b a b i l i t y d e n s i t y .
308 p r I J [ j ] : = Exp ( f i j [ j ] ) + cumPrIJ ;
309 i f i <> j then cumPrIJ := cumPrIJ+Exp ( f i j [ j ] ) ;
310 i f i = j then p r I J [ j ] : = p r I J [ j −1] ;
311 end ;
312
313 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
314 / / At t h i s p o i n t new v a l u e s o b j f u n c t i o n f o r a l l j ’ s a r e known .
315 / / Below h e r e : Mul t inomia l random c h o i c e e x p e r i m e n t ∗ ∗ / /
316 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
317
318 for j := 0 to N do
319 i f j = 0 then prI JChoice [ j ] : = p r I J [ j ]/ cumPrIJ e lse
320 prI JChoice [ j ] : = ( p r I J [ j ]−p r I J [ j −1])/ cumPrIJ ;
321
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322 / / Now d e t e r m i n e c h o i c e a c c o r d i n g t o SIENA d e c i s i o n a l g o r i t h m
323 ranNum:= random∗cumPrIJ ;
324 j := 0 ;
325 while ranNum > p r I J [ j ] do inc ( j ) ;
326 i f i = j then
327 i f ( random > 0 . 5 ) then inc ( j ) e lse dec ( j ) ;
328 / / a t t h i s p o i n t j i s t h e i n d e x o f t h e dyad f o r
329 / / which t h e s t a t e w i l l be t o g g l e d
330
331 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
332 / / At t h i s p o i n t dyad t o be t o g g l e d has been found : j .
333 / / Now a d a p t n e t w o r k s and graph s t a t i s t i c s a c c o r d i n g l y ∗ ∗ / /
334 / / ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ / /
335 / / now up da t e ne twork a c c o r d i n g l y .
336 i f j > 0 then
337 begin
338 o l d I J := net [ xNet , i , j ] ;
339 net [ xNet , i , j ] : = Abs ( net [ xNet , i , j ]−1) ;
340
341 / / Adapt network s t a t i s t i c s f o r a c t o r s a f f e c t e d by
342 / / t h i s dyad change
343 outDi [ xNet , i ] : = outDi [ xNet , i ] + ( net [ xNet , i , j ]− o l d I J ) ;
344 r e c T i [ xNet , i ] : = r e c T i [ xNet , i ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ xNet , j , i ] )
345 −( o l d I J ∗net [ xNet , j , i ] ) ) ;
346
347 / / change o f dyad i j can a l s o change count o f r e c i p r o c a t e d
348 / / t i e s in xNet f o r j
349 r e c T i [ xNet , j ] : = r e c T i [ xNet , j ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ xNet , j , i ] )
350 −( o l d I J ∗net [ xNet , j , i ] ) ) ;
351
352 / / c a l c u l a t e change in popRecTi and r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I s t a t i s t i c ,
353 / / on ly ne e ded f o r c o l l a b o r a t i o n network
354 i f xNet=1 then popRecTi [ xNet , i ] : = countPopRecI ( i , xNet ) ;
355 begin
356 popRecTi [ xNet , i ] : = popRecTi [ xNet , i ]+
357 ( net [ xNet , i , j ]− o l d I J )∗ r e c T i [ xNet , j ] ;
358 i f net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ xNet , j , i ]=1 then popRecTi [ xNet , i ] : =
359 popRecTi [ xNet , i ]−1;
360 r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I [ xNet , i ] : =
361 r e s o u r c e s C o l l a b I [ xNet , i ]+
362 ( net [ xNet , i , j ]− o l d I J )∗ a t t r i b u t e 1 [ j ] ;
363 end ;
364
365 / / a s s C o l l T r u s t : number o f dyads in which i jC−i j T
366 i f xNet=2 then
367 a s s C o l l T r u s t [ i ] : = a s s C o l l T r u s t [ i ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ 1 , i , j ] )
368 −( o l d I J ∗net [ 1 , i , j ] ) ) ;
369
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370 / / a s s T r u s t C o l l : number o f dyads in which i j T−i j C
371 i f xNet=1 then
372 a s s T r u s t C o l l [ i ] : = a s s T r u s t C o l l [ i ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ 2 , i , j ] )
373 −( o l d I J ∗net [ 2 , i , j ] ) ) ;
374
375 / / multTrustSupp f o r c h a n g e s in t r u s t ne twork : number
376 / / o f dyads in which i j T−i j S
377 i f xNet=2 then
378 multTrustSupp [ i ] : = multTrustSupp [ i ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ 3 , i , j ] )
379 −( o l d I J ∗net [ 3 , i , j ] ) ) ;
380
381 / / multTrustSupp f o r c h a n g e s in s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n network :
382 / / number o f dyads in which i j T−i j S
383 i f xNet=3 then
384 multTrustSupp [ i ] : = multTrustSupp [ i ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ 2 , i , j ] )
385 −( o l d I J ∗net [ 2 , i , j ] ) ) ;
386
387 / / r e cTrus tSupp f o r c h a n g e s in t r u s t ne twork :
388 / / number o f dyads in which j i T−i j S
389 i f xNet=2 then
390 recTrustSupp [ j ] : = recTrustSupp [ j ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ 3 , j , i ] )
391 −( o l d I J ∗net [ 3 , j , i ] ) ) ;
392
393 / / r e cTrus tSupp f o r c h a n g e s in s u p p o r t e x p e c t a t i o n network :
394 / / number o f dyads in which j i T−i j S
395 i f xNet=3 then
396 recTrustSupp [ i ] : = recTrustSupp [ i ] + ( ( net [ xNet , i , j ]∗ net [ 2 , j , i ] )
397 −( o l d I J ∗net [ 2 , j , i ] ) ) ;
398 end ;
399
400 updateOutputMeasures ;
401 / / n o t e : t h i s p r o c e d u r e change g l o b a l v a r i a b l e s f o r o u t put s t a t i s t i c s
402
403 i f ( ( i t e r mod 100) = 0) then controlForm . edCurIt . t e x t := IntToStr ( i t e r ) ;
404
405 / / var1 . . var10 c o n t a i n s v a r i a b l e s used in d i s p l a y S t a t e
406 i f ( ( i t e r mod i tPerOutput ) = 0) or ( i t e r =1) or ( i t e r =maxIter ) then
407 begin
408 Synchronize ( d i s p l a y S t a t e ) ;
409 end ;
410
411 inc ( i t e r ) ;
412 u n t i l Terminated or ( i t e r > maxIter ) ;
413 inc ( rep ) ;
414 u n t i l Terminated or ( rep > ( in i tRep+maxRep−1 ) ) ;
415
416 / / e x p e r i m e n t F i n i s h e d := ( minSize >=p1Max ) and ( para2 >=p2Max )
417 / / and ( para3 >=p3Max ) and ( para4 >=p4Max ) ;
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418 Synchronize ( d i s p l a y S t a t e S t a t i c ) ;
419 inc ( expCount ) ;
420 para4 := para4 + p4Step ;
421 end ;
422 para3 := para3 + p3Step ;
423 end ;
424 para2 := para2 + p2Step ;
425 end ;
426 para1 := para1 + p1Step ;
427 end ;
428
429 experimentFinished := ( para1 >=p1Max) and ( para2 >=p2Max) and
430 ( para3 >=p3Max) and ( para4 >=p4Max ) ;
431 i f experimentFinished then Synchronize ( d i s p l a y S t a t e S t a t i c ) ;
432
433 with controlForm do
434 begin
435 btnStopClick ( controlForm . btnStop ) ;
436 end ;
437 end ;
